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Protection of data in cloud computing including distributed environments is a critical
concern for many enterprises. This study proposes a solution that protects sensitive data
outsourced to a cloud throughout their entire life cycle—both in the cloud as well as outside
of the cloud (e.g., during transmission to or from the cloud). The solution enhances the
existing data protection approach known as Active Bundle scheme, which uses a Trusted
Third Party (ABTTP).
The Active Data Bundle (ADB) was formerly called an Active Bundle (AB). It is a
software construct that encapsulates data, metadata, and a virtual machine (VM). The
metadata includes, among other aspects, data access and data privacy policies for the
ADB’s data. The VM executes and directs ADB active operations on its sensitive data and
metadata, such as enforcement of all ADB policies (included in metadata), integrity selfchecking, evaporation (that is, a partial ADB self-destruction), and apoptosis (that is, a
complete ADB self-destruction). The current ADB implementation relies on a centralized
trusted third party (TTP) server. Using a centralized TTP in ABTTP increases the risks of
many attacks, including side channel and correlation attacks.
Our solution, known as Active Data Bundle using Secure Multiparty Computation
(ADB-SMC), uses: (i) active data bundles (ADBs) for self-protecting data; (ii) ciphertextpolicy attribute-based encryption for fine-grained access control; (iii) threshold RSA to
eliminate the problem posed by centralized TTPs; and (iv) multi-agent systems (MAS) to
reduce network traffic and support fault tolerance. We have implemented a prototype of
ADB-SMC on five hosts and re-implemented the prototype of ABTTP to record

measurements and compare the overhead of the two solutions. The results of performance
tests on our ADB-SMC prototype show that the execution time overhead is acceptable.
The features that distinguish ADB-SMC comparing to previous ABTTP solutions are:
(i) improvement of the creation, dissemination, and trust management of the earlier
implementations; (ii) providing higher security and fault tolerance due to eliminating an
easy target in the form of a single centralized TTP for key management; (iii) implementing
a data access policy to support secure fine-grained access control for ADB data; (iv)
protecting against data loss and reducing ADB dissemination overhead in the cloud by
using secure ADB backup services; and (v) deploying the solution on multiple hosts using
an inter-platform mobility service (IPMS). IPMS is suitable for a distributed environment
since it uses a "one-shot" migration strategy to transfer data and code every time an agent
moves, thus supporting fault-tolerance.
Our solution has a significant impact on protecting privacy in clouds and many other
distributed systems. The effects are noticeable for an application having, among others, the
following needs: (i) full protection of privacy of sensitive data throughout their entire
lifecycle; (ii) full protection of privacy of sensitive output data on untrusted hosts; (iii)
strong data and IDM (identity management) security in clouds and other distributed
computing systems; (iv) fault tolerance; and (v) efficiency due to exploiting parallelism.

Copyright by
Akram Y. Sarhan
2017

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. May Peace be upon you
all. All the praises and thanks be to Allah Almighty, for giving me the strength, confidence,
wisdom, perseverance, autonomy, and high spirit during my Ph.D. journey.
I would like to acknowledge the support and encouragement and express my sincere
respect to my adviser, Professor Steve Carr for his guidance, support, advices, and positive
criticism I received during my doctoral study and research.
I would like to thank my committee members: Professor Elise de Doncker, and
Professor Ikhlas Abdel-Qader for reading my dissertation, and for providing the valuable
time to listen and to read their comments and recommendations to improve the work
throughout all stages of my Ph.D. journey. I would also like to thank Professor Lillien for
his involvement.
I am also grateful to the faculty and staff of the Department of Computer Science for
their teaching and support during my Ph.D. journey. I am incredibly grateful for those of
you who stood by to support me along the way. Dean Susan Stapleton, Dean Houssam
Toutanji, and Professor Marianne Di Pierro.
Thanks to my family members in Saudi Arabia and the United States for their
encouragements and support. Thanks to my community stray cats for boosting my mood,
and helping me to deal with any stressful moment during my Ph.D. Journey.
Akram Y. Sarhan

ii

Preface
This dissertation holds material of the paper titled “An Approach to Identity Management
in Clouds without Trusted Third Parties” [SaLi14]
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1.

INTRODUCTION
Protecting privacy or confidentiality of sensitive data can be seen as one of the primary

challenges in the cloud including distributed environments. Therefore, it has been an active
research area over the past decades. Major advances have occurred in understanding the problem
theoretically and practically. Despite the billions of dollars spent every year on cybersecurity, the
number of breached records in 2015 were more than double that of 2014 as reported by the Privacy
Rights Clearinghouse [VORM16]. A recent report by Yahoo confirmed one of the most significant
cybersecurity breaches ever. Several users data, such as names, email addresses, telephone
numbers, dates of birth, hashed passwords, encrypted or unencrypted security questions and
answers, “associated with at least 500 million user accounts” have been stolen [CNN16].
People may feel reluctant to use their sensitive information in the digital world due to a variety
of factors. One of the problems is providing individuals with the tools to control the privacy of
their personal data and systems. For instance, not all social network services provide tools to
control user privacy. Furthermore, researchers found that not all privacy tools have a built-in
mechanism for obscuring a user’s IP address. Also, privacy tools do not provide full anonymity
and can make their users targets of prosecution. For instance, A VPN can defend against private
corporations’ surveillance, but it cannot make one entirely anonymous [Gold15].
According to the European Commission report, only 26 % of social network users think that
they can control their personal data completely [Euro11]. A study conducted by the University of
California, San Diego, in 2010 examined fifty thousand popular websites and indicated four
privacy violations caused by “web bugs:” cookie stealing, location hijacking, history sniffing, and
behavior tracking. The study showed that 485 popular websites had web bugs, which led to the
disclosure of not only email content but also revealed computer IP address [JJLS10, Nich01].
Users are aware of the existence of various spying cyber tools and are afraid of them [Euro10,
Euro11, GoMy02].
Continued and progressive violations in data security, as well as advances in smart
technologies, drive the need for new techniques to protect sensitive data. Morrow [Morr12]
estimated that over 3 billion new smart devices would be shipped by 2015. Another survey
[Morr12] indicates that more than 80% of workers use personal smart devices for work.
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Information about companies is stored on 47% of employees’ desktops; 41% is stored on their
laptops; 24 % is stored on their smartphones, and 10% is stored on their tablets. Most of these
devices (perhaps except desktops) reside at least, in part, outside of the scope of company privacy
policies and protections. This fact lends to the notion that maintaining confidentiality and security
are growing challenges.
Addressing data protection issues using Active Data Bundle (ADB). Ben Othmane and Lilien
[LiBh08, BeLi09] proposed a solution that claims to provide full protection for sensitive data
throughout their entire lifecycle. The solution, known as an Active Bundle scheme, uses a Trusted
Third Party (ABTTP). The Active Data Bundle (ADB) was formerly called an Active Bundle (AB).
It is a software construct that encapsulates data, metadata, and a virtual machine. The metadata
includes, among others, data access policies, data dissemination policies, data privacy policies,
and integrity self-check specifications [LiBh06, BeLi08, BeLi09, BenO10]. The virtual machine
(VM) executes and directs ADB active operations on its sensitive data and metadata, such as
enforcement of all ADB policies (included in metadata), integrity self-checking, evaporation (that
is, a partial ADB self-destruction), and apoptosis (that is, a complete ADB self-destruction). The
earliest implementation of ADB relied on a centralized Trusted Third Party (TTP) server [LiBh06,
BeLi08, BeLi09, BenO10], and therefore Angin et al. [ABRS10] pointed several drawbacks of the
solution known as ABTTP. Sarhan and Lilien [SaLi14] led further disadvantages found in
[RBBL10, ABRS10] as their solutions relied on trusted dealer and lacked many core features.
This dissertation proposes a new solution that enhances the first implementation called
ABTTP. The solution is fully decentralized; it combines several technologies to protect data
throughout their entire lifecycle. Compared with other solutions that use an Active Data Bundle to
protect sensitive data, our solution has the following advantages. First, it does not rely on a
centralized TTP or trusted dealer for key management. Second, it uses a backup mechanism to
protect ADB efficiently against data loss. Third, it supports fine grain access control for its
encapsulated data. Fourth, it enhances the previous design called ABTTP. In the proposed
solution, each ADB is implemented by a mobile agent A. In addition to using the acronym “ADB”,
we also use notation “ADBA”.
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The contributions in this work are as follows:
1) Proposed a new solution that we call ADB-SMC, which stands for Active Data Bundle using
Secure Multi-party Computation solution. It enhanced the previous ABTTP implementation
as follows:
a) Enhanced ADB creation mechanism.
b) Enhanced ADB dissemination mechanism.
c) Enhanced the destination hosts trust management mechanism used in ABTTP with a
simple trust management subsystem.
d) Replaced centralized Trusted Third Party (TTP) servers for key management [Beli09,
Beli10] with decentralized TTPs to overcome centralized TTP key management
limitations and issues.
2) Used dynamic access control technique, using Distributed Ciphertext-policy attributebased encryption (D-CP-ABE) to support secure fine-grained access control for ADB data.
3) Used secure ADB backup services to protect against data loss and to reduce ADBA
dissemination overhead in the cloud.
4) Presented a solution that protects sensitive data outsourced to a cloud throughout their
entire life cycle—both in the cloud as well as outside of the cloud (e.g., during transmission
to or from the cloud).
5) Presented a sample solution for identity management protection in the cloud.
6) Developed a stand-alone prototype of real implementation using Java agent development
framework (JADE), instead of actual implementation. We demonstrated the practicality of
the scheme by implementing the major solution functions and emulating the complex one.
This chapter includes seven sections. Section 1.1 states the terms used in this Dissertation.
Section 1.2 provides a background information about cloud computing. Section 1.3 provides
motivation for privacy and security in the cloud. Section 1.4 states the research problem and
Hypothesis. Section 1.5 states the dissertation research aims. Section 1.6 provides the scope and
limitations of the Dissertation. Section 1.7 delineates an outline of the proposed solution. Section
1.8 describes the organization of the Dissertation.

3

1.1.

Definitions and Terms

Privacy is the individual’s right to ensure protection against intrusion into his or her personal
life or business affairs, for instance, the protection against any unauthorized publication or access
to individual’s information is considered as individual’s right [Calc90]. People have the right to
determine and control whether their personal information [LoSh92], can be disclosed or not. This
should include the degree to share personal information with others and the level to interact with
the environment [LoSh92, Schi02]. For instance, using an individual's name, portrait, photograph,
or any other intellectual property for the purpose of trade or promoting a product or service without
individual's written or oral consent consider as a privacy violation. Another example is the illegal
gathering of consumer data via their on-line behaviors and interactions.
The focus of this work is privacy and security protection for sensitive data. Computer security
plays a viable role towards the protection of the privacy and confidentiality of data. It focuses on
“ the establishment of appropriate administrative, technical and physical safeguard to ensure the
security and confidentiality of data records and to protect both security and confidentiality against
any anticipated threats or hazards that could result in substantial harm, embarrassment,
inconvenience, or unfairness to any individual about whom such information is maintained ”
[LoSh92].
Individuals and organizations have the right to control the lifecycle of their information
including collection, storage, dissemination, and the entity or personnel allowed to access such
information. Such measures ensure data security and protection [Kiss13]. The lifecycle of data
besides creation and dissemination also includes evaporation (a partial self-destruction) or
apoptosis (total self-destruction) [LiBh06, BeLi08, BeLi09, BenO10].
The term sensitive data refers to “Data that should not be made public” and that should be
kept private [PfPf07]. Personal data are part of sensitive data; they cover all data that should be
kept private or planned to be held on computers or relevant filing systems [Parl98]. For example,
private or sensitive data can be described as follows: attributes or entities (name, birthdate, social
security number, image, or computer program). The protection of sensitive data should necessarily
control the lifecycle and proper use of personal information by third parties (e.g., governments,
business, organizations, etc.,) [Parl98].
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Protecting data throughout their entire life cycle suggests transforming passive data into an
active entity [BenO10]. In this dissertation, we mean by passive data as data that are incapable of
self-deciding or self-protecting itself: data that cannot ensure that the right user can only access
the right information at all times and within the proper context [Sert14].
Smart data files enable data to become active: this process occurs when intelligence is
embedded via an “intelligence engine” into the data, thus making it active and therefore capable
of self-monitoring/self-protecting an information set [BeLi09, BenO10, Sert14].
Self-protecting data can be protected by a certain policy so that they can be accessed at
whatever time by third party applications or hosts [YJLee12]. In information security, the policy
is described as “natural language description of desired system behavior” [LoSh92]. Policy is
defined to describe the lifecycle of data by setting the procedures that can determine the integrity,
security, and availability of data. For example, security policy acts as a set of standards that
facilitates the security services of data [LoSh92]. Security policy can be used to protect data at
different levels. For example, in computer security, a security policy is described as a set of
practices, laws and rules that control the process an organization uses to control, disseminate, and
protect sensitive information [LoSh92]. However, in information security, a security policy is
described as a proposal or strategy implemented by organizations to guarantee the protection of
data in terms of data assurance, or to provide confidentiality, authenticity, and availability
[LoSh92].
Security policy includes the following components: governing policies, end-user policies, and
technical policies. The governing policies are used to answer the “what” security policy questions.
The end-user policy and the technical policies are used to answer the “what, who, when, and
where” security policies questions. However, the “whys” is left to the data owner [Paqu13]. Selfprotecting schemes are equipped with security policies to ensure the proper access of the
authorized user to the right data within the specified context at all times [Sert14]. For example,
by using self-protected data frameworks [BeLi09, Sert14], data owners can set the governing
policies that determine “who” can access and use the data, including “what” information, “when,”
“where,” on “what” device or network. They preserve full management and control of appropriate
access to data [BeLi09, Sert14], that also includes the availability of the data that can be controlled
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using protection operations, e.g., evaporation (a partial self-destruction) or apoptosis (total selfdestruction) [LiBh06, BeLi08, BeLi09, BenO10].
Privacy policy focuses on the purpose of the use of data rather than the actions user execute on
data. Privacy policy specifies access policy that determines the objects to access a given data object
[YaBZ07]. The reference to access policy includes the “requestor identity, grantor identity, a set
of access rights, and a set of constraints” [RyNe00].
Privacy protection cannot be easily achieved using traditional access control models
[YaBZ07], especially since access control sets the procedure to grant or deny particular requests
to acquire and manipulate data and service [Kiss13]. Thus, we rely on a dynamic access control
model such as Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) [Kiss13], rather than traditional access
control models, such as discretionary access control (DAC) and mandatory access controls (MAC)
[Sand93, SaSa94]. We also avoid expensive to implement or outdated access control models
[CoWe13] like role-based access control (RBAC) [SCFC96, FSGK01, OsSM00, KSW03].
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) [Kiss13] relies on a related set of attributes that
describe resources, objects, subjects, initiators, or the environment. Its set of rules describes the
combination of attributes in which access could occur [Kiss13].

Attribute-based encryption

(ABE) is used to enforce securely ABAC policies on data sharing [Jin14]. There are two kinds of
ABE schemes: key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) and Ciphertext-policy attributebased encryption (CP-ABE). Both remove the dependency on TTP

present in identity-based

encryption [Sham85]. CP-ABE scheme embeds the access policy within the ciphertext and
associates the decryption attributes with the private key, whereas in KP-ABE, access policy is
embedded into the user's secret key, and the attributes are associated with the ciphertext.
Decryption in CP-ABE can be done only with entities that satisfy the decryption policy.
ABAC relies on Attribute Authority, which is “a trusted source of data for ABAC decisions”
[JeSC16] that acts as a verifier for the association of attributes to an identity. It is identified by the
Federal Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Policy Authority [Kiss13].
The trust level is used to determine if an entity can gain access to data. Host trust threshold
specifies the required trust level by the Active Data Bundle (ADB) virtual machine (VM) to enable
the ADB.
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Access Privacy Policies—in our scheme uses two methods to specify the privacy policies. Data
access policy based on the required host trust threshold (RTT), and data access policy based on
the host role. RTTlow and RTThigh are used to specify the data dissemination and access policy
based on the required host trust threshold; they define the minimal and maximal trust level required
by the VM to access the ADB.
CP-ABE are used to determine the data access policy based on host role. Data Outsourcing is
a new model to share and store data with trusted entity such that the data owner and trusted entity
storing the data are in two separate trusted domains [DFJP07]. Traditional access control
architecture relies on trusted third party (TTP) to define and enforce access control policies
[DFJP07]. Because TTP is not secure and it can be compromised, we rely on dynamic access
control scheme like CP-ABE. The outsourced sensitive private data can be partially or fully
accessed or authorized to be decrypted by authorized cloud user or cloud host.

1.2.

Background Information On Cloud Computing

This section includes the following: an introduction to cloud computing; cloud computing
advantages and drawbacks, and cloud computing deployment and delivery models.

1.2.1. Introduction to Cloud Computing
Advancements in networking have resulted in introductions of new computing models, such
as grid computing in the early 1990s, or cloud computing in 1996 [Mari13, Wiki15a].

According

to a survey conducted by RightScale in 2014, 87% of organizations were using public cloud
[WEIN14].

Furthermore, a study conducted by Gartner expected that spending on cloud

computing services would exceed $ 200 billion by 2016 [HESS12].
A cloud is made of interconnected computers and virtualized servers that are controlled and
offered as a pool of computing resources. Its management is based on a service-level agreement
(SLA) between users and service providers [VRCL08, VRCL08]. Users are no longer in charge of
maintenance, software services, storage space, network, or servers. All these cloud resources can
be provided as a service, accessed and priced on demand and per usage. For example, they can be
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offered in the form of Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), Infrastructure
as a service (IaaS), Database as a Service (DaaS), and many more deployment models.

1.2.2. Cloud Computing Advantages and Drawbacks
Clouds [ALER15] enable data sharing so that collaborative applications in many domains
(such as health, science, engineering, and business) can perform analysis of shared data sets to
solve diverse problems [Mari13]. However, clouds face many privacy and security challenges. A
recent cloud security study for a one-year period on customer dataset reported 78% attacks on
cloud environments versus 22% on in-house IT infrastructures [ALER15]. The study indicates that
the cloud is more vulnerable to cyber-attacks comparing to in-house IT infrastructure.
The cloud provides workload flexibility, efficiently accommodating computations with huge
peak-to-average ratios. Many other issues—such as fault tolerance, resource management, and
quality of service—become less challenging in cloud computing than in a heterogeneous
environment with uncoordinated resources operated in multiple administrative domains.
In addition, the cloud has changed the way most businesses operate, as the following examples
demonstrate. “[I]t used to take Eli Lilly seven and a half weeks to deploy a server internally,” while
Amazon can provide it within three minutes by using a virtual server [Hill09]. Also, “a 64-node
Linux cluster can be online in five minutes (compared with three months internally)” [Hill09].
Adoption of cloud computing at Sybase has saved the company annually $ 2 million [DaNa15].
Many US government organizations invested in cloud computing to improve their operations,
including NASA, Center for Disease Control (CDC), the Navy's Next Generation Enterprise
Network (NGEN), and the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) [Mari13].

1.2.3.

Cloud Computing Deployment and Delivery Models

This subsection briefly overviews cloud computing deployment models and then discusses
cloud computing delivery models.
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1.2.3.1. Cloud Computing Deployment Models
Private cloud is controlled, owned, and dedicated to a particular private organization. Third
parties might be permitted to control part of the private cloud services through contracting. The
computing infrastructure of a private cloud is hosted on private platforms that cannot be shared
with other organizations. The private cloud can be on-premise, located within the organization or
might be externally-hosted by a third-party, but it is exclusively used and managed by the private
organization. The private cloud is managed only by its owner, the private organization. Eucalyptus,
Microsoft, and VMware are examples of third parties hosting private cloud services [NIRI16,
Mari13, Yegul10].
Public cloud is provisioned and provided for only by a third party vendor or provider selling
the service. Its computing infrastructure is shared among many organizations but hosted at the
geographical location of its provider. Its facilities and computing services are offered from a
remote geographic location to the public as a service over the internet. Amazon Elastic Compute
Cloud (EC2), Google AppEngine and Windows Azure Services Platform are examples of third
parties hosting public cloud services [NIRI16, Mari13, Morr11].
A community cloud is managed by its owner or third party. Its computing infrastructure is
shared by multiple organizations that share common interest or concern, e.g., policy, mission,
security requirements, etc. Industries, such as finance, healthcare, or government, each can have
an individualized, customized community cloud. For example, a community cloud for the financial
organizations could be boosted to offer a need for “ultra-low latency” to execute transactions
related to the stock traders [Mari13, Morr11, Butl12]. The term “ultra-low latency” is used within
capital markets to describe trading at a speed of under one millisecond, so trades profitability can
be increased when they execute faster than their competitors. To show the value that financial
traders put on latency, “a large global investment bank has stated that every millisecond lost results
in $100m per annum in lost opportunity” [Info07].
The hybrid cloud provides computing infrastructures that are composed of one or more cloud
(e.g., public, private and/or community clouds) [NIRI16, Mari13].
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1.2.3.2. Cloud Computing Delivery Models
There are many cloud computing delivery models. Software as a service (SaaS), platform as a
service (PaaS), and infrastructure as a service (IaaS) are the most common three delivery models.
Software as a service (SaaS) provides software and tools to the public as a service. The software
and tools are supplied and managed by the computing infrastructure of the cloud service provider.
The cloud service provider is responsible for managing and maintaining the underlying cloud
infrastructure which includes applications, operating systems, network, and servers. The user
might be offered to control the setting of speciﬁc application conﬁguration. Google Apps and
Salesforce are examples of software as service delivery model [Mari13].
Platform as a Service (PaaS) provides the environment to deploy applications developed by
the consumers using tools and programming language supplied by the provider. The cloud service
provider is responsible for managing and maintaining the underlying cloud computing
infrastructure including network, operating systems, storage, and servers. The user can control the
deployed applications and might be offered to control the environment conﬁgurations of the
application hosting, e.g., sandboxes. IBM Bluemix and Microsoft's Azure are examples of the
platform as a service delivery model [Mari13].
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) provides provisioning service for web servers, storage,
operating systems, and server hosting. The cloud service provider is responsible for managing and
maintaining the underlying cloud computing infrastructure, but the consumer can control the
deployed applications, operating systems, storage, and might be able or offered to monitor some
networking components like the host ﬁrewalls. Amazon Web Services (AWS), Cisco Metapod,
Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute Engine are examples of infrastructure as a service delivery
model [Mari13].

1.3.

Motivation for Privacy and Security in the Cloud

This section reviews privacy and security in cloud computing; then it overviews Cloud
computing threats and recommended protection mechanisms; next, it discusses the privacy and
security challenges in the cloud. Then, it shows the motivation for self-protecting data solution.
Finally it overviews identity management systems in the cloud.
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1.3.1.

Privacy and Security in Cloud Computing

Many types of sensitive information are stored and disseminated in clouds, including personal
identification data, financial data, personal information, usage data, and important equipment IDs
[MaNa12]. All need to be safeguarded.
Protection of security and privacy in cloud environments is needed for both user and service
sides since both clouds, and their users can be malicious [MSLH11, ZYZL12].
Protecting privacy in clouds is more difficult than in traditional computing environments,
because sensitive data may be disseminated and stored over many external computing facilities
[WRLL10], managed by external service providers [DiJG14].
Privacy issues in cloud environment have been extensively studied (e.g., [MPBP13, HAMS13,
Jans11]). Many approaches and strategies designed to deal with privacy issues were introduced,
and many analyses were conducted, including investigations to assess unauthorized access to
sensitive data and to measure privacy losses. Among the proposed privacy solutions there are ones
for identity management, privacy-enhanced protocols, and use of cryptography.

Identity

Management “enables the right individuals to access the right resources at the right times and for
the right reasons” [Gart16]. Privacy-enhanced protocols is a defense mechanism to protect against
information disclosure threats [Ras16]. Cryptography is used to protect the confidentiality and
integrity of sensitive data.
Many privacy and security principles should be used to protect data in the cloud. They include
proper use disclosure and retention, accountability, openness and transparency, and compliance
[TWJZ12, LLCY11]. For example, in a cloud environment, improper disclosure of sensitive data
is considered as the biggest risk. Retention is the control of something. The objective of using
retention is to limit the amount of information kept in the cloud accounts, so data recovery needs,
security policies can be matched, and the cloud storage costs can be maintained in the budget.
Openness in the Cloud means the “exemption from external control, interference or regulation”
[Bake13]. Accountability is the “obligation and/ or willingness to demonstrate and take
responsibility for performance in light of agreed-upon expectations” [UHOR10]. Transparency or
cloud visibility is important in the cloud such that the service should be run transparently regardless
of the infrastructure. Transparency in terms of cost means the cloud provider should provide
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excellent customer service, after any deployment, and never force customers to pay more than for
what they use.
Many privacy mechanisms do not integrate them sufficiently well. In our approach, we strive
to address the majority of them.
Providing privacy and security for clouds, which is a responsibility shared by the cloud
providers and customers [ALER15], becomes more and more difficult. Reasons are twofold. On
the one hand, we experience the growing sophistication of attackers and their collaboration; and,
on the other hand, the increasing volumes of data stored in and distributed via clouds. Detecting a
breach takes on average more than two hundred days [Mand15]. A recent major security data
breach was detected only after two years [Expe15].

Figure 1.1. Cloud Challenges. (cf. [Cate13] )

1.3.2.

Cloud Computing Threats and Recommended Protection Mechanisms

In Table 1.1, we review and summarize most threats that affect the data privacy and security,
so concerning the protection of data in the cloud. We present possible defense mechanism for each
threat.
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Table 1.1. Data Threats and Recommended Protection Mechanism.
Cloud Security
Threat Definition
Protection Mechanism
Threats
Data piracy refers to the illegal  Peer collision detection and
Data piracy
copying, distribution, or use of
content
poisoning
software.
techniques [SMLF09].
Data inference Data Mining is the process of  Place effective Policies and
analyzing large dataset to extract
access control mechanisms
or mining
useful information.
to decide the permission to
mine the data [Comp11].
 Categorizing and splitting
data to multiple levels
based on sensitivity to
increase
privacy
and
minimize
the
risk
associated with mining
[DSBA12].
Masquerade attack refers to a threat  Machine
learning-based
Masquerade
where an attacker uses a false
technique [Sale12].
attacks
identity, such as a network identity
of another one to gain unauthorized
access to personal information.
Sybil attack relates to a threat where  Identity-based validation
Sybil attacks
an attacker uses a false identity to
techniques [Wiki16f].
gain unauthorized access to a
secured system.
Data breach/ Unauthorized release of sensitive,  Encryption
protected or confidential data to an  Access control
data leakage
untrusted environment [Wiki16g].
 Digital Signature
 Tamper-resistance
protocols
Permitting attackers to gain or  Authorization
Information
capture valuable information about a  Privacy-enhanced protocols
Disclosure
system [MSDN16].
 Encryption [Ras16].
Authentication
Denial
of Denial of service attacks refers to a 
threat where attacker attempt to 
Authorization
Service (DoS)
make a system or network 
Filtering
unavailable by flooding it with 
Quality of Service
useless traffic.
(QoS)
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Table 1.1 -Continued
Cloud Security Threat Definition
Threats
Type of known plaintext attack.
Correlation
The attack break stream ciphers
attack
whose keystream is a combination
of the output of several linear
feedbacks shift registers using a
Boolean function. The attack is
exploited due to poor choice of
Boolean function which exploit a
statistical weakness [Wiki16d].
The attack is caused by gaining
Side-channel
information from the physical
attack
implementation of a cryptosystem
to break the system. For instance,
system power consumption, timing
information, sound leaks, or
electromagnetic leaks, can be
exploited to break the system.
Another particular example is to
monitor critical security operations
such as the AES T-table entry, or
modular
exponentiation
multiplicand accesses to recover
the secret key [Wiki16e].
Man-in-Middle A “man-in-the-middle” is an attack
that alters the communication
attack
between
two
parties
communicating with each other. It
occurs
when
an
attacker
clandestinely
intervenes
in
communication between two
parties, who are not aware that a
third party has commandeered their
communication and that they are
no longer dialoguing together
[Wiki16a].
Occurs when developers overlook
VM-Level
critical factors during the coding of
attack
hypervisors.
This
leads
to
vulnerabilities appearing in the
hypervisors used to implement the
cloud. [TrMi11].
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Protection Mechanism
Protect against insecure cipher
by selecting a Boolean function
which
avoids
correlation
attacks [Wiki16d].


Reduce/eliminate the
leaks or release of system
characteristics information.

Remove the association
between the leaked information
and the secret information
[Wiki16e].

PKI mutual authentication
Stronger mutual authentication
[Wiki16a].

Monitoring, Firewalls

1.3.3.

Cloud Privacy and Security Challenges

Many security and privacy challenges are affecting moving into cloud environments, including
the following ones:
1) Assuring security of data outsourced to a cloud is a paramount requirement. 87.5% of users
indicate it as a concern, a number higher than for other cloud issues, such as availability,
lack of interoperability standards, cost, and performance [CCSG10]. Various aspects of
cloud security include data leakage, risk management, storage protection, and identity
management [Jans11]. Another cloud survey indicates that security and privacy are the
major challenges and concerns affecting many users, as shown in Figure 1 [Cate13]. Unlike
what most customers assume, security in the cloud is a shared responsibility [ALER15]
between the cloud providers and clients. Attackers today are more sophisticated to infiltrate
systems by working together in-group, sharing expertise, to reach sensitive data and turn it
into profits. A basic cloud security issue facing a user is whether a public cloud can be used
for sensitive data, or a private cloud (at least for some data) is required. For example, in a
hybrid cloud, with both public and private cloud components, sensitive data can be
processed in a private cloud, and other, less sensitive data can be processed in a public
cloud. Also, by relying on the data presented in these reports [WEIN14, HESS12] it is clear
that the public cloud is used more than ever before, a fact which could indicate a large
attack surface to penetrate sensitive data [ALER15]. Furthermore, SertintyONE [Sert14]
quotes Plunkett as saying “We have to build our systems on the assumption that adversaries
will get in.”.
2) A trust model allows an application to analyze, assess, evaluate, the trust or security
strength of the cloud hosts, applications, and security of services offered by the cloud
providers and their partner's providers. It is also needed to locate shortcomings and to
decide improvements in the cloud infrastructure [ShSa15]. It is used as a scale to setup a
cloud security service. A trust model can be used to evaluate and compute trust values used
to determine overall security strength. Also, due to the large number of cloud users, it is
challenging to establish trust between cloud users and cloud providers on the one hand, and
among cloud users sharing disseminated data via a cloud on the other hand.
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3) Privacy protection is needed in cloud environments on both user and cloud sides since any
user or any cloud can attack the privacy of any other user or any other cloud [ZYZL12].
Protecting privacy in clouds is more difficult than in traditional computing environments,
because sensitive data may be disseminated and stored over many external computing
facilities [9], and managed by external service providers [DiJG14].
Furthermore, privacy breaches are harder to prevent or control in clouds due to the scale of
data dissemination, as well as the scale of data storage and distribution with petabytes of sensitive
information processed in clouds. Furthermore, detecting a breach takes on average more than 200
days [VFTL15]. (e.g., a recent major security data breach that compromised customer’s sensitive
data detected after twenty-four months) [EXPE15].
An essential data protection technique is encrypting it before outsourcing them to a cloud.
Many threats, such as vulnerabilities of cloud servers, VM-level attack1, and phishing attacks could
affect the privacy of the cloud data. For example, a phishing attack on a cloud provider Salesforce
leaked customers’ sensitive data, including customer names and company names, e-mail addresses
and telephone numbers [SEHM15, SWCP07].

1.3.4.

Motivation for Self-Protecting Data

Development of new technologies—such as social networks, location-based services, cloud
computing, ubiquitous computing, and smart devices— results in new privacy challenges and
increases the chances of data leakage and theft. For example, more than 867 million records have
been exposed due to data breaches since 2005 [Sert14].
IT departments do not manage access to the majority of services based on these technologies
(as was the case traditionally) but by individuals. Also, since privacy is part of security [Sert14],
one should be cautious as “The mentality based on firewalls and preventing access to systems has
become outdated” as indicated by Young [Sert14].

1

VM-Level attack occurs when developers overlook critical factors during the coding of hypervisors. This leads to vulnerabilities
appearing in the hypervisors used to implement the cloud. [TrMi11].
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Users could rely on self-protection mechanisms to protect sensitive information from
unauthorized disclosures during dissemination, which should assure that valuable information—
such as intellectual property, confidential user information, and trade secrets—is protected against
malicious activities or accidental loss [Morr12]. A remark made by Dell security panel discussion
indicated that “Protection embedded in data will be more than just a good thing – it will be
mandatory to sustain any credible level of security into the future [Sert14].
It is obvious that the current available data-protection solutions for the clouds are not sufficient.
With this as the focus of this dissertation, the research approach will combine and enhance several
existing techniques to create an integrated and comprehensive data protection mechanism that is
able to support sensitive data in cloud computing and distributed environments throughout their
entire lifecycle.

1.3.5.

Identity Management in Cloud Computing

A strong identity management (IDM) system is needed to assure privacy and security in any
computing system, and clouds are not exceptions. IDM should support via the self-service feature
[HAMS13] users’ management and control of their personal credentials and sensitive information
entrusted to a cloud provider.
In traditional IDM systems, system administration functions are performed by system
administrators. In contrast, in cloud environments, regular users are required to manage resources,
a fact which increases risks. An effective cloud-based IDM system requires an efficient built-in
IDM role control to ensure security with regulations governing data protection including identity
and access control provisioning and de-provisioning, authentication and federation, compliance,
scalability, entitlement and synchronization to help the cloud users [KLSW10, CaYa10]. For
instance, IDM role can determine which actions a user can or cannot perform on the server. It is
created, granted and assigned by administrators.
Identity and access control provisioning within an IDM refers to the managing procedure of
the creation of user accounts and e-mail authorizations in the form of rules and roles, including
provisioning of physical resources. De-provisioning means the procedure to revoke user access
and privileges based on the user status [Gamb12]. IDM authentication in the cloud can be provided
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based on a single factor, two-factor or single sign-on (SSO) authentication. SSO guarantees user
access to the permitted trusted systems/resources within a single session [HAMS13]. Federation
is the procedure of making same user identification data to obtain access to multiple enterprises or
networks of all enterprises in the group [Rous07]. IDM compliant can be created using IDM tools
and procedures. Bigelow [Bige16] quotes Gerken as saying "Compliance is definitely driving
identity management, the need for identity management and the way that people implement
identity management." IDM scalability is essential for organization growth for supporting
hundreds of millions of users [FUSI15]. IDM entitlement considered as a permission slip, for
instance, a user must have an entitlement to grant an account on particular resource [Nove12].
IDM synchronization is an agreement or a process to share data back and forth between the IDM
domain or server and an active directory [redh16]. These control functions are essential for
successful management of authentication and identity between cloud providers and users
[KLSW10].
Diverse cloud-based IDM systems have been presented in the past. Most of them address many
needed functionalities—for instance, authentication, access controls, or authorization—but the
existence of a comprehensive, cloud-based IDM solution that addresses all or most critical cloud
privacy issues is not extant at this time.
There are two common types of cloud-based IDM solutions: centralized IDM systems and
decentralized IDM systems. Centralized IDM systems rely on trusted third parties (TTPs) to
enforce privacy policies. But a TTP becomes a bottleneck and a single point of failure [BenO10,
ABRS10, RBOL10]. Decentralized IDM systems [SaLi14] avoid relying on a TTP for creation and
verification of credentials.

1.4.

Problem Statement and Research Hypothesis

With the high need for computing models like the cloud to enable data sharing, save costs, and
allow multiple parties to perform analysis of shared data to solve diverse problems, comes the need
to propose an approach that protects sensitive data and the identities of their owners/guardians
throughout their entire life cycle (e.g, during transmission to or from the cloud). A guardian is an
entity (either human or not) that accesses data or disseminates them. The owner of sensitive data
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transfers them to a set of guardians. In turn, a guardian may transfer the received sensitive data to
another set of guardians [BenO10]. Over the past few years, several methods protecting sensitive
data have been proposed. However; most of these methods have the following problems: First,
they don’t protect data throughout their entire lifecycle. Second, they rely on centralized TTPs or
trusted dealer for key management which includes key generation and distribution. Centralized
TTPs or trusted dealer is insecure and possess many issues. Third, they don’t protect against any
unauthorized access to sensitive data due to the lack support for data privacy policy. Fourth, they
require adequate trust mechanism to evaluate the target hosts and then enforce data dissemination
policy. Fifth, they don’t protect against data loss in the cloud, and finally, they lack adequate data
disclosure mechanisms which include authentication and integrity checking mechanisms. Also in
term of IDM, there is not a single solution that combines all the needed core features to protect
data and identities in the cloud.
We believe that our ADB-SMC approach addresses the above problem. Therefore, the research
hypothesis for this Dissertation is:
The proposed system, called Active Data Bundles using Secure Multiparty
Computation (ADB-SMC), can protect sensitive data outsourced to a cloud
throughout their entire life cycle—both in the cloud as well as outside of the cloud.
It protects data handled and controlled by third party service providers, including
data stored on untrusted hosts. It supports data security, privacy, and
dissemination policies. It reduces overall dissemination overhead in the cloud.
Discussion of the hypothesis. The proposed ADB-SMC solution optimizes and improves an
earlier implementation of ADB, which so-called Active Bundle (AB) with Trusted Third Party
solution (ABTTP) to avoid the risks of many attacks, including side channel and correlation
attacks, and to eliminate the bottleneck, and single point of failure. It provides higher security and
fault tolerance (including but not limited to gains due to eliminating an easy target in the form of
a single centralized TTP); reduces communication overhead, and controls data access according
to the privacy policy. The scheme uses layering or multiple encryption algorithms to encapsulate
the data and metadata. Layering encryption is defined as the procedure of encoding an already
encrypted plaintext using the same or different encryption algorithm. Layering encryption is
utilized in the scheme as follows: (i) Decentralized CP-ABE is used to encrypt data and their access
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privacy policy, and therefore produces Layer One encryption. Layer One encryption is the
ciphertext that includes the outsourced data and the data privacy policy; (ii) Threshold RSA is used
to encrypt Layer One encryption, its calculated hashed value, and an identification of a hash or
integrity checking algorithm to be used, and therefore produces Layer Two encryption. Layer Two
encryption is the ciphertext that includes the ciphertext generated from the Layer One encryption,
its digest value, and integrity checking function to be used for decryption to provide the guarantee
of untampered ciphertext. The generation of Layer Two encryption is similar to the approach
called Encrypt-then-MAC. (iii) AES is used to create Layer Three encryption. Layer Three
encryption is the final step of encryption and the third step in creating the ADB. It is the ciphertext
that combines the digital signature value of Layer Two encryption, and the data dissemination
policy. The generation of Layer Three encryption is similar to the approach called Encrypt-thenSigned. The three encrypted layers are controlled, enabled, and disseminated using a virtual
machine. The scheme protects its virtual machine with an obfuscation tool called ProGuard. The
key management method that the solution employs relies on interactive and non-interactive key
management protocols using multiple key authorities. Note that Encrypt-then-MAC, and Encryptthen-Sign are approaches to authenticate the encryption, and therefore provide confidentiality,
integrity, and authenticity assurances on the data. In Encrypt-then-MAC, the readable text is first
encrypted, and then a MAC is produced by using a hash function to generate a hash digest value
of the ciphertext. The Encrypt-then-Sign approach concatenates both the encrypted data with their
digital signature. In this approach, the plaintext is first encrypted, and then a digest of the encrypted
text is calculated and signed with a signing algorithm.

1.5.

Dissertation Research Aims

Cloud users are greatly concerned about cloud privacy and security since any new privacy
challenges, which are inevitable in any new technology, increase the chances for data leakage or
theft. If there is no privacy guarantee by a cloud, users might not be willing to use its services
[Ryan11, ZYZL12]. Hence, the motivation of this paper is to provide a solution for protecting
sensitive data outsourced to a cloud throughout their entire life cycle.

20

To this end, we present a solution, called ADB-SMC, which combines and enhances several
existing techniques to create an integrated and comprehensive data protection scheme. The
scheme provides multiple levels of security. It is structured using cascade encryption, which is
beneficial for increasing data security and minimizing or eliminating data breaches. Cascade
encryption or superencipherment is the concept of Layering Encryption, which is the process of
encrypting an already encoded message, such that the resulted ciphertext from one encryption
algorithm is the input of the next one. The scheme uses cascading cipher of three independentlykeyed block ciphers or encryption algorithms which increase data security comparing to single or
double encryption in case a weakness in one of the cipher could allow recovering the encrypted
data [BeRo06, Schn96]. The scheme also protects against the key escrow problem, which can
occur if there is only one authority holding a master key that can decrypt all ADB A’s encrypted
data and metadata. The scheme uses the concept of secret sharing which split key into multiple
shares such that they are generated, distributed, and stored using multiple authorities or servers.
The solution aims to achieve the following objectives:
1) Providing adequate privacy and security for data in clouds, in particular protecting cloud
data against dishonest cloud providers, unauthorized sub-contractors, and dishonest co-tenants
(i.e., other cloud users). This goal will be achieved mainly by using the ADB scheme.
2) Managing access rights to cloud data by using attribute based encryption.
3) Providing assistance for trust evaluations for cloud hosts by using a backup and host trust
service (BHT2) distributed into every cloud provider.
4) Avoiding centralized trusted third parties (TTPs) by using only decentralized TTPs.
5) Reducing in particular dissemination overhead due to a loss of ADBA that had to apoptosize
before reaching their destinations. This goal will be achieved by using backup copies of ADBA.
6) Reducing overhead in one-to-many ADB disseminations by employing evaporation as a
data reduction mechanism besides its usage as a data security mechanism.
7) Balancing privacy and security with data protection requirements on the one hand, and
privacy and security with performance on the other hand.

2

BHT: keeps track of trust levels for the hosts of the cloud.
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1.6.

Scope and Limitations of the Proposed Research

We design and develop a solution to protect data during their entire lifecycle—including
dissemination—without relying on centralized TTPs or trusted dealers. Including the objectives
listed in Section 1.5, the solution focuses on the following threats: unauthorized data disclosures,
unauthorized elevation of data access privilege, unauthorized data modifications, unauthorized
data dissemination, and compromising the anonymity of interacting partners.
There are some limitations in our development of the ADB-SMC that remain outside the scope
of this dissertation and that will be considered as recommendations for future investigation. The
primary limitations are as follows:
1) Our solution of ADB-SMC does not consider many other threats such as data piracy, data
inference or mining, Sybil attacks, masquerade attacks, and denial of service attacks.
Data piracy refers to the illegal copying, distribution, or use of software. Data Mining is
the process of analyzing large dataset to extract useful information. Sybil attack relates to
a threat where an attacker uses a false identity to gain unauthorized access to a secured
system. Masquerade attack refers to a threat where an attacker uses a false identity, such as
a network identity of another one to gain unauthorized access to personal information.
Denial of service attacks refers to a threat where attacker attempt to make a system or
network unavailable by flooding it with useless traffic.
2) Our solution of ADB-SMC assumes that any visited host is secured, i.e., is itself protected
from the visiting data and their enveloping entities (such as ADB); this can be achieved,
e.g., by sandboxing.

1.7.

Outline of the Proposed System

The overall approach proposed here integrates Active Data Bundles (ADBes)—as a general
approach to protect sensitive data; multi-agent systems (MASes)—as an efficient vehicle to
implement decentralized servers replacing centralized TTPs; the RSA Threshold Cryptography
method—as means for secure implementation based on multiparty computation; the attributebased encryption (ABE)—for efficient and flexible access control, and the ProGuard obfuscation
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tool to obfuscate Active Data Bundle. Communication overhead is the result of distributing the
centralized TTP to multiple distributed TTPs, and by interactions of the server’s agents (including
the agent implementing the distributed TTPs).
ADBs encapsulate both data and metadata (including policies), as already mentioned.
Autonomous agents will be employed so that the system components can interact efficiently and
to the trust can be distributed among decentralized multiparty servers. Decentralized attribute
based encryption and threshold cryptography techniques will assist in overcoming the current TTP
key management limitations.
A centralized TTP is vulnerable to several types of attacks and is a single point of failure. Our
approach with using a multiparty solution does not rely on centralized TTPs or trusted dealers. It
provides server fault tolerance. Private key shares are generated and distributed by multiple
servers, and decryption for the encapsulated ADB data is performed in an interactive way using tout-of-k parties.

1.8.

Dissertation Organization

The rest of the Dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the related work which
includes solutions for protecting sensitive data and identities in the Cloud with centralized TTPs
and decentralized TTPs. Chapter 3 introduces the existing components for the solution. Chapter 4
presents the research methodology. Chapter 5 explains the design and implementation of the ADBSMC. Chapter 6 presents the solution proof of concept experimental scenarios. Chapter 7
concludes this dissertation, discusses its significance and expected impacts, and outlines future
work beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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2.

RELATED WORK
This chapter presents the related work used in this dissertation. We first present solutions for

protecting sensitive data in the cloud, and then present solutions for protecting the privacy of data
using a centralized trusted third party server (TTPs). Next, we evaluate solutions used for
protecting privacy by using encapsulation mechanisms. Fourth, we discuss solutions for protecting
data using access control mechanisms. Fifth, we discuss solutions that use multi-agent systems in
clouds. Next, we present solutions that protect identities in clouds using decentralized solutions.
Finally, we compare previous work using active data bundle vs. the contributions of this
dissertation.

2.1.

Solutions for Protecting Sensitive Data in the Cloud

Protecting data in the clouds or P2P systems is critical and differs when compared to protecting
data locally in personal computers [YLLP10]. The reason for this difference occurs because data
in clouds are spread across multiple machines and stored on third party servers, a fact which makes
it vulnerable to attacks; if not appropriately protected, data can be compromised at any time
[YLLP10].
Several solutions have been presented to protect data in clouds. Some rely on centralized
trusted third party servers (TTPs) [ARAF11, ItKC09, BenO10, Perl05a, Perl05b]. Others rely on
decentralized servers [SaLi15, RBOL10, ABRS10, GKLL09]. Some combine both centralized and
decentralized solutions [GKKL10, Pill11]. Still others use alternate self-protecting methods
[SaLi15, SaLi14, RBOL10, ABRS10, GKLL09, SrNa14, LiBh06, LiBh08, LiBh09], while others
rely on attribute-based encryption mechanisms [SaLi15, SaLi14, TLWW15, BiZh15, ChLG16,
YaJi12].
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2.2.

Protecting Privacy with Centralized Trusted Third Parties (TTPs)
Solutions

Several solutions have been developed and successfully applied in a wide range of
confidentiality and data protection domains, but they possess many drawbacks that limit their
effects. For example, several solutions store decryption keys on a single centralized TTP server,
and are thus vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. A “man-in-the-middle” (MITM) attack is an
attack that alters the communication between two parties communicating with each other
[Wiki16]. It occurs when an attacker clandestinely intervenes in a communication between two
parties, who are not aware that their communication has been commandeered by a third party and
that they are no longer dialoguing together. Ates et al. [ARAF11] propose a TTP module for
Identity Management (IDM) system. IDM is defined as the management of individual identities,
authorization, authentication, privileges and roles within or across systems with the goal of
increasing security and productivity while reducing cost, downtime, and monotonous tasks. IDM
is needed to increasing security and productivity, decreasing cost, repetitive tasks, and to ensure
privacy and security in any computing system by enabling the right entities to access the right
resources [Wiki16i]. The model consists of a logical identity proxy, including identity as a service
(IaaS). This module supports the following security features: authentication, authorization,
auditing, single sign-on (SSO), and credential management. The drawbacks of the solution include
the following: (i) Its dependency on a centralized TTP. (ii) Its lack of support for the minimum
disclosure property which is defined as given protocols that are used by a prover to convince a
third party or verifier that some verifiable secret information is known by the prover without
permitting the verifier to know the secret [BrCC88]; (iii) Its lack of protection for sensitive data
on untrusted hosts. Itani et al. [ItKC09] propose a TTP-based solution using a secure cryptoprocessor. The crypto-processor acts as a secure execution TTP, which processes sensitive data.
The scheme is offered as a privacy as a service (PaaS) model to protect processing and storage of
confidential data. It also allows for secure storage, maximizes user control for protecting sensitive
data, and provides feedback services to users in case of changes in the privacy or protection
operations. The authors claim that they are the first to implement a secure crypto-processor in
clouds.
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2.3.

Protecting Privacy Using Encapsulation Mechanisms

In this section, we first review several solutions that protect data using self-protecting
techniques, we then give an overview about active data bundle (ADB) scheme, and then finally
we compare active data bundle vs. other self-protected data solutions.

2.3.1. Self-Protected Data Using Encapsulation Methods
Recent research on privacy has addressed many new issues that have appeared due to
technological advances as well as the lack of proper safeguard mechanisms for them. However,
“An assumption of breach indicates that all networks are vulnerable and that even with current
and new technologies employed, cyber criminals find a way to break through and capture
classified data.” [Sert14].
Since data are the most critical element that could pose a threat to information security, data
privacy/security can be ensured through integrating a proactive protection in a data self-protective
technique. Self-protecting data have gone by many names, for example, the following: “Active
data bundle” [LiBh06, LiBh08], “Smart data” [Sert14], “self-protected mobile agent” [AROr04],
“self-decryption” [SrNa14], and “Self-Destructing Data” [LiBh06, LiBh08, GKLL09, NDCT07,
Perl05a, Perl05b].
Each self-protecting scheme applies a different design and is equipped with different protection
features to ensure data security. However, "A true self-destruction feature continues to be
challenging to provide" [Wate09]. Whether clearly stated as a system requirement or indirectly
assumed, the importance and ability of protecting data by complete deletion have been well studied
and presented as a core need and security goal in several solutions to protect against the presence
of an adversary [RBCa13].

For example [RBCa13], protecting data through the complete

removing of data presented in [BoLi96, LiBh06, LiBh08, TLLP10], self-destructed data presented
in [LiBh06, LiBh08, LiBh09, GKLL09, GKKL10], data deletion presented in [DiWa10], data
securely deletion presented in [DMSM12, BaPr01], data assuredly deletion presented in
[Perl05b,TLLP10, RCTL11], data destruction, presented in [Perl05b, BoLi96,LiBh06, LiBh08];
data sanitization, presented in [SwWe10, KSSX06]; data “erased”, presented in [BoLi96,
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SwWe10]; data “reliably removed”, presented in [SwWe10], data purged presented in [KSSX06,
RCTL11], data being forgotten, presented in [Perl05b, BoLi96]; and finally data revocation;
presented in [BoLi96, TLLP10].
Perlman [Perl05a, Perl05b] presents a centralized self-destructed data scheme solution that is
called the Ephemerizer. The solution claimed to use the concept of self-protecting by data
destruction through the time-based expiration technique. The scheme first encrypts its data and
then encrypts it again, accompanied by decryption keys which use a time-based key that is
managed by a key manager. The drawback of the scheme is the fact that it is insecure, since it
relies upon a centralized trusted third party key manager server to manage the time-based key.
Also, in this scheme, data are never completely removed: in other words, the scheme does not
apply the concept of data deletion as indicated since data and their decryption keys remain only
encrypted, but data would never be deleted if their decryption key expired.
Geambasu et al. [GKLL09], present a decentralized self- destructed data scheme that is called
the Vanish. In Vanish [GKLL09], the process of encapsulating data into a vanish data object
requires the encryption of the data with random key K, then splitting K into key shares using the
threshold secret sharing concept, and finally storing the key shares into n DHT indices. A vanish
data object encapsulates the following: the ciphertext (encrypted data), key L to drive the indices
storing the key shares, the number of shares n, and the threshold K used to create the key. The
decapsulation process in VANISH requires first to extract the key L that locates or accesses the
indices storing the decryption key shares at the DHT. Next, the key shares are reconstructed using
a predetermined threshold K. Vanish uses a default time-based expiration feature implemented in
the Vuze-based system [FPJK07, Vuz16] to apply the concept of data destruction. In the Vuzebased system [Vuz16], the key shares will vanish after eight hours [GKLL09, Pill11]. The scheme
has experienced the following drawbacks:
(i) Sybil attacks threat that can recover secret keys [WHHF10].
(ii) Vanish data are only protected using encryption since it relies on only timeout feature that
can manage the lifecycle of the keys, but not the data. In other words, the scheme does not truly
apply the self-destruction feature to protect its data [Wate09, BenO10, Pill11].
(iii) Vanish uses pre-installed components on the visited host that might be altered by the
visited hosts. Thus, key shares might be compromised [BenO10].
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(iv) Vanish relies on minimal fixed timeout to protect the key shares. Thus, expanding the
lifetime of the Vanish by reproducing key shares and updating old shares is expensive [BenO10,
Pill11].
Geambasu et al. [GKKL10] present a solution called the Cascade, which is built based on
Vanish, and is claimed by authors to improve the Vanish and make it harder for adversaries to
compromise the system, including dealing with Sybil attacks. The solution combines the multiple
key storage techniques into a single approach.
Prashant Pilla [Pill11], presents a solution that combines the principle of centralization used in
[Perl05a, Perl05b] and decentralization used in [GKLL09]. The solution claims to enhance the
Vanish system. The scheme uses Vanish as a base architecture, and relies on managing, storing
and distributing the key shares using centralized (Ephemerizer [Perl05b]) and decentralized (Open
Chord DHT [KaLo07]) techniques. The scheme uses two encryption mechanisms: one to encrypt
the data, and the other to encrypt the secret keys. The scheme is implemented using the following
components: AES [DoRi04], recursive secret sharing [PaKa11, PaKa10, PaKa09, GnKa02];
hashing [Konh10]; and Open Chord DHT [KaLo07]. The processes to encapsulate data using this
scheme are as follows: (i) A request for the encryption key H is sent to the Ephemerizer server to
encrypt the data for time T. (ii) The Ephemerizer generates a calculated hash H where H= (Nt, St)
and stores the following {T, St, IDt}, such that T is the timeout; Nt is a generated random nonce;
and St is a secret; and IDt is an ID. (iii) Ephemerizer uses an SSL connection to send {Ht, IDt,
Nt} to the data owner, then deletes H. (iv) The data owner encrypts the data and sends an
acknowledgment to the Ephemerizer. (v) Ephemerizer selects key L to select n indices into DHT.
(vi) Ephemerizer uses recursive secret sharing on (Nt, IDt) and generates N shares.

(vii)

Ephemerizer scatters the N shares into the DHT indices and sends the access key L and threshold
K to the data owner. (viii) If the requested time to store the data is larger than the DHT’s fixed
timeout, L is stored by the Ephemerizer. Otherwise, L is deleted. (ix) Data owner outsources {L,
C, k} to the targeted hosts, where C is the ciphertext.
The decapsulation process works as follows: (i) the target host receives {L, C, k} and uses L
to drive the key shares indices in the DHT. (ii) The secret and additional secret are reconstructed
using the threshold K; (iii) To decrypt the data, the user at the target host needs to verify the validity
of the shares by sending the values (Nt, IDt) to the Ephemerizer, where time T is checked. If the T
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is found to be expired, the Ephemerizer sends an error messages to the user otherwise, it calculates
and sends H, where H = H (Nt, St). (iv) Finally, data are decrypted using H.
The drawback of the scheme is the partial dependency of sharing the responsibilities over keys
on the centralized trusted third party server (TTP). Issues related to centralized TTP are discussed
next. Active data bundle, as discussed next, overcome issues presented in the previous solutions.

Figure 2.1. Active Data Bundle Structure (cf. [SaLi15]).

2.3.2.

Self-Protected Data Using Active Data Bundle

Lilien and Bhargava [LiBh06] propose the privacy-preserving data dissemination (P2D2)
scheme, which enables an enhanced control of data by their owner. It relies on the ideas of bundling
sensitive data with metadata, an adaptive evaporation (partial self-destruction) of the bundles, in
suspect environments, and an apoptosis (complete self-destruction) of endangered bundles in
dangerous situations. The metadata include privacy policies defined for sensitive data. The goal
of the P2D2 scheme is to encapsulate and protect sensitive data throughout their full lifecycle.
Ben Othmane and Lilien [LiBh08, BeLi09] extended the P2D2 scheme by adding a virtual
machine (VM) to the data-metadata bundle, and thus define the active bundle (AB), as shown in
Figure 2.1. (Now we are using a more descriptive name for AB: an “active data bundle” or
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“ADB.”) It is now the VM, rather than the host visited by the bundle, that applies a set of
operations—such as policy enforcement, access control, validation of integrity, evaporation and
apoptosis—to data protected by the ADB. For example, the VM apoptosizes data when the trust
level of the host visited by the ADB is below a required trust threshold.
The ADB scheme was implemented with a trusted third party (TTP), resulting in the solution
named ABTTP, which relies on a centralized TTP server [BeLi08, BeLi09, BenO10]. Ben
Othmane and Lilien [BeLi09, BenO10] and their co-authors [RBOL10, ABRS10] observed that
using a centralized TTP increases the risks of many attacks, including side channel and correlation
attacks. Therefore, Ben Othmane and Lilien indicated that this solution is only the first in a series
leading to a fully distributed solution that requires no TTPs.

2.3.3.

Self-Protected Data Using ADB vs. Other Encapsulation Methods

In the previous subsections, we reviewed several self-protecting solutions and presented their
drawbacks. In this subsection, we describe the main shortcomings of these solutions when
compared to active data bundle (ADB). Next, we discuss the practicality of ADB in protecting
data compared to the reviewed self-protected schemes.
(i)

Active data bundle [SaLi15, SaLi14] and the Vanish [GKLL09] are both decentralized
solutions that can be applied in peer-to-peer or cloud-based systems. Both use the idea
of self- destructed data to protect their data. Both schemes have presented solutions that
use the concepts of threshold secret sharing techniques [Sham79] and key expiration
time. However, Vanish does not support the idea of full disappearance of data since its
primary objective is to increase the privacy of data through relying on key shares
disappearance in the DHT [Pill11]. ADB not only improves data privacy, but fully
protects data privacy, so ADB supports the full removal of data by being equipped with
a truly self-destruction feature if its bundle is exposed to dangerous situations.

(ii)

Active data bundle appears to be more practical in protecting data throughout their
entire lifecycle when compared to other solutions. It does not rely on a timeout
mechanism or put the burden on the keys to assume the full destruction of data; it is
equipped with operations that fully destroy, without a retrievable trace and in a clean

30

way, all its contents. Thus, data protected using ADB are protected any time throughout
their lifecycle. In [SaLi14] we presented a solution that suggests using time and
locations attributes to increase the protection of sharing data, but that does not consider
the time-based expiration technique as a fully effective mechanism that can guarantee
the full protection of data. Solutions such as [Perl05a, Perl05b, GKLL09], minimize
the possibility of compromising the data through configuring a time limit or expiration
time technique on the keys [Pill11]. Such solutions [Perl05] seem invisible and cannot
be practical in P2P systems because they either fully rely on encryption methods or put
the burden of protecting the data on the keys, factors which pose a serious threat. In
this digital data era, where almost everything is digitalized, protection using the data
destruction technique is an important feature to ensure the full destruction of data, if
endangered. Data might be recovered, even if keys are lost. For example, a cloud
service provider might be able to access all data and keys, and therefore, decrypt the
data [Pill11]. Furthermore, Ephemerizer and Vanish have exhibited other issues, since
they do not protect as promised [Wate09, GKLL09, WHHF10], or are impractical
[Perl05]. Note that relying on a time-based approach to safeguarding the data can
minimize the possibility of attacking the data, but does not ensure the full destruction
of data after the timeout [Pilla11].
(iii)

Active data bundle metadata stores host trust policies to verify the trustworthiness of
their destination, and it only disseminates its sensitive data to the target host if it
demonstrated an acceptable trust level.

(iv)

Active data bundle uses a verification mechanism to verify the integrity of its encrypted
data at the destination. There is no transfer of the decryption keys (key shares) unless
its protected payload integrity proved to be uncompromised.

(v)

Active data bundle metadata store dynamic access control policies to enable the access
and share of data to only authorized users, so only authorized users can decrypt the
data.

(vi)

ADB, in its recent work, fully relies on a decentralized solution. It does not rely on
centralized TTPs [BeLi08, BeLi09, BenO10] or trusted dealer [RBOL10, ABRS10] to
manage its keys.
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Both Ephemerizer and the Vanish become useless after a timeout since they can no

(vii)

longer be accessed after their key shares disappear. Active Data bundle uses a backup
image mechanism that can work efficiently against data loss.

2.4.

Protecting Data Using Access Control Mechanisms

Sensitive data can be protected through access-restriction techniques. Abbadi et al. [AbAl08]
published a solution that protects data from being leaked in case an adversary is permitted to access
the data. In this approach, sensitive data are accessed based on an authorized domain of devices
managed by a security administrator. New devices can join the domain only from within the
organization. Each authorized device gets a pair of keys, one for encryption and the other for
decryption, managed by a trusted master controller (a software agent) and stored in a protected
storage. A crucial feature of this approach is dissemination restriction for unprotected data. Its
drawback is that it does not restrict ways in which authorized users can manipulate data.
Another approach presented by the same authors [AlAb08] is based on a trusted computing
platform which assures that encryption keys are not accessed by an external device. Sensitive data
dissemination is protected via a VPN connection and controlled via a software agent, which
prevents data dissemination to unprotected hosts or to hosts that are outside of the authorized
domain.
Yasuhiro et al. [KiSa02] protect against sensitive data leakage by encrypting them and
authorizing their disclosure only to authorized users. Two steps control the operation of this
approach: the download and view steps. In the download step, accessing, encrypting or controlling
data can be managed through a smart proxy and a database that controls user privileges. In the
view step, controlling displaying part of frame page can be managed through ActiveX control
embedded into Internet Explorer. The download step controls accessing, viewing or decrypting the
encrypted data. For instance, users authorized to view sensitive data can be restricted to only
printing or saving these data. The drawback of this approach is that the print-screen is not fully
protected.
We observed that most solutions use existing access control mechanisms that are either
traditional access control models [YaBZ07, Sand93, SaSa94]; outdated; expensive to implement
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[CoWe13, SCFC96, FSGK01, OsSM00, KSW03]; not fully flexible; and applied only within
specific (and thus quite limited) domains. In our research, for protecting data we rely on a dynamic
access control technique using ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [BeSW07].
CP-ABE is an encryption with a hidden policy scheme, in which the access policy is embedded
within the ciphertext, and the decryption attributes are associated with the private key. The scheme
was enhanced in many ways [YuRL10, YuRL08, NiYO08, Wate11, GJPS08, KaTS07, ChNe07].
We design our solution using a decentralized version of CP-ABE [LeWa11]. More details are
presented in Chapter 5.

2.5.

Using Multi-Agent Systems in Clouds and Distributed Environments

According to Tali [Tali14], multi-agent systems (MAS) characterize a distributed computing
model with multiple agents interacting intelligently. Lang et al. [LaOs99] list seven reasons why
mobile agents can be considered a good approach: they include mobility, asynchronicity,
autonomy, persistency, reduction of network traffic or bandwidth requirements, protocol
encapsulation, robustness, and fault tolerance. The main purpose of MAS is to solve complex
problems by a decentralized solution in which multiple agents facilitate the solution thanks to their
intelligent interactions and cooperation. Agents can run on parallel or distributed computers to
offer high performance, including fast execution time, in solving large complex problems. Since
both cloud computing and multi-agent systems are distributed computing models, integrating them
can be beneficial especially for the efficiency of resource management (including data storage and
service delivery).
Ming et al. [MYJY14] propose a MAS-based approach for cloud resource management, in
which cloud user tasks are assigned to individual agents. The authors claim that integrating MAS
with cloud resource management can reduce the execution time by 48% compared to traditional
cloud resource management solutions. They prove the correctness of their approach using the
CloudSim 1.0 modeling and simulation framework.
Talib et al. [TARM10] propose a cloud-based data security framework and architecture
founded upon a secure MAS architecture. Their goal is providing cloud storage that is able to
contend with security issues. The scheme consists of two layers: the agent layer and the cloud
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data storage layer. The MAS architecture consists of the following agents: User Interface Agent
(UIA); User Agent (UA); DER3 Agent (DERA); Data Retrieval Agent (DRA); and Data
Distribution Preparation Agent (DDPA). The scheme allows for the specification of security
policies needed to assure cloud data correctness, confidentially, integrity, and availability.

2.6.

Protecting Identities in Clouds Using Decentralized Solutions

Ranchal et al. [ABRS10] propose an IDM system that is independent of TTPs. The scheme
uses ADB [BeLi09] as a sensitive data encapsulation mechanism to protect against untrusted hosts,
and it combines multiparty computation and predicate encryption to provide secure authentication
without disclosing the plaintext credentials. The drawback of the proposed IDM system is reliance
on a trusted dealer. In addition, it lacks several core IDM functions, such as assuring access rights
or delegation of user credentials.
Angin et al. [ABRS10] propose an entity-centric IDM solution for cloud computing, called an
IDM wallet. It uses the ADB for protecting privacy, the zero-knowledge proof for anonymous
identification, and Fiat and Shamir’s [FiSh87] identification scheme for protecting digital identity.
The solution acts as a mediator during the interaction between the cloud services and entities. It
addresses common major limitations and issues found in other approaches related to the protection
of digital identities, such as Windows CardSpace [AlMi09] and Open ID [Open10]. A unique
feature of the solution is assuring the limited disclosure property (to minimize the risk of
information leak during authentication). However, it does not provide any fine-grained access
control mechanism or credential management.
Choudhury et al. [CKSL11] propose a decentralized IDM solution independent of TTPs. The
scheme assures strong entity authentication, achieved in two authentication phases: the first phase
uses smart-card-based bilinear pairings, and the second phase uses passwords. The framework
supports credential management, the minimum disclosure property (since identities are transmitted
via two authentication-isolated channels), and identity federation or single sign-on (to avoid
redundancy and eliminate the need to store identities at multiple places). Distribution of credentials
3

DER Agent might stand for Distributed Energy Resource Agent (its meaning is not explained at all by the authors
either in the referenced paper or other papers we checked); in such a case, this might be a “legacy” name inherited by
general-purpose MASes from a specific-application type, namely power grid applications.
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relies on smart cards for storing some information and relies on a one-time key sent by the server
to the mobile client via SMS. The drawbacks of the solution include a lack of authorization and
no protection for sensitive data on untrusted hosts.
Sarhan et al. [SaLi14], propose an IDM system that is independent of TTPs and trusted dealer.
In a co-authored paper, they reviewed some of the privacy and security recommendations, as well
as considerations posed as problems by Ben Othmane and Lilien [BeLi09, BenO10] and Habiba
et al. [HAMS13]. They then review some common cloud-based IDM solutions and compare them
based on two major criteria: (i) support for centralized or decentralized trust management; and (ii)
support for built-in IDM features. The paper highlighted the advantages and disadvantages of each
IDM model, and addressed issues presented in [RBOL10, ABRS10].

2.7.

Related ADB Work vs. Contribution of this Dissertation

This section reviews work related to protecting data using ADB. Then, it contrasts,
contributions of others with contributions of this Dissertation.

2.7.1.

ADB for Protecting Identities

Ranchal et al. [RBOL10] and Angin et al. [ABRS10] propose two identity management (IDM)
solutions that use ADBs to protect sensitive data. Both schemes do not rely on trusted third parties
(TTPs), but lack many core IDM functions, and are not fully decentralized. In our earlier paper
[SaLi14], we sketch a fully decentralized cloud-based IDM scheme that addresses major
limitations and issues found in Refs. [RBOL10, ABRS10].

2.7.2.

ADB for Protecting Data in Mobile Computing

Angin et al. [Angi13] present a framework for offloading mobile cloud computing. The
solution uses ADBs to provide tamper resistance protecting mobile code and data offloaded to the
cloud. The scheme relies on two ideas for self-protecting data: 1) using ADBs and 2) Using
dynamic verification of software integrity.
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Bhargava et al. [BARL12] present an approach that secures dissemination of data in mobile
peer-to-peer networks of aerial vehicles (AVs). The disclosure of data in this solution relies on the
trustworthiness of a node and data source, as well as destination matching policies. The solution
relies on ADBs to secure data disseminated across AVs and evaluates the solution with a
simulation using JADE.

2.7.3.

ADB Applications

Salih et al. [SaLi12, SaLi11] propose a solution for protecting the privacy of electronic
medical/health records (EMRs/EHRs) for patients in pervasive healthcare monitoring. The
solution uses ADBs and intelligent agents. It improves the early implementation of an ADB-based
scheme named ABTTP [BenO10] as follows: (i) it adds an algorithm that evaluates the so-called
privacy policy inclusion between two policies (including policies of an ADB and policies of the
host it visits); and (ii) it replaces TTPs with intelligent agents.
Ranchal et al. [RaBh13] use ADBs and TTPs to protect the confidentiality of shared
information for product lifecycle management (PLM) systems in supply-chain management. This
approach is flexible in protecting any product information shared among organizations that own
data and their partners. It addresses limitations imposed by the current PLM protection solutions,
which can protect PLM data only within an organization, but not among different organizations.

2.7.4.

Previous ADB Work vs. Contributions of This Dissertation

We have analyzed the previous ADB scheme implementations, and found that the following
changes would be needed to improve the implementation:
e) Replace the destination hosts trust evaluation mechanism and trust request design used in
ABTTP, which relies on a centralized TTP [Beli09, Beli10], with a dynamic trust mechanism
that manages the cloud host reputation database, and is maintained by the backup and host
trust service (BHT). In ADB-SMC, ADB disseminates to the target hosts only if learned that
the target hosts are safe. Details about how this could be done discussed in Chapter 5.
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f) Replace centralized trusted third party (TTP) servers [Beli09, Beli10] with decentralized
TTPs to avoid many attacks, including side channel and correlation attacks. We expect
additional but acceptable communication overhead due to the following: (i) distributing the
function of centralized TTP to multiple decentralized TTPs, and; (ii) interactions of the
server’s agents (including the agent implementing the distributed TTPs).
g) Use dynamic access control technique, using ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption
(CP-ABE) to support secure fine-grained access control. Previous ADB work suggested is
not fully flexible and is expensive to implement access control mechanism [CoWe13,
SCFC96, FSGK01, OsSM00, KSW03].
h) Use secure multiparty computation (SMC) for overcoming the current centralized TTP key
management limitations. A centralized TTP is vulnerable to several types of attacks, and is
a single point of failure. Our approach does not rely on centralized TTPs or trusted dealers.
Every player, which has an input to a function f, acts as a dealer and shares its secret input
with other players. SMC provides server fault tolerance. Consequently, the private keys are
generated and distributed by multiple servers, and the decryption for the encapsulated ADB
data is performed in an interactive way using a threshold t-out-of-k parties.
i) Use secure ADB backup services for every service provider to reduce ADBA dissemination
overhead in the cloud. Using a backup server will reduce the chances of losing ADBA, and
thus, this significantly reduces dissemination penalties that might be caused if ADBA would
need to be recreated from the originating host. It should be noted that many solutions for
protecting sensitive data, which are claimed to be decentralized (e.g., [RBOL10, ABRS10]),
are not fully decentralized and still rely on trusted dealers.
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3.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In this chapter, we introduce the methodology for controlling and investigating the proposed

solution. We first devise the abstract model for the ADB-SMC solution. Next, we present the
system analysis phase, then we introduce the system design phase. Finally, the chapter presents
the conclusion subsection.

Figure 3.1. The High-Level View of the Research Process.

3.1.

Devising the Abstract Model for the ADB-SMC Solution

This section briefly overviews a formal Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) methodology used for
the analysis and design of the proposed solution. Then, it presents the ADB-SMC planning phase.
Finally, it presents the methodology assumptions.
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3.1.1.

Research Methodology

The field of agent-based software engineering is a new research area in software engineering
and the advancement of new object-oriented programming. Thus, in the past few years, many
agent-based software methodologies have been proposed for the guidance of developing multiagent systems. For example, Gaia [WoJK00], MaSE [DeLo04], ADELFE [BGPP02], MESSAGE
[EKCG01], and Tropos [BPGG04] are agent-based methodologies that have been proposed to
investigate the analysis and design of multi-agent based solutions.
Our proposed solution uses JADE as the underlying agent development framework, so we are
using a formal methodology [NiCB06], explicitly developed to be used as a guideline for JADEbased solutions. The high-level view of the research methodology [NiCB06] covers the analysis
and design phases and follows a sequence of logical steps in both phases with the possibility of
overlap.

3.1.2.

Planning Phase

We investigated the problem using a combination of quite diverse methods and techniques,
most prominently the ones described in this section. The high-level view of the research process
is outlined in Figure 3.1.
We consulted the literature, analyzed the problem, then we have made a rational decision on
using an agent-based solution as the best option to implement the proposed decentralize solution.
Next, we investigated many solution components and evaluated them. Finally, we planned to select
and filter the solution components according to the following requirements:
(i)

Provide full protection of privacy and security of sensitive data throughout their entire
lifecycle.

(ii)

Assure a robust and secure key management, one that prevents key loss and protects
against side-channel attacks. This can be achieved through a solution component that
can avoid centralized TTPs and trusted dealer for key management and exploit
parallelism for efficient key shares and data dissemination.
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(iii)

Provide higher security, server fault tolerance, high performance, decentralized control,
protocol encapsulation, mobility, and reduce network traffic and communication
overhead.

(iv)

Provide a high level of expressiveness, fine granularity, confidential access decisions
on data, flexible data sharing, efficiency, and enforce access policies on the data to be
shared and distributed without the need for a centralized TTPs.

(v)

Provide efficient and flexible distributed storage to store key shares, such that they can
be referenced with known names and accessed speedily.

(vi)

Provide a flexible and effective method that reduces the chances of losing data in the
cloud.

The ADB-SMC system uses multi-agent development and Multi-Agent-Based Simulation
(MABS) tools since our solution is a decentralized solution. We use the development tool to
develop a stand-alone prototype of real implementation, instead of the actual implementation. The
solution scenarios simulate the decentralized interaction among the different system entities. The
performance overhead caused by the interaction is measured using the MABS tool.
In the beginning, the system will prompt users with a GUI dialog box and ask the user to enter
information and select the file to include the outsourced data. Next, the system will interact with
the system components to encapsulate the data within an agent, and then the agent will take over
and interact with the remaining different system components. More details are discussed in turn.

3.1.3.

Methodology Assumptions

The methodology we customized to fit our solution assumes the definition of agent as
presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4. It assumes JADE as a development tool and “Agent.GUI”
as tool of simulation. The organizational structure of the system does not expect non-emergent
behavior at runtime. By use of the term emergent behavior, we refer to “any behavior of a system
that is not a property of any of the components of that system. That is, a property that emerges due
to interactions among the components of a system, as mentioned below” [WaCu16]. The target
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domain of the system is data privacy and security. We consider the weaker notion of agency

4

when building our system; our system does not support strong notation of an agent 5. Our overall
definition for agent, besides the information presented in Chapter 3, is as follows:
“agents reside on a platform that, consistent with the presented vision, provides the agents
with a proper mechanism to communicate by names, regardless of the complexity and nature of
the underlying environment (i.e. operating systems, networks, etc).”

Figure 3.2. ADB-SMC System Analysis Phase Steps [NiCB06].

3.2.

System Analysis Phase

This section analyzes the ADB-SMC system, so a sufficient level of detail is presented before
moving to the design phase. It presents the ADB-SMC system scenarios. Then, it starts analyzing
the system requirement by giving the system use case diagram. Next, the agent diagram is created
after applying a set of rules. Then, the tasks table is created relying on both the agent types
determined in the agent diagram step, and also a set of rules. Then, the agent relation diagram is
created depending on the agent acquaintances identification. Finally, the agent deployment

4

The weaker notion of agency means software-based with the following characteristics Autonomy, Reactivity,
Pro-activeness, and Social ability [NiCB06].
5 The strong notion of agency extends the weaker notion by advocating additional humanistic, mental characteristics like belief,
desire, and intention [NiCB06].
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diagram is presented. Figure 3.2 shows the ADB-SMC system analysis phase steps. The analysis
details are described in turn.

3.2.1.

Scenario Analysis

We present a secure data outsourcing scenario, where a data owner wants to outsource data to
cloud users. The proposed solution should be capable of accomplishing the following tasks:
1) The ADBA can protect sensitive data outsourced to a cloud throughout their entire life
cycle—both in the cloud as well as outside of the cloud.
2) The ADBA is equipped with a protection operation that fully destroys, without a retrievable
trace and in a clean way, all its endangered contents.
3) The ADBA is equipped with a protection operation security service that evaporates sensitive
data when the host trust level is insufficient. More details are presented in Chapter 5.
4) The ADBA is responsible for communicating with the system entities to compare the data
required trust threshold and the host trust levels and then decide its dissemination, including
activation of its protection operations.
5) The ADBA requests positive integrity verification on its payload in order to enable itself at
any host.
6) The ADBA provides dynamic access control to its sensitive data, so only authorized users
can decrypt the data.
7) The ADBA relies on decentralized TTPs to store and manage the decryption keys.
8) The ADBA communicates with keys-share authorities to request encryption, signature,
verification and decryption keys to protect its payload (data and metadata).
9) The ADBA communicates with the host trust provider to request the cloud host trust level.
10) The ADBA supports higher security and fault tolerance.
11) The ADBA is responsible for minimizing system overhead, and minimizing data loss by
creating an image that is stored in a backup server near the cloud hosts.
12) The ADBA is in charge of disseminating its payload to the cloud hosts.
13) The ADBA is responsible for reporting its activities to an audit server.
14) The ADBA is responsible for informing its stored image to resume its operations in possible
alternative cloud host if endangered, and before it apoptosizes itself.
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15) The ADB-SMC system entities should be able to respond to ADBA requests, such as ADBA
identities, host trust level, etc.
The assumptions of ADB-SMC system are as follows:
1) The service should be accessible to a data owner through a client agent service which could
be a desktop or mobile application. It is also assumed that the cloud service provider will
support the data owner with information related to the host trust level information.
2) The data owner can determine the degree of trust to disseminate the data. It also assumes
that the outsourced data are self-protected and can be disseminated to only those hosts
identified by the data owner. It also assumes that a copy of the protected data might be stored
temporarily in a temporary location in the cloud whenever targeted cloud hosts show some
risks.
3) The JAVA Bouncy Castle Crypto, Paillier Encryption, and Java Pairing-Based Cryptography
APIs provides ADBA payload (message) protection.
4) ADBA persistence services to freeze and store ADBA images are provided by the JADE
persistence service API.
5) The JADE Mobility service API provides ADB-SMC inter-platform mobility service.
6) ADB-SMC system performance measurement is provided by the JADE extension MABS
API.

Figure 3.3. Use-Case Diagram Between the DO, the KA, the KS, and the DHT.
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3.2.2.

Use Cases

In this subsection, we present the system use cases to capture the functional requirements of
the multi-agent system. Use cases offer one or more scenarios to demonstrate the way the system
interacts with the end user or with another system. It also shows the way the system entities interact
to accomplish a specific goal.
The ADB-SMC system use cases are presented using Unified Modeling Language (UML)
[UML16]. Use cases and use-case diagrams are used to create an initial list of ADB-SMC expected
interactions scenarios. For example, the following use-case diagrams show the relationship
between the data owner, the key-share authority server, the key-share servers, the backup and host
trust server, and the cloud users, respectively.
Figure 3.3 shows a UML use-case diagram between the data owner and the key-authority
server, and key-share servers. The goal of this use-case is to capture the functional requirements
between the interacted entities and to present the interaction scenario among the mentioned
entities. The use-case demonstrates how a data owner should interact with the key-share authority
server, and how the key-share servers should communicate with the key-share authority servers. It
indicates when the data owner requests keys from the key-share authority and should include a
data security code with the request. The data security code should determine the level of protection
needed for encapsulating and decapsulating the ADBA. The request is delegated, including the
name or location of the key-share server ids. For instance, a particular security code could mean
that the data owner demands a high protection level and, thus more key-share servers should
be involved in generating, managing, and delivering the key shares. The key-share servers, when
storing or pulling up the key shares, should include or locate the indices storing the decryption key
shares in the DHT. Finally, the key-share servers should response to the request, including the
required key shares.
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Figure 3.4. Use-Case Diagram Between DO, Cloud User, BHT Server and Audit Server.

Figure 3.4 shows a UML use-case diagram between the data owner, the cloud user, the host
trust backup and the audit server. It shows another scenario about how a data owner should interact
with the host trust and backup provider or server, the cloud user, and audit server or provider. The
data owner should include host identification information when requesting host trust level
information from the host trust and backup provider. The host trust and backup provider, in
response to the data owner, should include the trust level for the indicated host. The data owner
compares the received trust level value with the required trust threshold to access the data.
Therefore, the result of the comparisons should include one of three responses : 1. high to indicate
the ADBA and can include ADBA migration request; 2. sufficient low should include “evaporate
data request”, which also should include a request for the audit server to record the data
evaporation event; 3. the third possible response from ADBA, low should include a request to
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destroy the data, which also should include a request for the audit server to record the destruction
event of the data. More description of the system components is detailed in Chapter 5.

Figure 3.5. Agent Digram for ADB-SMC Case Study.

3.2.3.

Agents Types Identification

This subsection presents the ADB-SMC agent type identification and agent diagram. We
follow the methodology rules which guide us to add one type of agent per user, device, or resource.
Figure 3.5 shows the agent diagram for ADB-SMC case study. There are four users or resources.
Thus we identify five agent types: ADB agent (ADBA), Trust level agent (TLA), Key-share
Authority agent (KAA), Key-share server agent (KSA), Audit Agent (AA).
We represent agent types by circles, users that interact with the system by UML actor symbol;
resources that must interact with the system by rectangles; and acquaintances that depict an arrow
representing the interactions of the linked elements. The agent diagram shows only acquaintances
between agents, resources or users; thus, the diagram does not demonstrate an agent-agent
interaction. For instance, an interaction between the KAA and the KSA is not shown in this diagram,
but this will be explained in the agent relation diagram in Subsection 3.2.5.
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3.2.4. Agent Tasks Identification
In this subsection, we show the agent tasks table for the ADB-SMC case study. The agent tasks
are driven from the system use cases. Table 3.1 shows the agent types and their tasks. To indicate
explicitly that in our solution each component is implemented by a mobile agent A, in addition to
using the acronyms “KA, KS, BC, TL, A” we also use notations “KAA, KSA, BCA, TLA, AA”.

Table 3.1. Tasks Table for ADB-SMC Case Study.
Agent Type
ADBA

Tasks
1) Send request for collection of key shares from data owner
2) Determine Metadata
3) Let data owner identifies data required trust thresholds values
4) Let data owner determines data privacy access policy
5) Encrypt data and metadata
6) Calculate hash value for encrypted data and privacy access policy
7) Embed calculated hash value and algorithm for calculating hash
8) Sign ADBA data and metadata
9) Send request for Host H trust information from data owner
10) Compare target host trust value with the data required trust
thresholds values
11) Decide ADBA action and Dissemination based on trust
information
12) Disseminate ADBA to the backup and host trust server
13) Disseminate ADBA to cloud Host H.
14) Report audit information to the audit server
15) Evaporate ADBA
16) Apoptosized ADBA
17) Verify ADBA
18) Decrypt ADBA
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Table 3.1 - Continued
Agent Type
KAA
KSA
BCA

TLA
AA

Tasks
Response to key shares request from ADBA
Delegate key shares request to KS agents
Response to key shares requests from KAA
Response to key shares requests to ADBA
Response to ADBA store request from ADBA
Save serialized image of ADBA in backup database.
Manage database of serialized ADBA images.
Manage database of TH trust level (THTL).
Response to ADBA request for host trust level information
1)
Response
to ADBA request for storing audit information
Record ADBA activities

Figure 3.6. ADB-SMC Agent Relation Diagram.

3.2.5.

Agent Acquaintances Identification

This step presents the interaction among ADB-SMC agents. Figure 3.6 shows the ADB-SMC
system agent relation diagram. It includes six agent types, each represented by a circle. A UML
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actor symbol represents the people that must interact with the system. Rectangles represent the
external systems or resources that must interact with the system. The acquaintances are represented
by an arrow linking instances which indicate that the elements will have to interact with the system
while the system is in operation.
Figure 3.6 shows ADBA has acquaintance relations with the following agents: the TLA; the
KAA; the KSA; the BCA; and the ADBA image and an acquaintance relation with KSAS.
The ADBA has an acquaintance relation with the TLA because it requires information, such as
cloud host trust level, to securely disseminating its payload (data and metadata). The trust level
information is stored in the host trust provider’s database and made available by the relevant TLA.
Similarly, the ADBA has an acquaintance relation with the KAA since the KAA manages some KSA
that are responsible for delivering the required ADBA identities to the ADB VM. Also, the ADBA
has an acquaintance relation with the KSAs because the required ADBA identities stored in DHT
are accessed by the KSAs. The figure also demonstrates acquaintance relations with the BCA that
manages a database of serialized backed up ADBA that can be triggered if needed.

Figure 3.7. ADB-SMC Agent Deployment Diagram.

49

3.2.6.

Agent Deployment Information

Figure 3.7 presents the agent deployment diagram for the ADB-SMC case study. It shows the
domain in which the system’s physical host agent will be deployed. The agents are deployed on
five network hosts.

3.3.

System Design Phase

In this section, we present the system design details. The goal of this phase is to realize
adequate design details to transition to the implementation phase.

3.3.1.

Agent Splitting

This step checks the agent types produced in the ADB-SMC agent diagram and determines if
any need to be split. It is an essential step that tends to analyze the design of the system to deal
with the system efficiency, complexity, and agent communications. Note that we have five
functionalities that are provided on one machine and, therefore, we need five agents. Our design
splits the functionality of agent type KSA to be provided by multiple agents determined by the data
owner.
Our system design proposes to deliver key shares to ADBA using various key-share agents, so
there is a good reason to split agent type KSA. The goal of splitting the agent KSA task to be
performed by multiple KSAs is to increase the system security as each KSA type is responsible for
delivering one or fewer key shares.

3.3.2. Agent Interactions Specification
This step produces an interaction table from the tasks table provided in the analysis phase. The
focus is on the tasks related to the acquaintance relation among agents. The design phase focuses
on the JADE platform, so we looked into the JADE platform features and incorporated them into
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the design. To specify agents’ interactions and produce the interaction table, the following need
to be addressed:
i) Name of the agent type that initiates the interaction from the task tables presented at the
analysis phase.
ii) An interaction FIPA protocol [FIPA02] that match the agents’ interaction roles. FIPA stands
for Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents. It is an IEEE Computer Society standards
organization that sponsors agent-based technology and the interoperability of its standards
with other technologies [FIPA00].
iii)The role of the agent involved in the interaction, whether initiator “I” or Responder “R”.
iv) The name of the second agent type participating in the interaction.
v) The condition when the interaction will take place.
vi) The template used to receive incoming messages.
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Table 3.2. ADB-SMC Agents Interaction Table.
Agent

Interaction

IP

Role

With

When

Template

Request
keyshares
information

FIPARequest

I

KAA

FIPARequest

Request for FIPAHost
trust Query
information
FIPARequestlike
Request
FIPAADBA image Request
to be copied
for (t) time

I

TLA

Want
to
encrypt,
sign, verify
and decrypt
ADB
Create
ADB

I

BCA

ADB
Request
trigger
evaporation
/ apoptosis.

Retrieve then
send
requested
host
trust
information
Receive copy
of ADBA

FIPARequest

R

ADBA

Receive
request

FIPARequestLike

R

ADBA

if TLH ≥ Request
RTTlow and
TLH
< RTThigh

Respond to
key
shares
request
Forward
ADBA
request
to
selected KS
agents
Respond to
key
shares
request

FIPA
R
Brokering

ADBA

FIPA
I
Brokering

KS
agents

Get
PROPOSE
message
Get
Request
Message

INFORM
propagate
proxy
PROPOSE
propagate

FIPA
R
Brokering
FIPARequest

ADBA

Receives
KA request

INFORMRESULT

Type
ADBA

TLA

BCA

KA

KSA
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QUERYREF

QUERYREF
INFORM

3.3.3. Agents-Resource Interactions
This step determines the agent type that needs to interact with ADB-SMC system resources.
There are two classifications of system resources: passive resources and active resources. The
passive resources change their status with the request of the controlling agent. The active resources
change their status independently from the controlling agent.
Three agent types are designed to interact with the system resources:
A BCA aims to interact with the backup database. This database stores ADBA images for a
temporary time and can control the status of the ADBA image when receiving a request from an
ADBA . So, we consider the backup database as a passive system resource.
A TL agent is designed to interact with the host trust database that store hosts’ trust information.
The cloud database storing and providing host trust information is assumed to change its stored
host trust information status automatically and independently from the TLA as a result of the
synchronization mechanism between the database and the cloud host trust status. Thus, we
consider the TL database as an active resource.
KS agents are designed to interact with the DHT to locate key shares stored values. The DHT
refreshes itself periodically and independently from the KSAs, so we consider the DHT resource as
an active resource. The interaction with the solution passive and active resources is discussed in
turn.

3.3.3.1. Interacting with ADB-SMC Active Resources
Figure 3.8 shows the steps that present the interaction between ADBA with the TLA to retrieve host
trust level information from the cloud host trust database. The information is accessed via Java
Database Connectivity (JDBC) which is an application programming interface (API) for Java used
to define how a database can be accessed by a client [Wiki16h]. ADBA first sends a query
expressed as a request in SL content language to the agent that manages this database, which is
agent BC (BCA). Note that SL is a human-readable string-encoded content language that its codecs
provided by JADE. Its queries are translated into SQL by the BC A to extract the result from the
database and send the result back to ADBA . This design avoids embedding JDBC code inside the
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BCA. It relies on FIPA-Request-like protocol and on the JDBC ontology, which maps the JDBC
ResultSet.

Figure 3.8. Extracting Host Trust Level Information Steps [NiCB06].

3.3.3.2. Interacting with ADB-SMC Passive Resources
We use the JADE persistence add-on service to activate JADE persistence service. This addon library is used to save and retrieve JADE agents on a persistent storage system. Thus, the
mechanism can be used to implement the ADBA backup service. The persistence service relies on
the Hibernate library. It describes the way Java classes are represented as database tables, using
XML mapping files.
The backup service managed by the BC agent provides a database that acts as a persistent
storage system. The persistence service can be used to recover the whole JADE platform;
however, it deals with agents only. We use it to freeze and then thaw ADBA.
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Figure 3.9 shows the assumed interaction design between the ADBA original copy and the
ADBA persistence image. The interaction design is illustrated as follows.
First, the ADBA image is created at the CA server. Then, the ADBA image moves to the backup
server that is connected to the backup database. At the backup server, the created image of ADBA
execution, including its state, are frozen, and its identity, including state, are preserved and stored
in the backup database. While at the backup repository, the frozen ADBA image can receive
(persistent) messages from other ADB agents, thus the ADBA image can be thawed to migrate to
the destination host and resume the evaporated or apoptosized ADBA activities.

Figure 3.9. Storing ADBA Image at Backup Server using Persistence Service [Jade07].
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Table 3.3. ADB-SMC Agent Behaviors.
Agent
Type

Task

KAA

-Act as a Broker AchieveREResponder
Agent
-Forward incoming
ADBA request for key
shares to KS agents
-Assign KS agents to
send key shares
response to ADBA
Act as key-share AchieveREResponder
authorities to run the
cryptosystems
responsible
for
generating
the
required key shares.
Direct n KS agents to
deliver the required
key shares to the
ADBA VM

SimpleAchieveREResponder

Manages copy of N/A
ADBA.
Inform ADBA with HostTrustResponder
indicated host trust
information.
Record
ADBA auditRequestServer
activities

N/A

KS
agents

BCA
TLA

AA

Behavior Name
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Behavior Extended From

SimpleAchieveREResponder

SimpleAchieveREResponder

CyclicBehaviour

Table 3.3 – Continued
Agent

Task

Behavior Name

Behavior Extended From

Type
ADBA

Model and Schedule ADBA Model the below N/A
ADBA
tasks behaviors
according to a Finite
State Machine 6

Prompt a client agent caBehaviour
GUI to the user to
enter the data

SimpleShotBehaviour

Send request to KAA
for ADBA identities.
Send request to agent
TLA for Host H trust
information
Reply VM with host
trust level
Receive
ADBA
identities and store
them temporary on
client agent host.
Report Apoptosis/
evaporation to AA.
Apoptosize ADBA
when it endangered.
migrate ADBA to
destination host
migrate ADBA back
to originating host

AchieveREInitiator

SimpleAchieveREInitiator

HostTrustProposer

SimpleAchieveREInitiator

HostTrustResponder

SimpleAchieveREResponder

ADBReceiverIdentities
OneShotBehaviour

auditRequestServer

simpleBehaviour

apoptosizeADB

OneShotBehaviour

migrateADBD

TickerBehaviour

migrateADBH

TickerBehaviour

6

A Finites State Machine (FSM) is an entity that is represented using State Transition Diagrams. It models software or hardware
as a sequence of state, such that the entity is in one state at a time [NiCB06].
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Table 3.3 – Continued
Agent

Task

Behavior Name

Behavior Extended From

Type
ADBA

Disseminate
migrateADBB
ADBA to backup
server to be
stored
temporarily.

TickerBehaviour

Create a Copy of copyADB
ADBA in case: if
TLH ≥ RTTlow
and
TLH
< RTThigh

TickerBehaviour

Encrypt then sign encryptsignADB
ADBA payload
message.

OneShotBehaviour

Decrypt
and decryptADB1
verify
ADBA
data,
and
metadata.

OneShotBehaviour

Receive ADBA ADBReceiverIdentities
identities
and
store
them
temporary
on
client agent host.
Evaporate ADBA evaporateADB
in case: if TLH ≥
RTTlow and TLH
< RTThigh
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simpleBehaviour

simpleBehaviour

3.3.4.

Agent Behaviors

The subsection presents the ADB-SMC agent behaviors. It maps the agent tasks listed in Table
4.1 into agent behaviors. We follow the suggested methodology and extend the system behaviors
from JADE class behaviors. Table 3.3 shows ADB-SMC agent behaviors. It shows the agent type,
agent tasks, agent behavior name, and the names of the Jade behavior class, where ADB-SMC
behaviors extended from. It should be noted that ADBA tasks are modeled using a Finite State
Machine. Each ADBA task represents an activity to be accomplished within a state of the defined
(FSM). The transitions among the FSM states are controlled by the method onEnd. Every time an
ADBA task that corresponds to an FSM state is completed, a newly selected transition is chosen to
trigger a new FSM state. The FSMBehaviour that models ADBA tasks should terminate whenever
it completes a specified tasks transition diagram. The ADBA state transitions can be registered and
unregistered during the setup or at runtime.

Figure 3.10. ADB-SMC State Transition Diagram.

Figure 3.10 shows the ADB-SMC state transition diagram that models the proposed solution
tasks.
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3.3.5.

Integrating MBAS Simulation into the Methodology

Figure 3.11 shows a high-level view of the ADB-SMC system methodological approach. The
integration of MBAS simulation into the methodology is in the last phase, the system testing phase.

Figure 3.11. ADB-SMC System Methodology.

Figure 3.12. Integrating Agent.GUI Tool into ADB-SMC Solution [DeBU11].
Figure 3.12, shows the integration of the tool that is called “agent.GUI” into our solution.
Unlike traditional distributed simulation, where the distribution can increase the performance of
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simulation, multi-agent based simulation is used to test a characteristically distributed system.
Also, compared to other conventional simulation techniques, in MABS, the entities that constitute
the systems are agents. The goal of using MABS is to build a simulation that addresses the agent
interactions, agent complex distributed correlations, and the interaction of independent participants
among ADB-SMC.

3.4.

Chapter Conclusions

We analyzed and designed our solution using a formal JADE-based methodology. We
presented the system planning, the system analysis, and the system design phases of the ADBSMC solution.
In the system analysis phase, we analyzed the scenario of our solution. We presented the
system uses cases, then modeled the major components as agent types. We then listed the
associated tasks for each agent and the agent deployment information.
In the System design phase, we highlighted the agents that need to be split based on their tasks.
We then presented the interaction of agents in the system, including the protocols used in the
interaction. Next, we showed how ADB-SMC agents can interact with the system’s active and
passive resources. We then presented the system agent behaviors and demonstrated how FSM is
used to model the distribution and complexity of agent interactions.
Finally, the chapter discussed the integration of simulation into the methodology. We presented
a high-level view of integrating “Agent.GUI”, the multi-agent based simulation tool into our
solution.
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4.

EXISTING COMPONENTS FOR THE SOLUTION
This chapter presents the components that we are using to build our solution. It presents

the first component, the active data bundle (ADB). It then describes the second component:
Threshold RSA cryptography. Next, it describes the third component: multi-agent system.
Fourth, it describes the next component: attribute-based encryption (ABE). Then, it
presents the fifth component: advanced encryption standard (AES). Finally, it presents the
sixth component: distributed hash table (DHT). The components of the proposed solution
are shown in Figure. 4.1, and discussed in turn.

Figure 4.1. Components of the ADB-SMC Scheme.

4.1.

Active Data Bundles (ADBs)

The active data bundle or ADB (a.k.a. data bundle or AB) as it shown in Figure 4.2, is
a software construct that encapsulates data, metadata, and a virtual machine [LiBh08,
BeLi09]. The metadata includes, among others, data access policies, data dissemination
policies, data privacy policies, and integrity self-check specifications. The virtual machine
(VM) executes and directs ADB’s active operations on its sensitive data and metadata, such
as enforcement of all the ADB’s policies (included in metadata); integrity self-checking;
evaporation (that is, a partial ADB self-destruction); and apoptosis (that is, a complete
ADB self-destruction). As an example, the VM apoptosizes its data when the trust level of
the host visited by the ADB is below a minimal required trust threshold. The ADB
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component has been enhanced to fulfill our solution design. More details about the ADB
enhancement is presented in Chapter 5. Note, since ADB is implemented by a mobile agent,
we denote it as ADBA. ADBA is an efficient way of carrying and encapsulating ADB’s
data, ADB’s metadata, and ADB’s enforcement mechanism (VM), making these three
components inseparable [BenO10].

Figure 4.2. Active Data Bundle Structure (cf.[SaLi15]).

4.1.1. Motivation of using ADB Component in ADB-SMC
This component is used in our solution to protect sensitive data throughout their entire
lifecycle both in the cloud as well as outside of the cloud (e.g., during transmission to or
from the cloud).
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4.2.

Threshold RSA

Threshold RSA is based on RSA algorithms, THRESHOLD CRYPTOGRAPHY
[Desm87, DeYa90, Desm94], and secure multiparty computation (SMC). It consists of four
major steps: candidate selection, modulus computation, bi-primality testing, and share
generation, and involves four major phases: (i) distributed shared key generation (DSKG);
(ii) encryption; (iii) decryption (iv) and signature using the distributed shared keys. The
RSA algorithm public and private key pairs are (N, e) and (N, d), where N is used as the
modulus for the both pairs and it is calculated by multiplying two distinct primes p and q
(N= pq); e is a public exponent, that is commonly set at 65537; d is the private exponent
that is calculated using the Extended Euclidean algorithm. The public and private
exponents e and d should satisfy the relation ed ≡ 1 mod ϕ(N) where ϕ(N)=(p−1) (q−1).
In the DSKG phase, public and private key pairs (N, e) and (N, d), respectively, are
generated in a distributed way, using a set of n servers using the protocol of Boneh and
Franklin [BoFr01]. BGW protocol in the modulus computation step of DSKG is used to
compute shared values between players without revealing them.
In the encryption phase, a public encryption exponent e is supposed to be publically
known. In the decryption phase, parties compute partial decryptions. The secret exponent
value d is reconstructed using t out of k parties, where t is the threshold of the scheme, or
the number of parties needed to reconstruct the secret or engage in the decryption
processes; the k is the number of parties engaging in DSKG;and n is the total number of
parties in the system.
Complete keys are never combined or restored on a single site. The public and private
key pairs are generated in a distributed way using a set of n servers. A system cannot be
compromised under this technique if fewer than k servers are compromised—since in this
case the attacker cannot restore the complete private key.
The DSKG phase in the threshold RSA protocol is a very important component because
it uses SMC, which eliminates the need for a trusted dealer (this is the main objective of
SMC as pointed by Nishide [Nish08]). Unlike secret sharing, where a dealer knows the
secret and distributes it among a certain number of players to reconstruct it. In SMC, there
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is no dealer, and every player acts as a dealer holding an input (partial secret) for a function
f and jointly computes the output of this function or the complete secret or gains enough
knowledge to succeed.

4.2.1.

Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC)

Secure multiparty computation (SMC) involves multiple parties to jointly compute
certain functions based on individually held secret inputs or functions. The SMC solution
is used as a supportive component of the threshold RSA method.
SMC is used, for example, in threshold cryptography [Pede91], where a given
ciphertext can be decrypted cooperatively by k members out of the set of n entities sharing
a secret key.
Chen et al. [ChGM97] demonstrate that a set of trusted servers can overcome problems
caused by a single trusted server. They categorize the use of trusted servers to transfer trust
into four major cases:
1) A single trusted server, trusted by two parties.
2) Two or more different trusted servers, trusted by two parties.
3) k trusted servers out of n servers are trusted to follow a protocol correctly. The trust
of each server is questionable when acting alone. There is no specific trust on any
single server, but despite this, k server can follow the protocol to produce a correct
outcome.
4) A set of servers with some (but not all) servers colluding. There is no specific trust
on any single server. This case answers how to get the minimum trust in the key
distribution such that no untrustworthy server can compromise the secret. The
correctness of the protocol is determined by the trustworthiness of the colluding
servers.
The environment, where the protocol operates, identifies the trust type existing between
parties and trusted servers. If the third-party servers cannot be individually trusted, an
appropriate set of them can be jointly trusted.
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4.2.1.1. BGW Protocol
The BGW Protocol [BeGW88] allows a set of parties to compute jointly a chosen
function f on shared or private input (from n inputs to n outputs). This is achieved by
emulating securely the arithmetic circuit that is computing f. In case of semi-honest
adversaries,7 where threshold t < n/2, parties first share their input using Shamir's secret
sharing [Sham79]. In case of malicious adversaries, a verifiable secret sharing protocol
Chor et al. [CGMA85] is used. The perfect secrecy of the protocol was proven by Asharov
and Lindell [AsLi14].

4.2.1.2. Shamir's Threshold Secret Sharing
Blakley and Shamir introduced the concept of secret sharing [Blak79, Sham79]. The
scheme works in two phases. First, in the sharing phase, a secret key is initially held by a
dealer and then distributed by the dealer to n parties. Second, in the reconstruction phase,
each party i reveals a part of its private information vi, such that the secret d can be obtained
based on a reconstruction function d = reconstruct (d1, d2, d3…), where di’s are partial
secret sharing values. The private key cannot be generated or reconstructed by a quorum
of less than t out of n parties.
The function-sharing scheme, proposed by Chor et al. [CGMA85] and Goldreich et al.
[GoMW87], is a useful extension of secret sharing in case of active dishonesty. The
drawback of this approach is the possible corruption of k (or more) servers by an adversary
when k secrets shares out of n are needed for a successful decryption [LeCa97].

4.2.2.

Motivation of using Threshold RSA Component in ADB-SMC

This component is used in our solution to assure a robust and secure key management
technique, one that prevents key loss and protects against side-channel attacks. It also
7

A semi-honest adversary (also known as a passive adversary or an honest but curious adversary) is a party
that correctly follows the protocol specification, yet attempts to learn additional information by analyzing
the messages received during the protocol execution [ShOj10].
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fulfills our need of a secure mechanism that makes multiple parties exchange private values
securely. We use Threshold RSA to protect an important part of our metadata as it will be
explained in details in Chapter 5.

4.3.

Multi-Agent Systems (MAS)

This section presents the third solution component. It first gives an overview of agent
and multi-agents and their characteristics. Then, it compares platform agent technologies
based on some factors which lead to our choice of the Java Agent Development Framework
(JADE). Next, we describe the multi-agent technology we integrate into our solution,
which is JADE and its advantages. We then describe JADE services that we rely on in our
solution: the mobility and security management services. Next, we describe “Agent.GUI”,
the multi-agent based simulation framework built on top of JADE to measure, describes
the system performance time. Finally, we discuss the motivation of using MAS in ADBSMC.

4.3.1.

Overview of Agent and Multi-Agents and their Characteristics

Wooldridge and Jennings [WoJe95, Wool02] define an agent as a problem solving,
autonomous, goal-driven computational entity with social abilities in an open system to
observe and act accordingly to achieve its goals. An agent, compared to a human, has less
understanding or has a small abstracted portion of the real world. Also, it is time and
resource consuming due to its complex processes and computations. Many types of agents
have different implementation architectures. For example, the Belief-desire-intention
architecture (BDI) is the most popular implementation of a deliberative agent type, which
has complex architecture and behavior that is equipped with methods to interpret and
predict the outside world. In contrast, the reactive agent type is simpler, since the agent
does not need to deal with a representation of a symbolic world model. It uses pattern
matching as its implementation architecture. In the real world, a multi-agent system (MAS)
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relies on an agent type that does not belong to the active or the deliberative agent. It relies
on an agent that is in between and is called a hybrid agent.
MAS consists of a loose set of intelligent agents that interact with other agents within
their environments or in a single system. It deals with problems that a single agent cannot
deal with. It reduces the network traffic, handles network interruptions, overcomes network
latency, offers asynchronous interactions [EsPG12], gains access to resources locally as
well as independently from operating systems and computer hardware [EsPG12, NIST07].
The main purpose of a MAS is to solve complex problems using a decentralized
solution in which multiple agents facilitate the solution via their intelligent interactions,
negotiation, cooperation, responsibility, delegation and trust [Wool09]. They form a
coalition of fully, semi-autonomous or coupled (problem-solver) agents that, with a
cooperative effort, can solve complex real-world problems that a single agent with limited
capabilities cannot. A complex task can be reduced by decomposing it recursively into
subtasks that each can be solved with a single agent. To achieve their mission, the involved
agencies rely on their social intelligence, negotiation, collaboration, communication, and a
delegation of responsibility [Unla15]. Agents can run on parallel or distributed computers
to offer high performance, including fast execution time, in solving large complex
problems. Since both cloud computing and multi-agent systems are distributed computing
models, integrating them can be beneficial, especially for the efficiency of resource
management, including data storage and service delivery.
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Table 4.1. Multi-Agent Platform Technologies [KrBa15].
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Table 4.1 - Continued [KrBa15]
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for
message
exchange

Agent Platform Technologies and JADE

Table 3.1 describes the motivation for using JADE as a supportive component for our
ADB-SMC solution. It shows a comparison review of several agent platform technologies.
We reviewed several agent-based technologies and selected JADE due to its rich support
for a decentralized environment and distributed simulation including high scalability,
performance, robustness, and stability. In addition, JADE has rich communication
protocols that support intra- and/or inter-platform messaging. It can be deployed in
numerous operating systems (OS), and support developing applications and simulation in
several domain areas. JADE provides excellent user support and offers the best security
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management support to develop or simulate security features compared to all other listed
MAS technologies [KrBa15].

4.3.3.

Java Agent Development Framework (JADE)

JADE is an open source framework for the development of distributed applications
based on the agent paradigm. It offers a Java middleware framework based on a peer-topeer architecture to simplify the development of multi-agent systems. Agents are the
modules of the applications developed on top of JADE. The agents can exchange messages
and interact by exchanging asynchronous messages. JADE provides GUI tools for
development, debugging and deployment of JADE-based systems [BeCG07, EsPG12].
JADE complies with the foundation for intelligent physical agent (FIPA 8) specifications
to ensure interoperability among agents.

4.3.3.1. JADE advantages
(i) A JADE agent executes its tasks autonomously; it can have its own
executable thread that makes it control its own life-cycle whenever it
performs some operations.
(ii) A JADE agent is identified by a uniquely global name to give it the ability to
interact and join the system or leave it during any operation.
(iii) A JADE agent has its own separate thread of execution. This gives it the
ability to run on different machines and in different environments. Also, it
communicates with other agents via the internet.
(iv) A JADE agent offers flexible implementation of various interaction
protocols and functionalities. Many built-in functions and add-on libraries
can be extended to provide rich functionalities.

8

FIPA stands for the foundation for intelligent physical agent, it an international organization that shares goals and
efforts to develop a standard specification for agent technology [FIPA15]
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(v) A JADE agent provides support for a wide area of distributed computation.
It can support both J2ME platform and wireless environment. [SuDI11,
BeCG07].

4.3.3.2. JADE Mobility
Agent mobility is the agent’s ability first to suspend its execution, then to move its
code, data, and state to a new location, and finally to resume its execution at the new
location. A mobile agent is movable and can transition its data, code, and state among
platforms to perform the assigned tasks. The movement of an agent requires a set of actions
that we call the migration processes [CuVA08, BeCG07].
JADE supports a built-in intra-platform and inter-container agent mobility service so
that an agent can move across the single platform containers, but is not allowed to move to
other platform containers [BeCG07]. JADE does not support inter-container and interplatform communication mobility services. A JADE add-on that is called Inter-Platform
Mobility Service (IPMS) is proposed [CuVA08] to provide an inter-platform and intercontainers feature for JADE agents.
The proposed ADB-SMC solution design supports both intra-platform and interplatform Mobility Service, as we discuss in Chapter 5.

4.3.3.3. JADE Security
Using an agent requires the following most common security requirements
[CuVA08].
(i)

Confidentiality: agent carried data including agent communications and
message flow must be kept confidential.

(ii) Authenticity and integrity: agent carried data and code can be guaranteed to
belong to the entity and claims their ownership through authenticity and
integrity.
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(iii) Access control: specific resources should be accessed only by authorized
agents. An agent should be assigned specific restricted degree of privileges.
(iv) Accountability: Agents and their platforms, including other entities in the
system, must be accountable for their actions.
(v) Availability: fault tolerance features should be presented to recover from
any platform failure or agent losses that could result in service interruption
or denial of service attacks.
(vi) Anonymity: agent owner anonymity and accountability must be preserved
so that an agent can take responsibility for its actions.
JADE supports a security management plug-in through JADE-S. JADE-S provides four
security services. One is mandatory (the security service) to start JADE-S, and the other
can be run independently. The JADE Security service is a base mandatory service that
supports authentication. The permission service is not a mandatory service and it is used to
support authorization [ViSc07].
JADE security also provides agent-to-agent encryption and signature services. This
applies to agent message communications to ensure reliable and confidentiality of data.
The signature services provide authentication and verification of agent messages, where
encryption services handle encryption and decryption operations. JADE assigns
asymmetric public and private keys for every agent [ViSc07].
In our solution, we do not rely on JADE-S as it has many limitations. We use another
cryptography API as it is detailed in Chapter 6.

4.3.3.4. Agent.GUI
Agent.GUI is a Multi-Agent based simulation (MABS) built on top of the JADE
framework. It is designed as a general purpose MABS tool to deal with the following JADE
decentralization issues: (i) time, (ii) visualization, (iii) agent interactions, and (iv) system
load measurement and balancing.
Unlike traditional simulation frameworks, “Agent.GUI” can deal with many issues like
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scheduling problems, crisis management, and energy markets. It allows the simulation to
be spread on an arbitrary number of hosts, where loads are balanced between all hosts. It
enables developers to create a JADE-based MAS application and develop MABS. It
encapsulates JADE agents and its resources into a project that can then be executed and
distributed. The tool runs and processes the developed agents as a simple array of objects
through start arguments. The tool lets the developer assign the object type and their order
for a single agent in the project definition so that it can be used at a later time.
Agent.GUI includes a simulation service that deals with agents’

bidirectional

interaction, and scheduling strategies. It uses some classes for the agent-environment
interaction. For instance, the SimulationMangerAgent class manages the environment
information. The simulationAgents class represents the acting agents, and it needs to
inherent sensor/actuator functionalities.
JADE uses the simulation time through the SimulationService. The SimulationService
provides the synchronized time to all distributed containers. It is connected with the
ServiceActuator which is the ServiceSlice of the JADE agent container where agents
reside. Agents are connected to the ServiceActuator through ServiceSensor. Since
“Agent.GUI” is built on top of JADE, its performance is determined by the JADE
implementation [DeBU11].

4.3.4.

Motivation of Using MAS for in ADB-SMC

There are a few reasons for using a MAS as the foundation in ADB-SMC. The primary
reason is the need to reduce high communication complexity and overhead [Kupc13]
resulting from distributing to multiple servers the job performed by a centralized TTP in
ABTTP. Other reasons include decentralized control, protocol encapsulation, mobility,
asynchronicity, computation and data autonomy, leanness, scalability, flexibility,
adaptability, intelligence, reactivity, robustness, and fault tolerance [Lang98, IsBe09,
Unla15].
An agent can allow code and data to carry their own security or protection mechanisms
wherever they travel. This improves traditional security solutions where security and
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protection are managed by a stationary platform, rather than an agent. Additional features
can be acquired to integrate agent-based technology to protect data, adaptability and
flexibility with every situation. In addition, it can extend to new security mechanisms and
coexist with different security schemes [VRCN06].

4.4.

Attribute-based Encryption (ABE)

There are two kinds of ABE schemes: key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE)
and ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE). Both remove the dependency
on a TTP present in identity-based encryption [Sham85]. KP-ABE has strong restrictions
and limitations: attributes have to be known publicly, the user cannot access encrypted data
based on the access policy [BeSW07], and the encrypter cannot control the attributes. The
access policy in CP-ABE is restricted to a single level, whereas in KP-ABE the access
policies can have multiple levels [Mart13]. Decryption in CP-ABE can be done only with
entities that satisfy the decryption policy. More details about CP-ABE are discussed in
turn.

Figure 4.3. An Example of CP-ABE Access Policy.
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4.4.1.

Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE)

We use a special subtype of ABE known as ciphertext-policy attribute-based
encryption or CP-ABE [19]. It is an encryption scheme with a hidden policy scheme, in
which the access policy is embedded within the ciphertext, and the decryption attributes
are associated with the private key.
ABE allows for avoiding the risk of compromising data and the complexity of
cryptographic key management in cases when the ciphertext needs to be shared among
multiple parties. Data are encrypted with a concealed 9 access structure (policy). Data can
be decrypted only if the private-attribute-based key matches the encrypted data access
structure.
For example, let us assume that Carol’s master key (MK) is associated with the
following attribute set {head of the security lab, lecturer, a member of security lab, cloud
security, cyber security}. Carol wants to allow Alice, her Ph.D. student, to access the lab’s
cloud security papers during her absence. Using CP-ABE, Carol can encrypt her data with
an access policy expressed by the following Boolean formula: ("member of security lab"
OR "lecturer”) AND (“cloud security" OR (“paper”). Figure. 4.3, shows Carol’s access
structure, which is described as a tree whose leaves represent attributes, and whose internal
nodes represent logical gates. Carol then attaches the Boolean formula to the ciphertext.
Carol can generate a secret key for Alice, one which is associated with the following
attribute set: keyAlice = {member of security lab, cloud security}. Now, Alice can access all
files related to the lab’s cloud security papers [SaLi14]. For instance, Carol can delegate

9

A concealed access structure (policy) for data means that the access structure is embedded and hidden within the
ciphertext data.
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only some of her access rights to Alice, which happens through the delegation of certain
attributes that Carol wants to share with Alice.
We use a special subtype of ABE known as ciphertext-policy attribute-based
encryption (CP-ABE) [BeSW07]. CP-ABE removes the dependency on TTPs. It is an
encryption scheme with a hidden policy scheme, in which the access policy is embedded
within the ciphertext, and the decryption attributes are associated with the private key. Data
can be decrypted only if the private key matches the encrypted data access policy AP.
CP-ABE drawback: If CP-ABE relied on a single TTP or a single attribute authority to
generate the master key, our system would be endangered if the authority is compromised.
In addition, it could be subject to collusion attacks. Therefore, we design our solution using
decentralized CP-ABE (D-CP-ABE) to overcome such issues. D-CP-ABE is discussed
next.

4.4.1.1. Decentralized. Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
D-CP-ABE is a multi-authority attribute-based encryption (ABE) system, where private
keys can be issued using multiple authorities or decentralized TTPs. It is an encryption
system where data can be encrypted for a policy created over attributes issued by diﬀerent
authorities [LeWa11].
In D-CP-ABE, an arbitrary number of independent parties are responsible for generating
and maintaining both the system attributes and their corresponding private key shares.
Our solution is designed based on the D-CP-ABE scheme of Lewko et al. [LeWa11].
This scheme does not require any central authority or any communication among parties
to generate the secret keys, and therefore, the scheme is secure against collusion attacks.
In this scheme, each authority creates one public key and multiple private key shares
reflecting system attributes. Since there is no coordination between authorities, private key
shares are tied together using so-called group elements.10 Group elements are mapped from
user global identities using a hash function. A user’s social security number is an example
of global identity [LeWa11]. The D-CP-ABE scheme consists of five algorithms described
10

Security parameter used to determine the bilinear group size involved in the construction of D-CP-ABE.
It represents the assumption complexity order that provides the security of the scheme [LoMS15].
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in [LeWa11]. During the system initialization algorithm, a trusted initializer according to
a security parameter λ 10 chooses the global parameters (GP). System authorities can make
use of the GP to perform their execution [RaDu13]. The global parameters (GP) consist of
a chosen bilinear group G of order N, where N is equal to selected prime order p (p1, p2,
p3), a generator g1 of Gp1, and a hashing function H that maps a global identities GID to
elements in G [LeWa11]. GID is used to manage the collusion resistance across multiple
key generations issued by different authorities.

4.4.2.

Motivation of Using D-CP-ABE in ADB-SMC

D-CP-ABE supports efficient and flexible fine-grained access control. We use it in our
scheme, due to its support for enforcing policies and its support for sharing data outsourced
to clouds without a prior knowledge of the receiver. Using D-CP-ABE also helps to avoid
the key escrow problem, which can occur if there is only one authority holding a master
key that can decrypt all ADB’s encrypted data and metadata. With D-CP-ABE, multiple
private key shares are generated and stored using multiple key-share authorities (servers).
The D-CP-ABE mechanism controls which portion of data is released in cases when the
appropriate portions of ciphertext of data and metadata are shared among multiple parties.

4.5.

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

Advanced encryption standard (AES) is a private key or symmetric cryptography
standard adopted by the U.S government. Initially, it was called Rijndael and includes
many packages of AES encryption. The design principle of AES is based on a substitutionpermutation network. It runs fast in both hardware and software. It has a fixed block size
of 128 bits and a maximum limit of 256 bits. It supports 128, 192 and 256 bits key length
with no maximum limits [ DaRi13]. The AES has integrated into several Java versions and
technologies. For example, it integrated into Java 2 SDK, Java Standard Edition (J2SE),
and JCE (Java Cryptography extension) [Pill11].
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4.5.1. Motivation of using AES in ADB-SMC:
AES has many advantages, such as efficiency, performance, security, flexibility, and
low memory usages. It resists many attacks such as, differential attack, brute-force attack
and linear cryptanalysis [OBSC10, BoRi14]. We use AES to encrypt all parts of data and
metadata as will be explained in more detail in Chapter 5.

4.6.

Distributed Hash Table (DHT)

A Distributed Hash Table (DHT) distributes data across a peer-to-peer network so that
they can be located in a short period of time. It is a decentralized system that offers a
lookup service like a hash table. It stores (key, value) pairs, where the key value controls
the node where values are stored in a DHT so that value can be efficiently retrieved through
its associated key by any participant node [Resc06].
DHT has many advantages and is highly scalable, offering distributed storage where
data can be referenced with known names. It supports robustness so that data can move
away from a failed node, and load can automatically be distributed to new nodes. It operates
as a self-control that avoids central control.
There are many implementations and protocols of DHT and each has its own design.
For example, BitTorrent DHT, Chord, Apache Cassandra, CAN, Kademlia, and Pastry are
all examples of DHT implementations. [Wiki16b, Resc06].
A Distributed Hash Table (DHT) is used for key management in ADB-SMC. It stores
key shares of identity-related data for ADBs, and speeds up accessing the key shares.
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4.7.

Chapter Conclusions

In this chapter, we described ADB-SMC solution components. We described ADB and
demonstrated how it protects data throughout their lifecycle. We then discussed RSA
Threshold cryptography, the component used for key shares management. We reviewed
several agent-based technologies and then explained the motivation behind using JADE as
our MAS components.
We explained attribute-based access control, the component we integrate with our
solution to provide fine-grained access control to our sensitive data. We discussed the risk
of using attribute-based encryption based on one single authority and how decentralized or
multi-authority can benefit our solution.
We then briefly described AES encryption and the reason we integrated it into our
solution; we finally reviewed the DHT table, the component we integrated to speed up
accessing the key shares.
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5.

THE PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE ADB-SMC
APPROACH
In this chapter, we start by briefly discussing the general structure of the ADB-SMC

proposed solution. Then, we discuss the major component enhancement of the ADB-SMC
solution. Next, we explain the operation of ADB-SMC, the threat Model, and the Proposed
Controls. Finally, the chapter presents the conclusion.

5.1.

General Structure of the ADB-SMC Solution

This section shows the high-level design of ADB-SMC solution using JADE. We start
this section by describing the JADE platform components. We then describe our solution
components and their interaction using JADE.

5.1.1.

Component of JADE Platform

JADE middleware technology simplifies implementation of multi-agent systems
[BeCG07]. A JADE platform is made up of a main container plus a number of agent
containers. Each main container or agent container can run on one or multiple hosts
(nodes), and can include one or more agents. Agents can interact with each other by
exchanging messages. The basic agents’ services are accessed by applications through
APIs [EsPG12, BeCG07].
Each host can run any operating system but must provide the Java Virtual Machine
(JVM) environment. A JVM on a host is a basic “container” for agents. Each container
inside the platform, including the main container, is a JVM and provides a run-time
environment for its agents. Hence, it can house other agents besides DF and AMS and
provides the run-time environment for multiple and concurrently executing agents.
The Main Container starts automatically when the JADE platform starts its execution.
Each agent has to register a unique global address with the main container (on its platform)
[KuMe14, LyPS04, DMRV03].

81

Figure 5.1. The UML Diagram of ADB-SMC.
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5.1.2.

JADE-Based Components and Structure of ADB-SMC

The ADB-SMC consists of five JADE platforms. Figure 5.1 shows the UML diagram
with these platforms, their names, their subcomponents, and their basic interactions within
the ADB-SMC. For simplicity, each of the containers defined below runs on a single host.11
In Figure 5.1 ADBA is disseminated from Host 1 to Host 4 and Host 5. ADBA is labeled
with a timestamp ti showing the location of ADBA at the indicated moment; for example,
ADBA(t2) indicates that at time t2, ADBA is at Host 4.

We discuss, in turn, communication facilities and all five platforms.

Figure 5.2. JADE Communication Methods.

11

Multiple containers can run on multiple hosts. We can use this capability to run, e.g., the host trust service provided
by BHT Platform in multiple clouds.
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5.1.2.1. Communication Facilities
Figure 5.2 shows the taxonomy of the communication methods provided by JADE.
We classify the agent communications methods by four different classifications, described
in turn.
a) Intra-Container communication:
(i) Intra-Container and intra-platform communication among agents use IMTP
(Internal Message Transport Protocol), which relies on message passing.
(ii) Intra-Container and inter-platform communication among agents are not possible
since a container is limited to be within a single platform.
b) Inter-Container communication:
(i) Inter-Container and intra-platform communication among agents use RMI
communication method.
(ii) Inter-Container and inter-platform communication among agents use Agent
Communication Channel (ACC). ACC is a software component that manages all
messages exchanged within the JADE platform and messages from the remote
platform [30]. ACC provides Message Transport System (MTS) [BeRi02], which
uses MTP. Therefore, in Figure 5.2, ACC provides MTS [BeRi02], relying on one
or more Message Transport Protocol (MTP) for inter-platform and, therefore,
inter-container communication among agents to handle the physical delivery of the
communications. Note that for inter-container and inter-platform communication,
we use MTP.
Agent mobility service is an essential platform service provided by JADE to give mobile
agents the ability to move across different containers on the same platform. Note that JADE
does not support Agent mobility service for inter-container and inter-platform
communication [BeCG07]. To address this issue, we rely on a JADE add-on, called InterPlatform Mobility Service (IPMS) for agent mobility service. More details about IPMS are
found in [Jade07].
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5.1.2.2. Client Agent (CA) Platform
The platform includes the Main Container and Container1-Host1. The Main Container
includes two special agents: Agent Management System (AMS) and Directory Facilitator
(DF), as well as Message Transport Protocol (MTP), Agent Communication Channel
(ACC), Internal Message Transport Protocol (IMTP). It could also include any number of
agents that are not shown in Figure 5.1.
AMS, DF, and ACC are mandatory components, required by FIPA for each platform,
that manage the agents' infrastructure. AMS offers white pages’ service and is in charge of
all platform management services, such as creating and killing agents, killing containers,
and shutting down the platform. If an agent wants to perform any management action, its
request should be directed to AMS.
DF acts as Yellow Pages or a centralized registry service for all agents of the platform.
If an agent wants to advertise its services, it must be registered with DF. An agent can
search for a service that is provided by other agents by asking the DF.
As described above, ACC is the default inter-platform (and thus inter-container)
communication method that must exist in every JADE platform.
Container1-Host1 represents the originator, that is, the host on which the data owner
creates an ADBA using CA. During the inter-container and intra-platform communications
between the Main Container of CA Platform and Container1-Host1 of the CA Platform,
Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI) is used by IMTP for transmission between these
two containers.
The black line shown in every platform labeled “RMI”, shows inter-container and intraplatform communication using RMI.
Every JADE container is launched with one or more MTPs. In Figure. 5.1, we locate
MTP below ACC to indicate that MTP is controlled by ACC.
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5.1.2.3. Target Hosts (TH) Platform
A target host for ADBA is a host to be visited by it. To illustrate TH Platform structure,
we assume two target hosts: Host 4 (residing in Container4-Host4) and Host 5 (residing in
Container 5-Host5), as shown in Figure 5.1.
TH Platform shows that ADBA is visiting both Host 4 at time t2 and, later, Host 5 at
time t3. Note that the inter-container and inter-platform Mobility service is handled through
MTP during the transmission of ADBA from Container1-Host1 to Container4-Host4 and
Container5-Host5.

5.1.2.4. Backup and Host Trust (BHT) Platform
BHT Platform has two goals. The first one is to reduce the dissemination overhead that
might be caused if ADBA apoptosizes when attacked. The second goal is to maintain a host
trust service for the cloud, keeping track of trust levels for the hosts of the cloud. Figure
5.1, shows that BHT Platform includes Main Container as well as two other containers:
Container2-Host2 and Container3-Host3.
The two containers provide two services. Container2-Host2 includes the trust level
agent (TLA). It manages the host trust service that maintains a database of trust levels for
the hosts of the cloud. Upon a request from the ADBA’s VM, it returns a trust level value
(TLH) for an indicated host.
Container3-Host3 includes the backup copy agent (BCA). It manages the backup
service for a given cloud. It maintains a database of copies of ADBA (the copies are
temporary AND time-restricted). Each ADBA copy has a unique id (a number). A copy
might be called to resume operation of, e.g., an apoptosized (self-destructed) ADBA on an
alternative (possibly more trusted) visited host. For example, suppose that ADBA
evaporates or apoptosizes because the host it was to visit has an insufficient trust level for
this ADBA. Before evaporation is started, a backup copy of the ADBA is made (if a copy
does not already exist within the backup service database of this cloud) and is stored by the
backup service. If ADBA is to be forwarded to another host, we can use its backup copy
provided by the backup service of the cloud. We expect that this will be more efficient than
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having no backup copies in the cloud and having to request another ADBA from the
originating site.

5.1.2.5. Key-share Authority (KA) Platform
KA Platform includes Main Container, Container6-Host6, and Container7-Host7. The
Main Container includes the key-share authority agent (KAA), which is an agent
responsible for managing a group of agents called key-share server agents (hence the
acronym KSA).
The numerous key-share server agents (KSAs) run on different key-share servers, and
are all managed by KAA.
KSAs managed by KAA are shown in Figure 5.1, as KSA1-KSA3 from Container6-Host6
and KSA4-KSA6 from Container7-Host7. Each KSA holds one or more key shares for the
public and private keys for one or more ADBAs. An attacker will learn nothing from
penetrating even a few key-share servers.
In more detail, the duties of KSAs are as follows:
a) For a “new encryption” request (that is for an encryption not using an existing, “old,”
key pair), KSAs construct two key pairs pubABE/priABE or pubRSA/priRSA and
store these two key pairs,wherein each key is a collection of key shares, distributed
across multiple KSAs.
Then, KSAs provide key shares implementing collectively pubABE or pubRSA, as
requested.
b)

For a decryption request, KS agents retrieve and provide key shares implementing
collectively priABE or priRSA.

c)

For a “new signing” request (that is a signing not using an existing, “old,” key pair),
KS agents construct a key pair [pubRSA/priRSA] and store this key pair, wherein
each key is a collection of key shares, distributed across multiple KS agents.
Then, KSAs provide key shares implementing collectively priRSA, as requested.
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d)

For a signature verification request, KS agents retrieve and provide key shares
implementing collectively pubRSA, as requested.
We define a data security level for given data as the level of protection required for

these data. Data security level impacts how key shares are managed. For example, if an
owner of ADBA demands a high data security level for (a part or all) of ADBA’s data, more
parties (KS agents) will need to participate in key sharing for these data, and, therefore,
more KSAs will be involved in encrypting or decrypting ADBA [11].For encryption, key
shares are provided to Host 1 (more precisely, Container1-Host1) on CA Platform, and for
decryption, key shares are provided to Host 4 or Host 5 on TH Platform.
For example, in Figure 5.1, in response to a request from the ADBA’s VM running on
Host 4, KAA orders a group of KSAs (KSA2, KSA3 and KSA6) from Hosts 6 and Host 7 to send
key shares (represented collectively as priRSA) to this VM, so that the VM (running on
Host 4) can decrypt its ADBA’s Ciphertext 2 (encrypted Ciphertext 3 and Metadata 2) and
then decrypt Ciphertext 3 (encrypted data and Metadata 3),using priABE.
The more key shares are used and the more widely they are distributed across KSAs,
the higher data security level we can obtain.
KAA is used to assure the required data security levels. For instance, in Figure 5.1, KAA
(in Main Container) manages six key-share server agents (KSA1-KSA6). KSAs are housed
within two containers, each with three agents. Host 6 manages agents KSA1-KSA3, and Host
7 manages agents KSA4-KSA6.

5.1.2.6. Audit Platform
The Audit Platform includes one container: Container8-Host8. It includes the audit
agent (AA), which is responsible for monitoring and recording all activities of ADBA. For
instance, when ADBA sends from the originating host (Host 1) to its destination (Host 5),
the audit agent (AA) on the audit platform receives an appropriate report from ADBA and
records this information into the audit database on Host 8.

88

5.2.

5.2.1.

The Components of the Proposed Solution and their
…...Enhancements and Integrations
Integration of Components into ADB-SMC Implementation

In this subsection, we briefly describe the integration of the solution components into
the solution implementation.

We then present the enhancement of the solution

components.

5.2.1.1. Integration of SMC into ADB-SMC Implementation.
Our scheme uses secure multiparty computation (SMC), which means that the
multiparty computation component is confirmed as secured by using some measurements.
The key management protocol in our scheme, the Threshold RSA, uses the BGW
protocol [BeGW88], so players can communicate over a pairwise secure channel. BGW
protocol relies on Information-theoretically SMC [AsLi14]. It allows a set of parties to
jointly compute a chosen function f on shared or private input (from n inputs to n outputs).
Shamir's secret sharing is a cornerstone in SMC since it is information theoretically
secure by offering perfect security. For example, to explain the passive adversaries limit,
let us assume two cases where the number of players are n= 6, and n=7. If the decryption
threshold in both cases was 4, then in case 1, where n=6, the number of adversaries needed
to rebuild the secret is 4, and the number of adversaries needed to stop the honest players
from reconstructing the secret is 3. In case 2, where n=7, the number of adversaries required
to rebuild the secret is 4, and the number of adversaries required to prevent the honest
players from reconstructing the secret is 4 [MAUL09].

5.2.1.2. Integration of ADB and CP-ABE into ADB-SMC Implementation.
The scheme we propose to protect identity management in the cloud uses an integrated
scheme of ADB and CP-ABE to provide protection of access to sensitive data. It provides
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fine-grained access control for one-to-many data disseminations.12 The policy or access
structure is not stored and processed by centralized TTPs. Instead, the access structure is
embedded within the ciphertext ADB’s metadata and can be decrypted by a visited host,
based only on attributes associated with the private key.
We extend a protocol designed in [DoJi11] that integrates CP-ABE [BeSW07] as well
as , (verifies) secret sharing to provide secure verifiable secret sharing in an interactive
protocol. Verifiable secret sharing extends by using the standard RSA modulus N in
[GHSG06]. In our ADB-SMC protocol, we use CP-ABE with threshold RSA [BoFr01] for
secret sharing verifiability.

5.2.1.3. Integration of Host Trust Mechanism into ADB-SMC Implementation.
Supporting an efficient trust evaluation mechanism is an important component of our
approach. We modified the design of the current trust evaluation mechanism used in
ABTTP for trust evaluation of destination hosts, a designthat relies on a centralized TTP.
The ABTTP uses the trust evaluation server (TES) to evaluate the trust level of the host to
be visited, in order to ensure that it exceeds the required host’s trust threshold level. If the
destination host fails to exceed the threshold, the TES alerts the security server.
We use host trust mechanism to ensure that the visited hosts do not exceed the required
host’s trust threshold level. If the destination host fails to exceed the threshold, the backup
and host trust service (BHT) alerts the ADB, when requested. Decryption keys are sent
only to hosts that have a sufficient trust level for accessing the sensitive data included in
the active data bundle.
The ADB can obtain from BHT information indicating the trustworthiness of any host
visited by an active data bundle. Host trustworthiness information is obtained through
different approaches. For instance, the method of Zhong et al, [ZBLL06, ZBLA15]
combines a trust level that is computed relying on multiple sources of evidence, such as a

12

The ADB scheme [LeWa11] allows one-to-many dissemination but the authors concentrated on one-to-one
dissemination, and did not work out the details of one-to-many dissemination.
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guardian first-hand experience, a neighbors’ second-hand opinions, and reputations
obtained from databases. In this context, a guardian is an entity (either human or not) that
accesses data or disseminates them. The owner of sensitive data transfers them to a set of
guardians. In turn, a guardian may transfer the received sensitive data to another set of
guardians [BenO10].
The reputation database collects the behaviors of all cloud hosts inside the space of
their watch [ZBLA15, DaIs12, MaMT10, Ordi96, Ches95]. The reputation database is
assumed to be deployed at the backup and host trust service (BHT), as a service. Other
methods, such as remote attestation of hosts [CGLH10], Zhong’s trust framework
[Zhon05], and a self-organizing peer-to-peer trust model [CaBh06], can be extended to
create a trust management model 13.
When an ADB considers visiting Host H, it must obtain the current trust level for H
(TLH) from the BHT. The ADB faces three cases:
(i)

The original (unchanged) ADB may visit Host H only if TLH > RTThigh.

(ii)

The evaporated ADB (i.e., the ADB with some of its data and metadata
destroyed to prevent their unauthorized disclosure) may visit H only if TLH ≥
RTTlow and TLH < RTThigh.

(iii)

The ADB must be apoptosized (self-destruct completely) if TLH < RTTlow (i.e.,
when H is too dangerous to visit for this ADB).

Before identifying which of the three cases it faces, the ADB’s VM must get BHT’s ID
and the two RTT values, which are stored in Metadata 1 (M1). This means that the VM
must be able to get unencrypted M1 before visiting H. Figure 5.3 shows that M1 is
decrypted before M2 and M3 are decrypted.

13

We plan for future work to create a trust management technique that relies on a crowd sourcing consensus technique
that uses consensus and trustworthiness techniques for recognizing, managing, and deciding the successful execution of
a task on visited host. The result or decision for successful completion of a task depends on the degree of agreement of
the majority [CFLM15]
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5.2.2.

Active Data Bundles (ADBs) Enhancement

Active Data Bundle (ADB) has been described in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. In this
subsection, we present the enhancement of ADB-SMC. We first describe the enhancement
of the ADB key management and then the enhancement of ADB creation mechanism. Next,
we present the enhancement of the ADB’s dissemination. Then, we present the
enhancement of the ADB signing mechanism. Finally, we present the enhancement of the
ADB’s data disclosure mechanism.

5.2.2.1. Enhancing Key Management in ADB (Using SMC)
The key management technique in ADB-SMC is enhanced by avoiding the use of
Centralized TTPs, including using Centralized TTPs for key management. It relies on
threshold cryptography’s key generation and distribution. This technique is used to solve
key management issues due to Centralized TTP limitations. Recall that a centralized TTP
is vulnerable to several types of attacks: it is a single point of failure, insecure, and does
not protect against many types of attacks, including side-channel, and correlation attacks;
it does not support dynamic key management, and it stores decryption keys in a single
centralized TTP server.
Our approach, with a multiparty solution, is a more secure and more efficient approach
to key management, which is handled by multiple servers, without any reliance on
centralized TTPs or trusted dealers. It provides server fault tolerance. Private keys are
generated and distributed by multiple servers, and decryption for the encapsulated ADB
data is performed in an interactive way, using t-out-of-k parties.
It relies on a fully decentralized key management approach that has the following
features: (i) Use Threshold RSA for protecting metadata2 (M2) and Ciphertext3 (C3); (ii)
Use D-CP-ABE for protecting data and metadata3 (M3); (iii) Use DHT for key-share
management to store/access key shares of identity-related data for ADBAs.
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Figure 5.3 Enhanced Active Data Bundle.

5.2.2.2. Enhancing the ADB Creation Mechanism
This subsection presents the enhancement of ADB’s creation mechanism as shown in
Figure 5.3, which includes the ADB’s metadata enhancement, the ADB’s encryption
mechanism enhancement, the ADB’s signing mechanism enhancement, the ADB’s
decryption and verification mechanisms enhancement, and finally, the ADB’s VM
protection mechanism.

5.2.2.2.1.

Enhancing Metadata

Three components of ADB metadata. ADB metadata has three parts: (i) Metadata 1
(M1)—including RTTlow, RTThigh, and the id of the backup and host trust (BHT) server,
which keeps track of current trust levels (TLs) for the hosts of the cloud (more details
below); (ii) Metadata 2 (M2)—including integrity-check metadata, identification of
hashing or integrity checking algorithms to be used, etc.; and (iii) Metadata 3 (M3)—
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including the remaining metadata of the ADB (i.e., metadata that are not in M1 or M2),
among others data access policies based on the user role.

Figure 5.4. ADB-SMC Encryption and Decryption Steps.

5.2.2.2.2.

Enhancing the ADB encryption Mechanism

The ADB encryption mechanism is enhanced by making it a three-step process. As
shown in Figure 5.4, these steps are as follows: (i) encrypting ADB data and M3—
producing Ciphertext 3 (C3); (ii) encrypting together C3 and M2—producing Ciphertext 2
(C2), and (iii) encrypting together C2 and M1—producing Ciphertext 1 (C1). We assume
the protection on C2 is strong enough to protect M2.
Since the ADB encryption mechanism has three steps, each ADB uses two pairs of
asymmetric keys (and hence two pairs of two sets of key shares), and one symmetric key.
As shown in Fig. 3, one key pair (pubABE/priABE) is used to create and decrypt Ciphertext
3 (including ADB data and Metadata 3) ; another key pair (pubRSA/priRSA)is used—to
create, and decrypt Ciphertext 2 (including Ciphertext 3 and Metadata 2) ; and a
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symmetric key (K) is used—to create, and decrypt Ciphertext 1 (including Ciphertext 2
and Metadata 1).

Figure 5.5. ADB-SMC Signing and Signature Verification Steps.

5.2.2.2.3.

The ADB Signing Mechanism

The signing and signature verification for Ciphertext 2 (C2), as shown in Figure 5.5,
uses one pair of keys (one pair of sets of key shares). C2 is signed because it includes two
important parts that need to be validated. It includes C3, which contains the sensitive data
and M2, which contains the hash value of C3, referred to as C3hash. It should be noted that
by signing C2, we protect both the sensitive data and the decryption keys since the VM can
only request data decryption keys if C2 and C3 are valid. We assume C1 is protected
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sufficiently by obfuscation.
We first calculate a hash value for C2 using for instance SHA-2.14 (at the originating
host) — generating C2hash; we then sign C2hash, using the signature key priRSA—
generating (C2sig). Finally, we add C2 with C2sig, producing SignedC2.
When ADB reaches its destination, it verifies the signed hash value of C2: C2sig with
the Signature Verification key pubRSA— generating C2hash. Next, a comparison should
be made between this C2hash with a newly calculated hash value of C2 at the target host
(C2hash). If both hashes match, then the signature is valid, and ADB should then proceed
to the next step in the enabling process.
We sign and verify signedC2 to validate its integrity. C2 includes both C3, which
contains the sensitive data, and M2 that contains C3hash, and the identification of integrity
checking algorithms to be used to validate it. C3hash is the integrity check value of C3,
calculated by the ADB VM by an assistant from the CA.
Note that our design does not require C3hash to be signed, since the protection on C2
is sufficient to protect the C3hash. Our goal of validating C2 and C3 is to maximize the
protection level of the data, including their decryption keys, and to minimize the overhead.
For example, the VM first verified signedC2 and proceeded to the following step of
validating C3, only if C2 appeared to be valid. Next, If C3 also appeared to be valid, then
only in this case would the VM request the decryption key shares (priABE) to decrypt C3;
otherwise, the VM will trigger the apoptosis operation to destruct the ADBA.
Note that there is only a request (key shares: priABE) if C2 contents and then C3
contents appeared to be unmodified; this way, we maximize protection of both the data and
the decryption keys and avoid any unnecessary overhead.

5.2.2.2.4.

Enhancing ADB decryption and verification mechanisms

If the ADB is allowed to visit H, either in the original or evaporated form (i.e., if TLH
≥ RTTlow), then the ADB’s VM must perform, this time, while visiting H, the next set of

14

SHA-2 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2) is a set of cryptographic hash functions used to determine data's integrity [49].
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checks, which are as follows.
(i) Decrypt Ciphertext1 (C1) to get signedC2 and M1.
First, M1 must be decrypted in order to get RTTlow, RTThigh, and the id of the backup
and host trust (BHT) server. Thus, the VM must use the symmetric key (K) to decrypt C1
to get signedC2 and M1. SignedC2 is composed of Ciphertext2 (C2) and the generated
signature value of the hashed C2. More details about how C2 and SignedC2 are generated
are shown in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 and are detailed in the enhancement of the signing
mechanism subsection. The VM uses the BHT server id to get the host trust value from
the BHT and compares it with RTTlow, and RTThigh to decide ADB dissemination.
(ii)

Verify C2sig then decrypt Ciphertext2 to get Ciphertext3 (C3) and M2.
Only after positive integrity verification of C2 signature (by its VM), C2 must be

decrypted to get C3 and M2. The verification of C2 signature starts by verifying its signed
value, C2sig. This means that at this step, the VM must use the signature verification key
on C2sig to get C2hash value calculated during ADB creation (cf. Fig. 5.4). Then, the VM
uses SHA-2 to calculate the C2 hash value at the destination and compares the result with
the one calculated during ADB creation. If both C2 hashes match, the VM proceeds to the
following step and decrypts C2 to get C3 and M2.
(iii)

Verify C3 then decrypt it to get Data and M3.
To verify C3, the VM must get the hashing/integrity checking algorithm and the

C3hash value calculated during ADB creation; both are stored by the CA. The computed
hash value C3hash is stored as a part of Metadata 2 (M2). This means that now, after
arriving at Host H, the VM must be able to decrypt M3 before releasing any data to Host
H.
Only after positive integrity verification of ADB (by its VM), Metadata 3 (M3) must
be decrypted in order to get data access policies. The policies are then followed to release
to H only the data that the policies allow H to see. This means that at this step the VM
decrypts Data and M3 (cf. Figure 5.3), so it is able to release any data that the visited Host
H may see.
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It should be clear from the above description that–since the ADB decryption process
has three steps—then the corresponding encryption process (run when an ADB is created)
must also have three steps. As shown in Figure 5.3, these steps are as follows: (i) encrypting
ADB data and M3—producing Ciphertext 3 (C3); (ii) encrypting together C3 and M2—
producing Ciphertext 2 (C2); and (iii) encrypting together C2 and M1—producing
Ciphertext 1 (C1). We assume the protection on C2 is strong enough to protect M2.
Since the ADB encryption mechanism has three steps, each ADB uses two pairs of
asymmetric keys (and hence two pairs of two sets of key shares), and one symmetric key.
As shown in Figure 5.3, one key pair (pubABE/priABE) is used to create and decrypt
Ciphertext 3 (including ADB data and Metadata 3), another key pair (pubRSA/priRSA)—
to create, and decrypt Ciphertext 2 (including Ciphertext 3 and Metadata 2), and a
symmetric key (K)—to create, and decrypt Ciphertext 1 (including Ciphertext 2 and
Metadata 1).

5.2.2.2.5.

Proposed VM Obfuscation Mechanism

Note that VM is not encrypted in any step, as it is protected by obfuscation.
Obfuscation is a defense mechanism used to protect against reverse engineering by
rendering the agent code unintelligible. It is the process of transforming an agent code into
an equivalent one that is hard to understand or reverse engineer without changing the
functionality of the agent code [31, 32]. According to Ref. [KuMe14, CGJZ01], many
obfuscation techniques are practical [KuMe14, DMRV03, Lafo16, BaSc05, CoTL98,
Low98, WHKD01, CGJZ01, BaSC05, Prem16, ScKa11]. We found out that the opensource obfuscation tool called ProGuard [Lafo16] is suitable for our design; further, it can
be integrated with JADE [BrVl09, Sula10, BCCD16]. It obfuscates Java code by replacing
and renaming fields, attributes, methods, and classes with ambiguous characters.

5.2.3.

Enhancing ADB Dissemination Mechanism

It is enhanced by making it a three-step process. When an ADB considers visiting Host
H, it must obtain the current trust level for H (TLH) from the BHT. The ADB faces three
cases: (i) the original (unchanged) ADB may visit Host H only if TLH > RTThigh; (ii) the
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evaporated ADB (i.e., the ADB with some of its data and metadata destroyed to prevent
their unauthorized disclosure) may visit H only if TLH ≥ RTTlow and TLH < RTThigh; and
(iii) the ADB must be apoptosized (self-destruct completely) if TLH < RTTlow (i.e., when
H is too dangerous to visit for this ADB).
Before identifying which of the three cases it faces, the ADB’s VM must get BHT’s ID
and the two RTT values, which are stored in Metadata 1 (M1). This means that the VM
must be able to get unencrypted M1 before visiting H. Fig. 3 shows that M1 is decrypted
before M2 and M3 are decrypted.

5.2.4.

Enhancing ADB Full Disclosure Mechanism

The subsection presents the enhancement of ADB’s data disclosure mechanisms. It first
discusses the enhancement of ADB evaporation mechanism. Then, it presents the ADB
apoptosis mechanism, and finally, it discusses the full disclosure of the ADB data
condition.

5.2.4.1.

Enhancing the ADB Evaporation Mechanism

Recall that the ADB’s evaporation (partial self-destruction) [BenO10] is triggered if
the ADB’s data are threatened with a disclosure. When a host’s trust level exceeds the
minimum trust threshold required by an ADB, the ADB will permit the visited host to
access all or some of its sensitive data (as determined by the ADB’s policies included in its
metadata). The ADB’s execution protocol triggers evaporation to destroy to some of the
sensitive data for which the current visited host has no authorization (and which it might
try to steal).
We enhanced evaporation by creating a secure backup ADB copy as follows. When an
ADB is about to visit Host H, the ADB’s VM first obtains TLH from the BHT. Then, the
VM compares TLH with two trust thresholds for the ADB: RTTlow, and RTThigh. If TLH ≥
RTTlow but TLH < RTThigh, we say that TLH is “sufficient but low.” In this case, H receives
an “evaporated” version of the ADB: that is, the ADB with some data and metadata
evaporated.
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The backup ADBA copy can then be used (instead of another original ADBA
retransmitted from the ADBA‘s originating site), if another destination host has a higher
trust level than the one for which an evaporation or apoptosis of the ADBA was performed,
thereby saving the need to get another original ADBA from the site of its creation.

5.2.4.2. Enhancing the ADB Apoptosis Mechanism
ADB’s apoptosis function is triggered to destroy, without a retrievable trace, and in a
clean way, all ADB’s data. In ABTTP, data are completely apoptosized if the visited host’s
trust level is below the required apoptosis threshold. In ADB-SMC, we will use a
mechanism with CP-ABE, permitting assessment of encrypted data and assuring that data
decryption takes place only if the attributes satisfy the ciphertext access structure, and if—
as a result—the assessment produces a positive outcome.
The apoptosis mechanism is enhanced in an analogous way. A time-restricted backup
ADBA copy is created when TLH < RTTlow. It is protected by an access structure, and can
be apoptosized when threatened, when a predetermined time period expires or when
another condition (to be determined by us) is satisfied.
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Figure 5.6. The ADB Creation Process in ADB-SMC.
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Figure 5.7. The ADB Enabling Process in ADB-SMC.
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5.2.4.3. Enhancing the ADB Full Disclosure Mechanism
When an ADB is about to visit Host H, the ADB’s VM first obtains TLH from the BHT.
Then, the VM compares TLH with two trust thresholds for the ADB: RTTlow, and RTThigh.
If TLH ≥ RTThigh, we say that TLH is “sufficiently high.” In this case, H receives ADB with
full data and metadata. Note that in the previous ABTTP design, ADB obtains TLH on the
visited host, which increases the risk of compromising ADB’s data and decryption keys
since the full disclosure of ADB’s data is decided on Host H.
The enabling process for the full disclosure of data case is already illustrated in
subsection 1a4. To fully disclose authorized ADB’s data at Host H, ADB’s VM must
validate a series of conditions described as follows: (i) TLH ≥ RTThigh; (ii) The verification
of C2 must be valid, and finally (iii), The verification of C3 must be valid. The new ADB
creation and enabling processes can now be summarized as shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.7.

5.2.5.

Control Access to Sensitive Data with Decentralized AttributeBased Encryption (ABE)

ADB-SMC supports fine-grained privilege control on ADB data based on D-CP-ABE,
which is extended from CP-ABE to maintain privacy using independent, decentralized
multiple authorities. The scheme relies on Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS) matrices
as an access structure. LSSS is a secret sharing scheme that is defined over a finite field F,
such that the shares are computed as a linear function of the secret that consists of one or
more field elements and some random field elements [DaDa14]. It is used for implementing
a monotone access structure in CP-ABE. It protects both data and the identities of cloud
users by issuing and managing users’ credentials via multiple authorities.

5.2.5.1. Access Policy Setup for D-CP-ABE
A data owner can use D-CP-ABE to format the access policy. D-CP-ABE relies on
Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS) Matrices [LeWa11]. LSSS can be derived from a
Boolean formula. A Boolean formula is considered as an access tree A, where the leaf
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nodes correspond to the attributes, and the logical gates “AND (˄)” and “OR (˅)” act as
interior nodes.
In LSSS, the number of rows should match the number of leaf nodes in the access tree.
Every piece in LSSS is a vector over some finite field. In the access structure, every set
participates in reconstructing the secret using a linear combination of the piece’s
coordinations. (1,0,…0) is used as a sharing vector of the LSSS matrix. The root node of
the access tree is labeled with vector (1), which means a vector with length 1.
The child nodes are labeled with vectors determined by the vector parent. In the case
of OR gate, the child nodes are labeled with v; if their parent node is an OR gate, they are
labeled with vector v. However, if the parent node is an AND gate that is labeled with a
vector v, then v is padded with 0 at the end, if needed, to make the vector length c. C is
maintained as a global counter variable that is initialized to 1. Next, one of the AND gate
children is labeled with the vector v|1, where | denotes concatenation, and the remaining
children are labeled with the vector (0,...,0)|−1, in which (0,...,0) means the zero vector of
length c. The AND gates vectors we described sum to v|0. Next, c is incremented by 1. At
the end, when the entire tree has been labeled, we check the vectors labeling the leaf nodes
from the rows of the LSSS matrix and pad the shorter ones with 0’s, in case they have
different lengths and to make it all consistent with the same length [LeWa11, DYLC14].

5.2.5.2. System initialization for D-CP-ABE
In the system initialization phase, the data owner first selects a large prime q, and two
groups G1, and G2 of order q; A map e: G1 x G1 → G2; and a hash function H: {0,1} ∗
→ G, which maps the user global identities GID to elements of G1. Next, the data owner
identifies a set of attributes Si to describe accessing the data file; then it selects two random
exponents αi, yi ∈ Zq for each attribute in S. Hence, the system secret key is as follows:
SK = {αi, yi ∀ i}, and the system public key = PK[i] = {e (g, g) αi, gyi, i ∈ si}.
The system initialization phase is achieved by running the global setup algorithm
[LeWa11], which takes security parameter λ as an input and outputs global parameters GP
for the system. Then it takes GP as an input and outputs the pair:
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PK[i] = {e (g, g) αi, gyi, i ∈ si}, SK[i] = {αi, yi, i ∈ si}.

5.2.5.3. Encryption for D-CP-ABE
For every outsourced data file, the data owner needs to define first the set of attributes
used to describe accessing the file. The steps of constructing the access policy and
converting it to an LSSS matrix was already discussed in Subsection 5.2.3.1.
A message is encrypted using the LSSS access structure (M, ρ ), such that M is the
message and ρ is a permutation function to map the message rows into attributes in the
access tree A. The encryption algorithm takes as an input the public key and the access
matrix (A, p), data, and produces the Ciphertext. The data owner processes the message
M by using the encryption algorithm [LeWa11] as follows:
(i)

Select randomly a seed s ∈ Zq and a random vector v ∈ Z1q , such that s is the
first entry.

(ii)

let λx denote Ax. v, where Ax is row x of A.

(iii)

Select randomly a vector v ∈ Z1q with 0 as the first entry.

(iv)

Encrypt Message with access matrix (A, p), and compute the ciphertext as
follows:
C0 = Me (g1, g1) s, C1, x = e (g1, g1)λx e (g1, g1)αρ(x)rx, C2, x = grx 1 , C3,x
= gyρ(x)rx 1 gωx 1 ∀x.

Where ρ(x) is a permutation function mapping Ax to attribute si.
(v)

Finally, the ciphertext of encrypting the data and metadata (access matrix) is as
follows:
∀x {cx, {C0, C1, x, C2, x, C3, x};(A, p)}.

5.2.5.4. Key Generation and Distribution for D-CP-ABE
The key is generated and distributed using D-CP-ABE as follows:

105

(i)

The data owner gets the cloud user GID from the key authorities.

(ii)

The data owner assigns a set of attributes Si: for example, Host4 (H4) denoted
as SiH4 for user UH4.

(iii)

The authority calculates the secret key as follows:

priABE = KeyGen (GID, GP, si, ski), where GID is the global identifier that is used
to manage collusion resistance among authorities. GP is the global parameters, and
si is the set of attributes belong to selected authorities and their secret keys ski.
priABE (Ki; GID) = gαiH(GID)yi.
The key generation algorithm [LeWa11] takes as an input the following: KeyGen (GID,
GP, Si, Ski), where GID is the global identifier that is used to manage collusion resistance
among authorities; GP are the global parameters; and Si is the set of attributes that belong
to selected authorities and their secret keys Ski (ski: secret key shares generated by each
authority).

5.2.5.5.

Decryption for D-CP-ABE

When cloud users receive the data, they can be decrypted as follows:
(i)

The cloud user receives the encrypted data C= {{C0, C1,x,C2,x,C3,x}x
∈{1,2,3,4};(A, p)} including the access matrix, and computes the H(GIDH4)

(ii)

The cloud user selects constants cx ∈ Zq such that ∑𝑥 = cxAx = (1, 0,...,0)

(iii)

The cloud user receives the secret keys {Kρ(x),GID} for a subset of rows Ax
(CT,{Ki,GID},GP) → M , then calculates:
∏x e(g1,g1)λx e(H(GID),g1)Ax)cx and message is obtained s follows:
M = C0/e(g1,g1)s.
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Figure 5.8. Access Policy Example of ADB Data.

Figure 5.8 shows an example of a Boolean formula of the attribute set access structure
for the outsourced data. The formula is presented as follows: S = {s1(PhD Student),s2(25122-1414),s3(Security Lab),s4(2016)}. We convert the formula to an LSSS matrix by using,
as an example, the algorithm presented in Liu et al.[LiCa10]. Hence, the outputted matrix
for Figure 5.7 and permutation function p should look like the following [LeWa11,
DYLC14]:

MAp =

1
0
0
0

1
-1
-1
0

0
0
1
-1
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Table 5.1. Permutation Function p Example [DYLC14].
p

1

2

3

4

P(x)

S1

S2

S3

S4

The data owner encrypts the file with access matrix (M, p) and system public key PK,
and then sends the generated ciphertext C= {{C0, C1,x,C2,x,C3,x}x ∈{1,2,3,4}; (A, p)}
accompanied with the hash function H to the cloud user. Hence, only users have a secret
key matching, for example, “Ph.D. Student and 2016” in order to access the file.
If Alice is a cloud user with IDH4 and wants to access the file with Ph.D. student AND
security lab AND 2016, the following should be accomplished:
(i)

Alice is given the following attributes: s1, s3 and s4. Hence, SH4 = {s1, s3, s4},
where H4 denotes the Host 4.

(ii)

Alice is given the secret key SkH4 = {sk1, H4, sk3, H4, sk4, H4}.

(iii)

The generated ciphertext that is resulted from encrypting the data using the
above attributes, and outsourced to Alice should look like the following:
C = {{C0, C1,x,C2,x,C3,x}x ∈{1,2,3,4};(A, p)} and H(GIDH4).

(iv)

Alice will use the permutation function p to check the common attributes
accompanied with the outsourced data, e.g., s1,s3 and s4.

(v)

The LSSS matrix A then is checked to find the matching vectors of attribute
s1,s3 and s4 which happen to be (1,1,0),(0,1,1) and (0,0,1).

(vi)

Following the decryption algorithm, Alice locates the linear combination of
rows 1,3 and 4 to (1,0,0) as follows: (1,1,0) + (0,-1,1) + (0,0,-1) = (1,0,0). Next,
Alice recovers the encrypted data by using the decryption algorithm to calculate
e(g1,g1)s .
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5.2.6.

Providing Decentralized Solution for Protecting Outsourced
Data in the Cloud

The subsection presents two solutions. One protects sensitive data outsourced to a cloud
throughout their entire life cycle—both in the cloud as well as outside of the cloud (e.g.,
during transmission to or from the cloud). The other protects identities in the cloud.

5.2.6.1. Using ADB-SMC for Outsourcing Data into a Cloud and Data
Dissemination
We propose a solution that outsources data into the cloud, using ADB-SMC. We
already described our enhancement for the solution components. In this section, we present
the sequence diagrams and their detailed scenarios. We describe, in turn, the sequence
diagrams for creating, enabling, and disseminating ADBA.
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KAA

CA (1)
2.1) Determine
access policies AP (M3)
and attributes Si
2.2) Forward
AP, Si

KSAs

2.3) Distribute AP, Si & request
generating pubABE, priABE
2.4) Run global setup
2.5) Run authorities setup
to generate pubABE
2.6) Run key generation
to generate priABE
2.7) Store ADBA

3.1) Select
security level
3.2) Inform Security level

identities

3.3) Determine k & t
3.4) Request DSKGs
3.5) Run DSKGs
3.6) Store ADBA
identities

4.1) Ask for pubABE

4.2) Request pubABE
4.3) Send pubABE
5) Encrypt data, and
M3 to generate C3
6.1) Compute hash
for C3
6.2) Determine M2
7.1) Ask for pubRSA & priRSA
7.2) Forward request
7.3) Send pubRSA, priRSA
7.4) Encrypt C3 & M2 to generate C2
7.5) Sign C2 to generate signedC2
7.6) Encrypt signedC2 & M1 to
generate C1
8.1) Add migration itineraries to
complete VM Implementation
8.2) Obfuscate VM

Figure 5.9. ADBA Creation Sequence Diagram.
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5.2.6.1.1.

ADB-SMC Sequence Diagram for Creating ADBA

Figure 5.9 shows the sequence diagram for creating a single ADBA. Before discussing
the diagram in detail, let us note that KA platform and servers managed by KS agents are
not a part of any cloud.
Figure 5.8 shows how a data owner (DO) can use the proposed scheme to create an
ADBA encapsulating DO’s data. (ADBA can then be outsourced into one or more clouds).
The data and metadata are structured with cascade encryption algorithms. The virtual
machine manages the creation processes via a client agent GUI. The ADBA creation steps
are as follows:
1)

DO uses the CA (Client Agent) software: (i) to create ADBA, which encapsulates
DO’s data; and (ii) to manage the dissemination of ADBA. The CA software is
implemented using a mobile agent [Jade07].

2)

DO assisted by CA, determines the access policies (AP) needed when encrypting the
DO’s data. Then, CA distributes through KAA the attributes needed in the process of
encrypting and decrypting the data to a random subset of KSAs. In practice, we would
allow every single authority to control several attributes, and the authority would run
the D-CP-ABE setup algorithm for each attribute: each attribute would have its own
public key and secret key. Note that AP is contained within Metadata 3 (M3). Each
KSA is instructed by KAA (from KA Platform) to generate its pair of public and private
key shares. The appropriate shares are later tied together to create pubABE, and
priABE. There are five substeps in this step:
2.1) Each DO, with CA’s assistance (such as templates, forms, drafts, etc.), determines

access policies AP, which we called Metadata 3 (M3), and a list of attributes Si.
DO encrypts the data according to the access policies, such that only cloud users
with attributes associated with their private key shares can decrypt the DO’s
Data if matched or if satisfy the policy. For example, suppose the DO is a
professor who wants to encrypt her lab report files for all members of the
security lab or for any one of her Ph.D. students: The DO will want to encrypt
the files with the access policy {"Security lab" AND "member of security lab"}
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OR "Ph.D. student". In this scenario, only cloud users with attributes (private
key shares) that match the policy can decrypt the DO files.
2.2)

CA forwards the access policies AP and the attributes Si through the KAA to a
random subset of KSAs, and requests that they together generate key shares for
the public key pubABE, and key shares for the private key priABE; the key
shares will be used to protect ADBA’s data.
The access policies AP are used to encrypt the DO’s data that will become
ADBA data. AP will be embedded with DO’S data ciphertext during encrypting
the DO’S data and used to determine who can access the data, based on user
role. The attributes Si are used to generate the public and private key shares for
encryption and decryption.

2.3) KAA

forwards the AP and distributes the attributes Si to a random subset of KS

agents, and instructs them to generate the key shares for the public key pubABE,
and the key shares for private key priABE, based on the access policies AP and
the attributes Si. (Note that in Substep (2.2) forwarding is from DO/CA to KAA,
and here from KAA to a subset of KS agents).
2.4)

KSAs runs the D-CP-ABE global setup algorithm [LeWa11], which takes
security parameter λ as an input and outputs global parameters GP for the
system.

2.5)

Each KSA runs the D-CP-ABE authority setup [LeWa11], which takes the GP as
an input and output public and secret key shares (pki, and ski). Note that pubABE
is generated in this step, using the public key shares (pki) from the relevant keyshare authorities. The priABE is generated in the following substep:

2.6)

KS agents run the key generation algorithm [LeWa11] to generate the private
key shares priABE that are used to decrypt ADBA sensitive data. During the key
generation phase, a random set of KSAs is instructed by the KAA to run the key
generation algorithm which takes as an input the following: KeyGen (GID, GP,
Si, Ski), where GID is the global identifier that is used to manage collusion
resistance among authorities. GP are the global parameters, and Si is the set of
attributes belonging to selected authorities and their secret keys Ski (ski: secret
key shares generated in Substep (2.6) by each authority).
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2.7)

The generated priABE will be stored on the selected KSAs using a distributed
hash table (DHT) scheme.

3)

DO (acting via CA software) determines the security level needed for the data and
part of the metadata (metadata 2). This determines the total number of authorities
(KSAs) and the threshold needed in the decryption process. There are six substeps in
this step:
3.1)

DO via CA selects the security level required to decrypt Ciphertext 2 (C2).

3.2)

DO informs the KAA about the selected security level.

3.3)

KAA selects a random set of KS agents, to determine the number k of

participating agents, and the threshold t (that is, the number of participants needed
for C2 decryption).
3.4)

Then, KAA, based on the selected security level value, instructs random

subset of KSAs to run the DSKG.
3.5)

Each KSA using DSKGs (encryption and signature) protocols calculates

jointly two pairs of keys shares; one pair is used for encryption and decryption,
another for signing and signature verification.
3.6)

The generated encryption, decryption, signing, and signature verification

key shares are stored in a DHT, in association with the information stored in Substep
(2.7).
4)

DO uses the CA software to access the key information from the KS agents to encrypt
the needed data to be outsourced. There are three substeps here:
4.1)

CA via the KAA requests encryption key shares required to encrypt the

DO’s data.
4.2)

KAA requests appropriate KSAs to forward pubABE generated in Substep

(2.5) to encrypt the data.
4.3)

KS agents forward the encryption key shares pubABE to the CA.

5) CA encrypts the sensitive data using the encryption algorithm [LeWa11] and
generates Ciphertext 3 (C3). The encryption algorithm takes as an input pubABE,
Metadata 3 (M3) (represented as access matrix15 (A, p)), data, and produces
Ciphertext 3. Metadata 3 is the data access policy based on user role.
15

Information about how to drive LSSS Matrices from Boolean Formulas is found in [LeWa11].
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6) CA computes the integrity check value of for C3 that we call C3hash and the
identification of integrity checking algorithm to be used to validate C3 then
determines metadata 2 to encrypt it with C3. There are two substeps in this step:
6.1) CA computes the hash value for C3 to generate C3hash.
6.2) CA Determines Metadata 2 (M2), which includes (C3hash, identification of hash
or integrity checking algorithms to be used, etc.).
7) CA uses the encryption, and signature generation algorithms [BoFr01] to encrypt
together C3, and M2. The output of the encryption step is Ciphertext 2 (C2). C2 is
signed and the produced value C2sig is attached then with C2 to produce signedC2.
There are six substeps in this step:
7.1) CA sends a request to the KAA for the encryption and signature keys shares
(pubRSA, and priRSA).
7.2) KAA requests appropriate KSAs to forward the pubRSA and priRSA keys.
7.3) KS agents deliver the requested keys shares to the CA.
7.4) CA uses the delivered pubRSA key to encrypt C3 and M2. C2 is generated.
7.5) CA hash C2 and produce C2hash. C2hash then is signed using priRSA
producing C2sig. C2sig is then attached to C2 to generate signedC2.
7.6) CA uses the AES symmetric algorithm [DoRi04] to encrypt signedC2 and
Metadata 1 (M1). The algorithm takes as an input signedC2, M1, and the
symmetric key (K) and output Ciphertext 1 (C1).
8) ADBA finalizes the implementation of its VM so that ADBA can be delivered to its
destination. There are two substeps in this step:
8.1) ADBA completes the implementation of its VM by adding the migration
itineraries so that ADBA can be delivered to its target host. This should include
the Ciphertext 1 (C1).
8.2) CA Obfuscates ADBA VM using ProGuard [Lafo16]. ADBA is generated.
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5.2.6.1.2.
ADB-SMC Sequence Diagram for Disseminating and Enabling
…...ADBA
The subsection presents three scenarios for disseminating and enabling ADBA to its
destination hosts. We first describe the major steps that ADBA needs to perform, and then
we present the scenarios.
A) The apoptosis operation:
a.1) ADBA reports apoptosis operation to the audit service.
a.2) The VM apoptosizes ADBA.

B) The evaporation operation:
b.1) VM re-encrypts signedC2 & M1.
b.2) VM obfuscates ADBA.
b.3) VM creates an image of ADBA.
b.4) ADBA image moves to BHT to be stored temporarily until either a predetermined
time expires or ADBA copy receives a call from ADBA to resume its work.
b.5) ADBA reports the evaporation activity to the audit service.
b.6) VM triggers the evaporation mechanism to evaporate the data that requires trust
level larger than RTThigh.

C) Checking Host Trust Level operation:
c.1) The VM uses the BHT server id to get the host trust value from the BHT and
compares it with RTTlow, and RTThigh to decide ADB dissemination.
c.2) The VM sends a request to the BHT inquiring about H4 trust level.
c.3) BHT replies with Host H4 trust value.
c.4) The VM compares ADB RTTlow, and RTThigh, with the extracted host trust value
TLH4. The result of the comparison is one of the following three cases:
c.4.1) TLH4 < RTTlow, means the host trust level is low.
In this case, the VM call the apoptosis operation
c.4.2) TLH4 ≤ RTTlow & TLH4 < RTThigh, means the host trust level is sufficiently
low. In this case the VM calls the evaporation operation.
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c.4.3) TLH4 ≥ RTThigh means the host trust level is sufficiently high.

D) Decrypting Layer Three encryption:
d.1) VM Un-obfuscate ADBA using ProGuard [Lafo16].
d.2) VM uses the symmetric key K to decrypts C1 into M1 and C2 in order to get
contents of M1: RTTlow, RTThigh, BHT server id.
d.3) VM decrypts C1

E) Decrypting Layer Two encryption:
e.1) VM sends a request to the KAA asking for the verification and decryption shared
keys.
e. 2) KA forwards the VM request to the KS agents.
e. 3) KSAs sends the verification and decryption shared keys to the VM.
e .4) VM uses the verification shared key to verify the data and metadata sent from
its owner. This means verifying signedC2 as explained in enhancing ADB
signing above.
e.5) VM decrypts C2 into M2 and C3 in order to get contents of M2: integrity-check
metadata (C3hash), and identification of hashing or integrity checking
algorithms to be used.
e.6) VM uses identification of hashing or integrity checking algorithm, SHA-2 to
Compute C3 hash value.
e.7) VM compares C3hash stored in M2 with the one calculated at the CA, and makes
sure they match, so the enabling process will continue only if this condition hold.
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F) Decrypting Layer One encryption:
f.1) VM request KAA to send priADB
f.2) KAA forwards the VM request to the KS agents.
f.3) KS agents send priADB to the VM.
f.4) VM uses priABE to decrypt C1 into data and M3. (release only required portion
of data based on host role).

5.2.6.1.2.1.

ADB-SMC Sequence Diagram for Disseminating and Enabling
ADBA Scenario One

The subsection presents a Scenario One sequence diagram for disseminating and
enabling ADBA. Scenario One is executed when the destination host is low. Or if TLH4/H5
< RTTlow, we say that TLH4/H5 is “low.” In this case. ADBA triggers the apoptosis
operation to destroy ADBA, and therefore H4/H5 does not receive ADBA since it is being
created from the originating host. Figure 5.10 shows that ADBA is scheduled to be
delivered to two users residing on two hosts: Alice on Host 1 (H4) and Bob on Host 2
(H5).16 It illustrates how cloud users enable the outsourced data protected by the proposed
ADB-SMC system. Enabling this outsourcing involves the following steps:

16

Recall that in one-to-one ADBA dissemination, the ADB is sent to a single destination. In one-to-many ADB
disseminations, the same ADB is sent to 2 or more entities. Therefore, we illustrate here the simplest one-to-many ADBA
dissemination.
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DO

CA
(1)

KAA

1)
Un-Obfuscate
VM C1
2) Decrypt
(b1)
4) Get TLH4

KSAs

BHT

H4
Alice

Audit

H5
Bob

3) Request TLH4
(c.2)

5) VM find out
TLH4 < RTTlow
(c.4)
7) Apoptosize
ADBA (a.2)

6) Report
(a.1)

Conditional Communication

Conditional Event

Figure 5.10. ADB-SMC Enabling and Dissemination Sequence Diagram, Scenario
One.

1) VM decrypt Layer Three encryption.
2) VM call the “checking host trust level” operation, and found that the host is low,
so it call the apoptosis operation.
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priRSA
19) Verify signedC2
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22) Decrypt C2
23) Compute
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24)Compare
C3 hashes
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priABE
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28) Direct
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29) Send
priABE
30) Decrypt C3

Conditional Event

Conditional Communication

Figure 5.11. ADB-SMC Enabling and Dissemination Sequence Diagram, Scenario
Two.
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5.2.6.1.2.2.

ADB-SMC Sequence Diagram for Disseminating and Enabling
ADBA Scenario Two

The subsection presents the scenario two sequence diagram for disseminating and
enabling ADBA. Scenario Two is executed when the destination host is sufficient but low.
Or If TLH4/5 ≥ RTTlow but TLH4/5 < RTThigh.

In this case, H4/H5 receives an

“evaporated” version of the ADB (that is, the ADBA with some data and metadata
evaporated). Figure 5.11 shows that ADBA is scheduled to be delivered to two users
residing on two hosts. Alice on Host 4 (H4) and Bob on Host 5 (H5). Enabling this
outsourcing involves the following steps:

1) VM decrypt Layer Three encryption.
2) VM call the “checking host trust level” operation, and found that the host is
sufficiently low, so it call the evaporation operation.
3) VM migrates the evaporated ADBA copy to Host H4.
4) VM decrypt Layer Three encryption.
5) VM decrypt Layer Two encryption and call the apoptoise operation if the
verification process failed.
6) VM decrypt Layer One encryption.
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Figure 5.12. ADB-SMC Enabling and Dissemination Sequence Diagram, Scenario
Three.
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5.2.6.1.2.3.

ADB-SMC Sequence Diagram for Disseminating and Enabling
ADBA Scenario Three

This subsection presents the scenario three sequence diagram for disseminating and
enabling ADBA. Scenario three is executed when the destination host is sufficiently high.
In other words, when TLH4 ≥ RTThigh. In this case, H4/H5 receives ADB (that is, the
ADB with all data and metadata). Figure 5.12 shows that ADBA is scheduled to be
delivered to two users residing on two hosts. Alice on Host 4 (H4) and Bob on Host 5 (H5).
Enabling this outsourcing involves the following steps:
1) VM decrypt Layer Three encryption.
2) VM check host trust status and found that the host is sufficiently high.
3) VM migrates ADBA to Host H4.
4) VM decrypt Layer Three encryption.
5) VM decrypt Layer Two encryption and call the apoptosis operation if the
verification process failed.
6) VM decrypt Layer One encryption.

01:
02:
03:
04:
05:
06:
07:
08:
09:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:

main () {
/* Bundle data, metadata, and VM into ADB
(5.2.6.1.1) Step (1)(2)(3)*/
data = Ask owner for the data;
/* Metadata is divided into M1, M2, and M3
*/
M1 = RTTlow, RTThigh, BHT server id;
adbInt = C3hash calculated by the CA;
M2 = adbInt, identification of hash or
integrity checking algorithms to be
used, etc;
M3 = Data access policy (AP)from DO;
GP = Set of global parameters;
K = AES symmetric key;
pubABE = CP-ABE public key shares from DHT;
pubRSA = RSA public key shares from DHT;
priRSA = RSA private key shares from DHT;
VM = an instance of a mobile agent java
class;
/* Ci denotes ith ciphertext. Call Function
encryptDataM3 (5.2.6.1.1) Step (4) */
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23:
24:
25:
26:
27:
28:
29:
30:
31:
32:
33:
34:
35:
36:
37:
38:
39:
40:
41:
42:
43:
44:
45:
46:
47:
48:
49:
50:
51:
52:
53:
54:
55:
56:
57:
58:
59:
60:
61:
62:
63:
64:
65:
66:
67:
68:
69:
70:
71:
72:
73:

C3 =

encryptDataM3

( data, M3, pubABE );

/* Call Function encryptM2 Step (4) */
C2 = encryptM2 ( C3, M2, pubRSA );
/* Call Function signEncryptedM2 Step (4)
Step (5) */
signedC2 =signEncryptedM2 (C2hash,C2,
priRSA);
/* Call Function encryptM1 Step (7) */
C1 = encryptM1 ( signedC2, M1, K );

}

/* Call Function createADBagent */
ADBagent = createADBagent ( C1, K, VM);
/* main */

/* Function Encrypt data and M3 with pubABE
Step(8)*/
encryptDataM3 ( data, M3, pubABE ) {
Encrypt data, M3 with pubABE;
return C3;
} /* encryptDataM3 */
/*Function encrypt C3, M2, with pubRSA */
encryptM2 ( C3, M2, pubRSA )
{
Encrypt C3 and M2 with pubRSA;
return C2;
} /* encryptM2 */
/* Function sign C2 with priRSA */
signEncryptedM2( C2hash, priRSA ) {
Hash C2 using SHA-2 to generate C2hash;
Sign C2hash with priRSA to get C2sig;
Combine C2 and C2sig;
return signedC2;
} /* signedEncryptM2 */
/* Function Encrypt signedC2 and M1 with K */
encryptM1 ( signedC2, M1, K ) {
Encrypt signedC2 and M1 with K;
return C1;
} /* encryptM1 */
/* Function Implement ADBA */
createADBAgent (C1, K, VM){
Bundle C1, K with VM;
Obfuscate VM with ProGuard;
return ADBA;
} /* createADBAgent */

Figure 5.13. Pseudocode for ADB Creation.
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5.2.6.2. Pseudocode for Using ADB-SMC in Outsourcing Data into Cloud
This section presents the pseudocode for implementing ADBA to outsource data into
the cloud. We first describe the pseudocode for creating ADBA to encapsulate the data that
need to be outsourced, including the metadata as it shown in Figure 5.13. We then describe
the pseudocode for disseminating and enabling the ADBA as it shown in Figure 5.14. Our
pseudo-code is a C-style pseudocode, as discussed next.

01:
02:
03:
04:
05:
06:
07:
08:
09:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:
26:
27:
28:
29:
30:
31:
32:
33:
34:
35:
36:
37:
38:
39:
40:

main () {
/* Metadata is divided into M1, M2, and M3 */
M1 = RTTlow, RTThigh, BHT server id;
M2 = adbInt, identification of hash or integ
Rity checking algorithms to be used, etc;
M3 = Data access policy (AP);
GP = Set of global parameters;
K = AES symmetric key;
pubRSA = RSA public key shares from DHT;
priRSA = RSA private key shares from DHT;
priABE = D-CP-ABE private key shares from DHT;
adbInt = C3hash calculated by the CA;
adbInt-New = C3hash calculated at TH;
TLH = Host trust level for host H from BHT;
RTTlow = ADB low required trust threshold;
RTThigh = ADB high required trust threshold;
/* 3 cases to enable and Disseminate ADBA
Step(C)
*/
switch (TLH ) {
case low:
Un-obfuscate VM;
M1 = decryptEncryptedM1 ( C1, K );
Request TLH4 from BHT;
Get TLH4 from BHT;
if (TLH4 < RTTlow ) {
Report to audit server;}
Apoptosize ADBA;
break;
case sufficient:
switch (TLH ( sufficient )) {
case sufficentLow:
Un-obfuscate VM;
M1= decryptEncryptedM1 ( C1, K);
Request TLH4 from BHT;
Get TLH4 from BHT;
if( TLH4 ≥ RTTlow && TLH4 < RTThigh ){
C1=encryptM1(signedC2,M1, K)
Obfuscate VM;
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41:
42:
43:
44:
45:
46:
47:
48:
49:
50:
51:
52:
53:
54:
55:
56:
57:
58:
59:
60:
61:
62:
63:
64:
65:
66:
67:
68:
69:
70:
71:
72:
73:
74:
75:
76:
77:
78:
79:
80:
81:
82:
83:
84:
85:
86:
87:
88:
89:
90:

Obfuscate VM;
ADBA = createADBagent(C1,K, VM);
enableSuffLow (ADBA, K,
pubRSA, priABE);}
break;
case high:
Un-obfuscate VM;
M1= decryptEncryptedM1 ( C1, K);
if ( TLH4 ≥ RTThigh){
C1=encryptM1(signedC2,M1,K);
Obfuscate VM;
ADBA = createADBagent(C1,K,VM );
enableHighADB (ADBA, K, pubRSA,
priABE);
}
break;
} /* switch (TLH ( suf*))*/
break; /* case sufficient */
} /* switch (TLH )*/
} /* main */
/* Decrypt C1 using K Step (D)*/
decryptEncryptedM1 ( C1, K){
Decrypt C1 using K;
return signedC2, M1;
} /* decryptEncryptedM1 */
/* Verify signedC2 is sent from the DO
Step(E)*/
verifyEncryptedM2( SigneC2, pubRSA ) {
verify C2sig with pubRSA generating
C2hash;
Hash C2 using SHA-2 to generate C2hash;
Compare C2hash hashes;
return (C2hash == C2hash));
} /* verifyEncryptedM2 */
/* Decrypt C2 with priRSA Step (F) */
decryptEncryptedM2 ( C2, priRSA){
Decrypt C2 using priRSA;
return C3, M2;
} /* decryptEncryptedM2 */
/* Compare host & destinations hash values Step
(C)*/
intgComp ( adbInt, adbInt-New ) {
Compare adbInt with adbInt-New;
return (adbInt == adbInt-New)
} /* intgComp */

125

91: /* Decrypt C3 Step (F) */
92: decryptEncryptedDataM3 ( C3, priABE ){
93:
Decrypt C3 using priABE key;
94:
return data and M3;
95: } /* decryptEncryptedDataM3 */
96:
97: /* ADBA mobility if trust is sufficientLow
98:
Step(C)*/
99: dissLowADB ( ADBA ) {
100:
Create ADBA Copy;
101:
Move ADBA Copy to BHT;
102:
Store ADBA Copy at BHT;
103:
DataEvap = evaporateADB ( C3, M3, M2 )
104:
/* re-encrypt evaporated data */
105:
C3 = encryptDataM3( DataEvap, M3, pubABE );
106:
C2 = encryptM2 ( C3, M2, pubRSA );
107:
signedC2 = signEncryptM2( C2, priRSA );
108:
C1 = encryptM1 ( signedC2, M1, K );
109:
ADBevap = createADBagent( C1, K, VM );
110:
Move
ADBEvap to TLH4;
111: } /* dissLowADB */
112:
113: /* ADBA mobility when trust is high Step(C)*/
114: dissHighADB ( ADBA ) {
115:
Move ADBA to Host H4;
116: } /* dissHighADB */
117:
118: /* ADBA enabling when TLH is sufficientLow */
119: enableSuffLow ( ADBEvap , K, pubRSA, priABE ) {
120:
dissLowADB (ADBEvap);
121:
Unobfuscate ADBA VM;
122:
M1= decryptEncryptedM1 ( C1, K);
123:
if ( verifyEncryptedM2 (SignedC2, pubRSA )){
124:
C3 = decryptEncryptedM2( C2, priRSA );
125:
if ( intgComp ( adbInt, adbInt-New)){
126:
data=decryptEncryptedDataM3(C3,priABE);
127:
return data, M3;
128:
} else {
129:
Report to audit;
130:
Apoptosize ADBA;
131:
} /* if-else (intgComp (adbInt,*)) */
132:
} /* if(verifyEcryp*(signe**,pubR*)) */
133: } /* enableSuffLow */
134: /* ADBA mobility if trust is high */
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135: enableHighADB (ADBA, pubRSA, priABE, K ) {
136:
dissHigADB ( ADBA );
137:
Unobfuscate ADBA VM;
138:
if ( verifyEncryptedM2 ( SignedC2, pubRSA)) {
139:
C3 = decryptEncryptedM2 (C2, priRSA );
140:
if (intgComp ( adbInt, adbInt-New )){
141:
data=decryptEncryptedDataM3(C3,priABE);
142:
return data, M3;
143:
} else {
144:
Report to audit;
145:
Apoptosize ADBA;
146:
} /* if-else ( intgComp (adbInt*)) */
147:
} /* if (verifyADB (signD**, pubR* )) */
148: } /* enableHighADB */
149:
150: /* Evaporate most sensitive Data Step(B)*/
151: evaporateADB (C3, M3, M1) {
152:
if (TLH4 ≥ RTTlow && TLH4 < RTThigh ) {
153:
Evaporate data which require TLH larger
154:
than RTThigh and data which do not
155:
Satisfy user role specified in M3;
156:
return DataEvap;
157:
} /* if ( data do not satisfy *** */
158: } /* evaporateADB */

Figure 5.14. Pseudocode for ADB Enabling and Dissemination.

Table 5.2. Illustration of Distributed Partial Secret Shares [MaWB99].

Server Name

S1

S2

S3

Key Shares

d1

d2

d3, d1

5.2.6.3. Salient Features of the ADB-SMC Scheme
Our integration highlights the following objectives:
1) ADB-SMC replaces the centralized TTP with decentralized TTPs. This supports fault

tolerance, protects private keys better, and offers parallelism.
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2) ADB-SMC supports fault tolerance. Our solution supports fault tolerance by

allowing some parties to hold additional (and redundant) partial shares distributed by
other members. We assume that our solution relies on an enhanced version of
[BoFr01], which we refer to as Malkin et al method [MaWB99] to support fault
tolerance. Malkin et al. [MaWB99] explain a method for fault tolerance that is
appropriate for a small value of N. The idea is to make Server i split its private key
further into more shares, to allow k-out-of-N sharing. Table 5.2. shows that S1 and
S2 keep only single shares of the key, but S3 keeps an additional redundant Share d1.
This protects against loss of this particular share. Using t-out-of-k shares enables any
subset of t parties to obtain the private key, but a secret cannot be reconstructed at a
single location or by one entity. If N is large, the Rabin’s method17 is recommended
for fault tolerance.
3) ADB-SMC uses threshold RSA cryptography, which includes the DSKG phase that is

used for key management and support of fault tolerance. DSKG uses the BGW
protocol [BeGW88] for secure distribution of private shares in the modulus
computation step. The DSKG protocol was enhanced and implemented by Malkin et
al. [MaWB99] to show parallelism and enhance fault tolerance. We use it for key
management.
4) ADB-SMC eliminates duplicate shares during decryption. In order to guarantee a

correct group-based decryption18, we integrated CP-ABE with SMC for accurate and
correct decryption of the ciphertext. We hash each share and use OR gates during
decryption to avoid any involvement of duplicate shares in the decryption process
[DoJi11]. We also use a time and location attributes to maximize the level of security
during the decryption phase. This helps to eliminate some attacks. In other words,

17

Rabin’s method relies on private key sharing over integers, which means that private key sharing must be an integer.

18

A group-based decryption is used for a group of users of a flat or hierarchical organization, in which sharing the
responsibility of a single role is possible. This single role could be an encryption, decryption, or signature that are
done by a group of users that each responsible to do part of the task.
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parties are given an access policy and can participate in the protocol if their attributes
satisfy the access policy.
5) ADB-SMC enhances the creation, dissemination and enabling processes of ADB. It

enhanced metadata, encryption, decryption verification, authentication and integrity
checking) in the creation process, and enhance the ADBA data disclosure mechanism
(evaporation, apoptosis mechanisms) in the enabling process.
6) Support dynamic access control based on user role. In our scheme, when the ADB

data owner (DO) plans to share data with N cloud users, DO first assigns a user role
to the each cloud user. The user role is assigned based on the attributes such as user’s
professional characteristics or obligations in accessing the data, and therefore
attribute-based access control (ABAC) is applied. Hence, ABAC controls
users’access permissions for the ADB data based on users’ roles. The process goes
as follows: DO assigns user role during encrypting the data and M3, so the data is
encrypted using a set of cloud users’ role attributes, then the cloud users who are
given the matching decryption keys can decrypt. None of the users can control the
whole ADB. A user can only access any part of the ADB data based on his
professional role assigned by the DO. For instance, if Alice at Host H is not
authorized to access any ADB data, she would not be assigned any role to access
ADB.

5.2.7.

Providing Decentralized Solution for Protecting Identities in the
Cloud

We presented a sample approach to protect identity in the cloud. We proposed an
efficient decentralized cloud-based IDM solution that protects identities in untrusted hosts.
We applied ADBs and SMC in a cloud environment.
The solution relied on threshold cryptography and CP-ABE [BoFr01, BeSW07]. It
required that parties involved in the decryption phase are determined and given access
policy attributes by the service provider (SP). For example, an SP receiving an identity
from a user performs two activities: (i) distributes the access policy attributes to the parties;
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and (ii) determines the number of participants in the decryption process—based on the
identity rank level and security level of the operation.
The solution enhanced the ADB and integrates CP-ABE into it.

This helps in

eliminating the need for using centralized TTPs, and thus eliminates the risk inherent in
using a centralized TTP as a trusted server. We believe that the ADB is more efficiently
protected by a using one-to-many dissemination utilizing CP-ABE. CP-ABE permits
assessment of encrypted data, so there is no need to evaporate some sensitive attributes at
certain hosts (as these attributes will be decrypted or accessed only if the targeted host is
authorized to decrypt them—in other words if the access policy is satisfied).
The solution enhanced the fault tolerance process proposed by Malkin et al. as follows:
It integrates CP-ABE into the share-generation step in the DSKG phase for verifiability
and correct reconstruction of the secret sharing. As the authors [DoJi11] proposed, we use
OR gates during the decryption process in order to avoid using duplicate shares in this
process.
As a more specific example, let us assume that Alice holds a senior position in a
company, and Bob is a regular employee. Alice’s position demands the Single sign-on
(SSO) access type (so she can access multiple services with a single sign-on) and Bob’s
does not (he will have to sign on many times for multiple services). Single sign-on (SSO)
is an access control feature that allows a user to log in into multiple systems using a single
user ID and password. In this case, we require that the number of parties that should
participate in key sharing and decryption is larger for Alice than for Bob—since the access
rights for a more privileged user require a stronger authentication process.

5.2.7.1. The Required Solution Features
We start description of the proposed cloud IDM solution with defining its required
features:
(i)

Protect sensitive data on untrusted hosts: Data need to be protected during their
life cycle, especially in a cloud environment where the user and the service
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provider have less control of data movement. In particular, they might be unable
to prevent moving sensitive data to untrusted hosts. To date, most IDM
solutions require data to reside on trusted hosts.
(ii)

Limit disclosure of identification data to minimize damage: Cloud IDM needs
to satisfy this goal in order to guarantee the minimum disclosure of user identity
when communicating with the service provider during the authentication phase
or anonymous identification. The proof of identity can use many methods,
including zero knowledge, pseudonym-based, and attribute-based encryption.

(iii)

Minimize authentication overhead by providing single sign-on (SSO): The SSO
feature assures that users can access all required or trusted resources without
having to login separately for accessing each resource individually [JHDP05,
Jans11]. However, SSO might make IDM vulnerable to many attacks, such as
dictionary attacks, identity thefts, eavesdropping and others [MPBP13]. To
prevent this, we need to use two-factor authentication.

(iv)

Authenticate with encrypted credentials: An entity needs to send its encrypted
identity credentials to the service provider. If the credentials are decrypted at
the service provider, they become vulnerable to attacks; secure computing
allowing to authorize without decryption would overcome this problem.

(v)

Avoid using TTPs, including using TTPs for key management: There are many
issues that occur when relying on TTPs, such as TTP as a single point of failure;
TTP not protecting against many types of attacks (including side-channel, and
correlation attacks); and TTP not supporting dynamic key management.

(vi)

Provide revocation and delegation of access rights: In cloud IDM access rights
for services and resources are granted to authorized users. There should be a
mechanism to take them away (e.g., in response to abuse of rights by a user).

(vii)

Provide revocation of user credentials: There should be a mechanism to take
away user credentials; this could include credential time-outs. Current IDM
approaches do not support revocation of user credentials, if the user does not
demand any services.
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5.2.7.2. Providing Solution Features
The required solution features (listed above) will be provided as follows:
(i)

Sensitive data are protected on untrusted hosts with active bundles. The active
bundle scheme protects data through their entire life cycle.

(ii)

The minimum disclosure property is realized with attribute-based encryption.

(iii)

Authentication uses SSO. One approach to SSO is through group
authentication, where members of a group can authenticate as a part of an
(authorized) group, and have the right to modify or decrypt stored data. In
contrast to most conventional user authentication schemes with one prover and
one verifier, the group authentication [Harn13] is a many-to-many type of
authentication with multiple provers and multiple verifiers. This makes group
authentication very efficient since it is sufficient to authenticate all users of a
group at once. (If there are non-members, group authentication can be used as
a preprocess before applying conventional user authentication to identify
nonmembers.)

(iv)

Authentication uses encrypted credentials. This allows for anonymous
authentication, in which user identities are not disclosed [ZhLi05]. Previous
schemes used common approaches, such as zero-knowledge proof, and
predicate encryption for authentication. In contrast, we use attribute-based
encryption where users can be authenticated based on the enforced privacy
policy.

(v)

Not using TTPs for key management (or other activities): We use decentralized
shared-key management, providing independence of TTPs. More precisely, we
rely on threshold cryptography, which does not store decrypted keys on a single
server (as is the case when TTPs are used) that might be vulnerable to attacks
and failures. The solution is based on the approaches in [BoFr01].

(vi)

Supports revocation and delegation of access right.

(vii)

Supports revocation of user credentials. Furthermore, the efficiency of our
proposed scheme will be enhanced by using parallelism.
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5.3. OPERATION OF ADB-SMC
The subsection presents the ADB-SMC model work in response to threats. It also
presents the solution proposed controls.

5.3.1. ADB-SMC Threats Model
The proposed solution protects the privacy of sensitive data against unauthorized data
disclosures, unauthorized elevation of data access privilege, and unauthorized data
modifications. It also protects cloud data against attackers, dishonest cloud providers,
unauthorized sub-contractors and dishonest tenants. Many other threats remain outside of
the scope of this research. Examples include data piracy, data inference or mining, Sybil
attacks, masquerade attacks, and denial of service attacks.
The solution considers the following assumptions:
1) We assume here a secure communication between the solution components
(realized, e.g., by a secure socket layer or SSL).
2) The scheme assumes that KA Platform and servers managed by KSAs are not a part
of any cloud.
3) The distributed TTPs we call KSAs are located in an entirely anonymous and
secured location.
4) Target host is protected using Sandboxing.
5) The three ADBA components are as follows: data, metadata, and VM assumed to
be inseparable. For example, if an adversary were successful in isolating the VM,
he will not have full access to the sensitive data. The decryption is requested only
by the VM after a series of integrity checks, and the ADB record is encrypted using
ABE such that in the case of a successful attack only limited information is
compromised.
6) A time-restricted copy of ADB might be stored temporarily at BHT until either a
predetermined time expires or ADBA copy is called from ADB to resume its work.
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Each ADBA copy has a unique id (a number). A copy might be called by its id to
continue operation on an alternative (possibly more trusted) visited host. The
assumption is that the backup server storing the copies are part of the cloud, and it
is located in a anonymous secure location. We assume only ADB can communicate
with the ADB stored image since it stores its Agent Identifier (AID). AID is used
as a label for an agent, so it can be distinguished definitely within the Agent
Universe. In this case, AID is used to identify an ADB image instance. We assume
the backup ADB copy cannot be altered by the dishonest cloud provider.
7) Our scheme does not rely on a trusted dealer or TTPs.
8) Our scheme protects against collusion resistance, and side channel attacks that
could result from a trusted CA/TTP [ChCh09], however, another side channel
attack might occur by leaking decryption keys if the targeted host attempts to access
the memory of ADB [BenO10].
9) Our approach minimizes the risk of compromising ADB. Note that there is only
request of the data decryption (key shares: priABE) if C2 contents and then C3
contents appeared to be unmodified; this way we maximize protection of both the
data and the decryption keys and avoid any unnecessarily overhead. We consider
ADB data protected by two major layers. The outer layer includes part of the
metadata that needs to be validated before enabling the inner layer. The inner layer
is protected by an access control mechanism that permits assessment of encrypted
data and assuring that data decryption takes place only if the attributes satisfy the
policy.
10) We assume the cloud service provider is “curious,” that might try to modify or
access the outsourced data, however, ADB protects its data fully such that the
chance of a cloud service provider compromising ADB data is very minimal.
11) We assume the key share authority servers are semi-honest which operate
individually, and will never collide with each other or with external users to
compromise the data.
12) We assume the cloud users are unable to collude, so they could combine their key
shares to access any unauthorized data.
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13) We assume the data owner is trusted and that no active attack can be injected into
the cloud using a malicious active data bundle.
14) We assume no successful man-in-the-middle attack can be performed on the ADBSMC solution. Data and their policies are fully encapsulated and protected against
eavesdropping. Keys are distributed and sent as partial shares from multiple
anonymous servers using SSL: combining them at any server or host other than the
destination host is not possible.

5.3.2.

ADB-SMC Proposed Controls

The basic interactions among the ADB-SMC components are shown in Figure 5.1 with
colored lines. We assume here a secure communication between the solution components
(realized, e.g., by a secure socket layer or SSL).
First, the dark blue line labeled “1” shows a request sent by Host 1 of CA Platform for
encryption keys pubABE and pubRSA, and for signature key priRSA which are needed to
encrypt and sign respectively, the ADBA’s data and metadata. Once KAA receives the
request, it selects a random subset of KS agents that can satisfy the request of Host 1; in
our scenario (Figure 5.1) these could be KSA1 from Host 6 plus KSA4 and KSA5 from Host
7.19
Second, the light blue line labeled “2” shows the transmission of the encryption keys
pubABE and pubRSA and the signature key priRSA from agents KSA1, KSA4, and KSA5 to
Host 1 from the CA Platform.20 The key shares received by Host 1 are used first to encrypt
ADB data and Metadata 3 using pubABE, obtaining Ciphertext 3. Then, Ciphertext 3,
together with Metadata 2, is encrypted using pubRSA to obtain Ciphertext 2. Next,
Ciphertext 2 is signed using the signature key priRSA. Finally, the signed Ciphertext 2 is
encrypted with Metadata 1, using the symmetric key (K) to obtain Ciphertext 1.

19

In practice, the key shares will be distributed to a high number of hosts (not just three KSAs on two hosts), which is
why we use DHT in the ADB-SMC scheme.
20 The shares are neither collected by KA from its KSAs nor forwarded via KA . Instead, they are sent directly to VM
A
A
by individual KSAs. This reduces the probability of a successful attack on the encryption keys.
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Both keys request and reply from Host 1 to Host 6 and Host 7, and back to Host 1 are
handled through MTP. Note for Ciphertext 1; K is generated and handled locally by the
CA.
Third, the solid red line labeled “3” shows communication between ADBA VM located
at Host 1 from the CA Platform and the trust level agent (TLA) residing at Host 2 from the
BHT Platform. Its goal is to verify that the hosts of the TH Platform (i.e., the hosts to be
visited by ADBA sent from Host 1) have a sufficient trust level for ADBA. The
communication between Host 1 and Host 2 (request and reply) is handled through MTP.
Fourth, the green line labeled “4” shows transmission of ADBA from Host 1 to Host 4
and/or Host 5 of TH Platform. It can occur only if ADBA’s VM while on the CA finds
TLH4/H5 ≥ RTThigh. The TLH4/H5 should be sent from the TLA in response to the request
described in step 3. It is also handled by MTP.
Fifth, the solid red line labeled “5” shows that VM of ADBA running on Host 4
communicates with KAA on Platform KA. This VM requests for decryption key priRSA,
and for signature verification key pubRSA. VM needs them in order to verify ciphertext 2.
KAA orders an appropriate subset of KSAs (running on Host 6 and Host 7) to retrieve and
deliver to this VM the key shares it requested. In our scenario the selected KS agents are
KSA2, KSA3, and KSA6, so the decryption and signature verification key shares will be
provided to VM by KSA2, KSA3 and KSA6. They together have enough key shares to provide
appropriate collection of key shares needed by VM to obtain the keys priRSA, and pubRSA,
that this VM asked for. A successful verification of ciphertext 2, should lead to another
request from the VM to the KAA asking for decryption key priABE, to decrypt Ciphertext
3 and hence the data. By doing so, we provide a higher level of security not only for the
data but for the decryption keys as well.
Sixth, the green line labeled “6” shows the transmission of the decryption keys priRSA
as well as the signature verification key pubRSA from KSA2, KSA3, and KSA6 directly to the
VM that asked for the keys.21 Note that in practice every key share should be collected
21

The shares are again sent directly to VM by individual KSAs to reduce the probability of a successful attack on the
decryption and signature verification keys. The shares are neither collected by KAA from its KSAs nor forwarded via
KAA. Instead, they are sent directly to VM by individual KSAs. This reduces the probability of a successful attack on
the decoding and signature verification keys.
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from a different KSA, however for simplicity and due to space limitations, in our scenario
some key shares are collected from the same KSAs.
Seventh, the dark red dashed line from Host 4 (ADBA) to Host 3 (BCA) labeled “7”
shows a “conditional” path that a backup copy of ADBA will follow if a target host’s trust
level is insufficient. ADBA is sent using MTP.
Finally, the black dashed lines labeled “8” show a hint (no detail) of auditing activities
for ADBA.

5.4.

Chapter Conclusions

We discussed the structure and detailed design of ADB-SMC solution. We presented
the general structure of the ADB-SMC Solution. We then presented the major Components
enhancement of ADB-SMC.

We then presented the implementation details for the

enhancements of ADB-SMC solution. Next, we discussed managing access to sensitive
data with attribute-based access control. Then, we presented two solutions for Protecting
Outsourced Data in the Cloud, and for Protecting Identities in the Cloud. Finally, the
chapter discussed the Operation of ADB-SMC, as well as the threat model and proposed
controls of ADB-SMC.
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6.

PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ADBSMC SOLUTION AND PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION VIA EXPERIMENTATION
This chapter presents the implementation details and performance discussion of the

ADB-SMC solution. It first introduces the prototype of the ADB-SMC solution. Then, it
shows the computing environment for the experimental work. Next, it explains the
architecture of the ADB-SMC components and the implementation details of the ADBSMC prototype. Fourth, it introduces the simulation scenarios and the simulation
assumptions. Sixth, it presents the ADB-SMC simulation measures. Then, it examines the
ADB-SMC performance results and presents the analysis and discussion of the ADB-SMC
results. Finally, it presents the chapter conclusions.

6.1.

The Prototype of the ADB-SMC Solution

We develop a prototype to show how the ADB-SMC approach protects outsourced
shared sensitive data in the cloud. We use Java Agent Development Framework (JADE)
[Jade07] as a development tool and Agent.Gui as a Multi-Agent-Based Simulation tool
[DeBU11].
The goals of our experiment are as follows:
(i)

Prove the concept of the ADB-SMC solution.

(ii) Implement and integrate the ADB-SMC system components (platforms and
agents).
(iii) Apply the ADB-SMC system functionality; such as ADBA protection
mechanism via multi-layering encryptions solution, the ADBA dissemination
policy, and the ADBA verification, decryption, and access control on the shared
data.
(iv) Measure the ADB-SMC system performance and system load.
(v) Compare the ADB-SMC overhead and system performance with the previous
solution known as ABTTP.
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(vi) Present the best practical scenarios on how outsourced data can be protected.
(vii) Simulate the interaction between the system entities that are modeled as agents.
(viii) Provide an overall intellectual analysis of the solution behaviour via:
1)

The verification of our ADB-SMC system behaviour hypotheses achieved
through simulation experimentation [GaJa13] to ensure that our simulation
model complies with the system design specification.

2)

The implemented solution uses different setups to compare alternative design
or implementation strategies.

(ix) Overcome issues related to a future implementation and use of the system by
simulating the coordination of timely execution of activities among the system
components inside single and or multiple subsystems [BPLK06].

6.2.

The Computing Environment of the Experiment

This section presents the configuration (hardware and software components) that we
use to setup and implement our system. There are five entities, three physical computers
called Computer 1, Computer 2, and Computer 3 and two virtual machines called VM1 and
VM2. Each entity includes one JADE Platform. VM1 installed on Computer 1. Thus
Computer 1 includes two JADE Platforms that all share the hardware components of
Computer 1. We call those platforms Platform 1 and Platform 4. VM2 is installed on
Computer 2. Thus Computer 2 includes two JADE Platforms that all share the hardware
components of Computer 2 excluding the hard disk, VM2 is installed and run from external
hard drive. Computer 2 includes Platform 2 and Platform 5. Table 6.1 shows the
computing environment configurations of the ADB-SMC solution.
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Table 6.1. ADB-SMC Computing Environment Configurations.
Configurations
Host Name

Platform 1
Slave1

CPU

Storage

Intel(R)
i5-2467M
@ 1.6 GHz
2 core
3.00 GB
RAM
120 GB

Operating
System

Windows 7
64 bit

Memory

VMware Player
Eclipse IDE
JDK
JADE
Org-apachecommonscode.jar library
Cryptography
API
Paillier
Agent.GUI
IPMS
MySQL

LINKSYS
WIRELESS
ROUTER (10/100
MBPS) PORTS

Platform 2 Platform 3
Slave2
Slave3
Hardware
Intel(R)
Intel(R)
i5-4570T
i5-4570T
@ 2.90
@
2.00
GHz
GHz
4 core(s)
2 core(s)
6.00
GB
4.00
GB
RAM
RAM
1 TB
100 GB
Software and API
Windows
Windows 7
8.1 64 bit
Professiona
l 64 bit

4.5.1
1.8.0_74
4.3.1


4.5.1
1.8.0_74
4.3.1

4.5.1
1.8.0_74
4.3.1


Bouncy
Castle 1.46
JPBC v.2.0

Bouncy
Castle 1.46
JPBC v.2.0

Bouncy
Castle 1.46
JPBC v.2.0

1.04
1.04
1.04
2.0
2.0
2.0
Workbenc
h 6.3 CE
Communication facilities




Platform 4
Slave4

Platform 5
Slave5

Intel(R)
i5-2467M
@ 1.6 GHz
2 core(s)
1.00 GB
RAM
1 TB

Intel(R)
i5-4570T
@ 2.90
GHz
4 core(s)
2.00
GB
RAM
40 GB

Windows
Developer
Build 8102
v. 12
4.5.1
1.8.0_74
4.3.1

Windows 8
Enterprise
64 bit
v.7
4.5.1
1.8.0_74
4.3.1

1.04
2.0

1.04
2.0





TRANSFER
SPEED 300 MBPS

COMMUNICATIO HTTP,
RMI
N PROTOCOL

HTTP,
RMI

HTTP,
RMI
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HTTP,
RMI

HTTP,
RMI

6.3.

ADB-SMC Prototype Components Architecture

In this subsection, we demonstrate the process of building the system components.
There are five JADE platforms installed and created on five configured local area network
hosts. The hosts are Slave1, Slave2, Slave3, Slave4, and Slave5. We use three computers
to build our system; they are described next.
Figure 6.1, shows the architecture of Computer 1. Computer 1, includes two host
names: Host Slave1, and Host Slave4. Host Slave4 is created on VM1. VM1 shares the
memory and CPU of Computer 1 along with Host Slave1, but it is deployed on an external
hard disk. Host Slave1 has Windows 7 as a primary operating system, and Host Slave4 has
Windows Developer as a guest operating system. Both hosts include JADE and
AGENT.GUI. Also, the figure shows a creation of a JADE platform in each host. Host
Slave1 shows the client-agent platform where ADBA is created. Host Slave4 shows the
backup and host trust (BHT) platform which includes two agents: backup agent (BCA) and
trust level agent (TLA).

Figure 6.1. Computer 1 Architecture.
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Figure 6.2, shows the architecture of Computer 2. Computer 2 includes Host Slave2
and Host Slave5. Host Slave5 created on VM2. VM2 shares the resources of Computer 2
along with Host Slave2. Host Slave2 has Windows 8 as a primary operating system, and
Host Slave5 has Windows 8 as a guest operating system. Both hosts include JADE and
AGENT.GUI. Also, the figure shows a creation of a JADE platform in each host. Host
Slave2 shows the key-share authority (KA) platform which includes nine Agents: KAA,
KSA1, KSA2, KSA3, KSA4. KSA5, KSA6, KSA7, and KSA8. Host Slave5 shows the Audit
platform which includes the audit agent (AA). We are using different Operating systems
(OSs) to test the performance of the system under different OSs, as it is the case in the
cloud where virtualization can make one test an application on multiple OSs. In addition,
cloud data centers are heterogeneous, which means they are configured to provide multiple
OSs. Some applications built to function well on certain OSs compared to others. Cloud
users have different preference in terms of using OSs. OSs are not always free. A user
leasing resources in the cloud might be required to pay extra to use certain OSs versions.

Figure 6.2. Computer 2 Architecture.
Figure 6.3, shows the architecture of Computer 3. Computer 3 includes Host Slave3.
Host Slave3 has Windows 7 as a primary operating system. It includes JADE and
AGENT.GUI. Also, the figure also shows a creation of the target host (TH)JADE platform,
and ADBA as a visitor agent.
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Figure 6.3. Computer 3 Architecture.

6.4.

The Implementation of the ADB-SMC Prototype

We developed a stand-alone prototype of a real implementation of the ADB-SMC
solution. The prototype is sufficient to prove the concept of the ADB-SMC solution; it is
considered as an essential start for a future full implementation of the ADB-SMC solution.

6.4.1.

ADB-SMC Prototype Components Implementation Details

In Chapter 5, we presented the UML design of the ADB-SMC components. In this
subsection, we demonstrate the process of building the system components.

6.4.1.1. Building ADB-SMC Local Area Network
We created a wireless local area network that connects five hosts using a Linksys
wireless router. The hosts are Slave1, Slave2, Slave3, Slave4, and Slave5. Host Slave1 and
Host Slave3 are configured on two laptops. Host Slave2 is configured on a desktop
computer. Two virtual machines used to emulate two network hosts. VM1 (Host Slave4)
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share the hardware resources of Host Slave1 excluding the hard disk, so it runs from an
external hard drive. VM2 (Host Slave5) share the hardware resources of Host Slave2.

6.4.1.2. Building the System Platforms
There are five JADE platforms deployed on the created network hosts. The platforms
as shown in Figure. 5.1. They consist of the Client Agent Platform, the Key Authority
Platform, the Backup and Host Trust Platform, the Target Host Platform, and the Audit
Platform. The implementation of the system platforms is described next.
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Table 6.2. ADB-SMC Platform Add-On Libraries Descriptions.

Bouncy
[BoCa16]

Library Name
Castle Crypto

APIs 



Java
Pairing-Based 
Cryptography Library (JPBC)

[JPBC16]
Paillier Encryption [Pail10]




Hex based encoder [Hex04]






JADE Inter-Platform Mobility 
Service [IPMP10]


JADE 4.0




Agent.GUI




Descriptions
Consist of many APIs including a lightweight
cryptography API in Java and C#.
Define more algorithms and cipher suites than
the Java Cryptography Architecture(JCA).
Used to provide authentication and integrity
checking for Ciphertext2 and Ciphertext1.
Perform mathematical operations underlying
pairing-based cryptosystems directly in Java.
Used to provide fine-grained access to the
outsourced data, and to create Ciphertetx3.
Provides secure (encrypted) multiparty
computation.
Used to test the key shares creation
measurement times for Ciphertetx2.
Manage to encrypt arbitrary long byte arrays,
and to handle encrypting bitstring longer than
the maximum block size.
Encode encrypted byte into a Hex based String
It has both static and non-static methods for
encoding and decoding for text and binary data.
Used for Encrypting and decrypting large data
using Java and RSA.
Allows agents to move from one execution
environment to another.
Used to allow agents to carry their data, code,
and state, from one platform to another and
resume their execution upon arrival.
JADE (Java Agent Development Framework)
is a software framework fully implemented in
Java language.
Used to simplify the implementation of multiagent systems, and thus implementing the
ADB-SMC solution.
Multi-Agent-Based Simulation tool (MBAS).
Used to simulate the interaction between the
systems agents and to measure load
performance.
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Figure 6.4. Client Agent GUI.

6.4.1.2.1. The Client Agent (CA) Platform
The Client Agent (CA) Platform is comprised of two containers. The Main Container
and Container1-Host1. We first create the Main Container and then create Container1Host1 as a peripheral container. The Main Container run on host Slave1 and holds the DF
and AMS agents. Container1-Host1 run on host Slave1 and contains the ADB agent.
In our solution design, the creation of ADBA requires the implementation and execution
of eight mandatory behaviours (actions). The mandatory actions are cABehaviour,
AchieveREInitiator,

ADBReceiversIdentities,

encryptsignADB,

TL4ADB,

migrateADBD, decryptADB, and migrateADBH. We also created four optional actions
designed to be executed under different scenarios to ensure full protection of the ADBA.
The optional behaviours are copyADB, evaporateADB, apoptosizeADB, migrateADBB.
Table 6.7 give details of the ADBA behaviours.
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Figure 6.4 shows a sample client agent GUI used to demonstrate the processes of
creating ADBA. The process of creating ADBA consists of eight steps modeled as JADE
behaviours using a Finite State Machine. Each ADBA behaviour of the eight behaviours
represents an activity to be accomplished within a state of the defined FSM.
First, ADBA calls cABehaviour which is a Java class to trigger the Client Agent GUI.
The user fills in the form, and presses encapsulate to start the creation process. Thus the
data will be stored in an array data structure and saved into a file. Second, ADBA calls the
next FSM behaviour in the set of transitions, which is AchieveREInitiator behaviour. The
execution of the AchieveREInitiator behaviour means asking the KAA, the broker agent, to
delegate the ADBA identities request to a group of selected KS agents. Next ADBA uses
ADBReceiversIdentities behaviour to receives the requested identities from KS agents, and
thus the identities will be saved in files on Host Slave1.
Fourth, the encryptsignADB behaviour is triggered to encapsulate the data and
metadata and create Ciphertext1, Ciphertext2, and Ciphertext3. As described in Chapter 5,
Ciphertext3 encapsulates data and metadata3 which includes the data access privacy policy.
The policy consists of a number of attributes. We include the time attribute and the location
attribute to maximize the level of protection to access the data. For instances, the time
attribute permits the cloud user to access the data only from 8:00 am to 5:00 p.m. The
location attributes include a range of IP addresses for the cloud providers, to ensure ADBA
can only be decrypted within the cloud provider network or geographical location.
Ciphertext2 and Ciphertext1 should be created following the creation of Ciphertext1 using
the encryptsignADB behaviour. Table 6.2 describes the Java libraries needed to implement
the ADBA behaviours.
The TL4ADB behaviour sends a request to TLA asking for Container4-Host4 trust
status and compares the received value with the RTT values specified by the data owner.
Finally, assuming ADBA can migrate safely to the destination host, migrateADBD
behaviour should be proceeded next to carry ADBA code and data in a single strategy to
the target host, Container4-Host4.
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Figure 6.5. BHT Platform on VM.

6.4.1.2.2. The Backup and Host Trust (BHT) Platform
The backup and host trust (BHT) platform manages two services: one provides trust
information for cloud hosts, the other acts as a repository to serialize, save and deserialize
ADBA copies. The platform includes the Main Container and two other containers.
Container2-Host2 and Container3-Host3. The two containers provide two services.
Container2-Host2 includes the trust level agent (TLA). It manages the host trust service that
maintains a database of trust level values for the hosts of the cloud. Upon a request from
the ADBA’s VM, for host H trust level, it returns a trust level value (TLH) for an indicated
host.
Container3-Host3 includes the backup copy agent (BCA). It manages the backup
service for a given cloud. It maintains a database of copies of ADBA (the copies are
temporary, time-restricted).
As shown in Figure 6.5, we first create Container2-Host2 to hold the TLA. The TLA
includes one behaviour, the HostTrustResponder behaviour. The HostTrustResponder
behaviour is triggered to respond with host trust status when receiving a request from the
ADBA, TL4ADB behaviour.
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The container that we create next is Container3-Host3, the BCA is created next to
manage any expected copies from ADBA as described in Chapter 3. Please note that it is
outside the scope of this work to implement the persistence service described in Chapter 3
to freeze and then thaw the received ADBA copies. The ADBA images are used to replace
any lost ADBA.

Figure 6.6. KA Platform Agents.

6.4.1.2.3. The Key-Share Authority (KA) Platform
The KA Platform includes the Main Container, Container6-Host6, and Container7Host7. The Main Container includes the key-share authority agent (KAA), which is an
agent responsible for managing a group of agents called key-share server agents (hence the
acronym KSA).
The numerous key-share server agents (KS agents) run on different key-share servers
and are all managed by KAA. KS agents operated by KAA. There are four KS agents located
in Container6-Host6: KSA1, KSA2, KSA3, and KSA4; and four KS agents located in
Container7-Host7. The number of KS agents can be increased or decreased based on the
user data protection level interest. KAA and ADBA manage the security request level. Each
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KSA holds one or more key shares for the public and private keys for one or more ADB
agents. An attacker should learn nothing from penetrating even a few key-share servers.
The Key Share Authority Platform is implanted using the JADE agent nested protocol.
In this protocol there are three type of agents: FIPARequestInitiatorAgent, BrokerAgent,
and FIPARequestResponderAgent.

The FIPARequestInitiatorAgent, AchiveREinitator

behaviour determines where the requested action needs to be performed. The role of
BrokerAgent is to delegate any request coming from FIPARequestInitiatorAgent to
FIPARequestResponderAgent.
In KA Platform, there are two agent types: KAA, and KSA. We implement the role of
the BrokerAgent using the KAA agent. The behaviour of FIPARequestInitiatorAgent is
implemented via the ADBA.

The behaviour of the FIPARequestResponderAgent is

implemented via the KS agents
KAA acts as a broker to forward an incoming request from ADBA (for ADBA identities)
to n KS agents. The number of KS agents are determined by a security code transmitted
from the data owner (DO) via ADBA to KAA. Assuming the DO demands more protection
on the data, KAA as a broker will forward the request to more KS agents to manage the
cryptographic services. Please note that ADBA cannot interact directly with KS agents to
ask for any identities. However, it can request from the broker, the KAA, to delegate
requests.
The implementation process shown in Figure 6.6 starts by creating the Main Container
t hold the key-share authority agent (KAA). Next, we create Container6-Host6, and
Container7-Host7 and their KS agents. The ADBA request is delegated to KS agents via
KAA. Agent KAA transfers the request to eight KS agents as an argument.
Next, the procedures to create the requested eight KS agents and running the crypto
services are handled.
sendADBIdentities.

There are two primary behaviours KSAsReceive, and

KSAsReceive is responsible for receiving the delegated ADB A

request coming from ADBA AchieveREInitiator behaviour via KAA.

Next, the

sendADBIdentities behaviour in response to AchieveREInitiator behaviour reads the
ADBA files that hold the identities which are stored as binary on Host Slave2 and then store
their values as ACL object messages to be delivered through eight KS agents to the ADBA.
Next, ADBA receives the provided keys via the ADBReceiversIdentities behaviour.
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Figure 6.7. Audit Platform on VM2.
6.4.1.2.4. The Audit Platform
The Audit Platform includes one container: Container8-Host8. It includes the audit
agent (AA), which is responsible for monitoring and recording all activities of ADBA.
For instance, when ADBA is sent from the originating host (Container1-Host1) to its
target host (say, Container4-Host4), AA on the audit platform receives an appropriate
report from ADBA and records this information into the audit database on Container8Host8.
As shown in Figure 6.7, we created the Audit Platform on Host Slave5. There are two
containers: one is the Main Container, and the other is Container8-Host8. The Main
Container includes two special agents: Agent Management System (AMS) and Directory
Facilitator (DF). AMS offers a white page service and is in charge of all platform
management services, such as creating and killing agents, killing containers, and shutting
down the platform. If an agent wants to perform any control action, its request should be
directed to AMS. DF acts as yellow page or a centralized registry service for all agents of
the platform.
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In our solution, when ADBA reports an event to AA, the received information is stored
into a file on Host Slave5. The stored information includes ADBA ID, ADBA Location
Address, and ADBA action.

Table 6.3 summarize the ADB-SMC System agents

descriptions.
Table 6.3. ADB-SMC System Agent’s Description.
Agent Type
ADBA

Task Description

Name of Platform
Executing the Task
Trigger CA GUI for the user CA platform
to insert ADBA data.
Send request to KAA for CA platform
ADBA identities.
Receive ADBA identities and CA platform
store them temporary on
client agent host.
Encrypt and sign ADBA data, CA platform
and metadata.
Decrypt and verify ADBA TH platform
data, and metadata.
Send request to TLA for Host CA platform
H4/H5 trust level.
Compare the trust level CA platform
received from TLA with RTTs
(RTTlow, and RTThigh).
Apoptosize ADBA in case if CA platform/ TH
TLH < RTTlow . See Table platform
Note 1.
Evaporate ADBA in case: if CA platform/ TH
TLH ≥ RTTlow and TLH platform
< RTThigh. See Table Note 1.
Create a Copy of ADBA in CA platform
case: if TLH ≥ RTTlow and
TLH < RTThigh See Table
Note 1.
Disseminate ADBA to BC CA platform
server
to
be
stored
temporarily. Table Note 1.
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Behaviour
cABehaviour
AchieveREIniti
ator
ADBReceiverId
entities
encryptsignAD
B
decryptADB1
HostTrustPropo
ser
HostTrustPropo
ser
apoptosizeADB

evaporateADB

copyADB

migrateADBB

Table 6.3- Continued
Agent Type

Task Description
Disseminate ADBA to TH.

KAA

KSA
BCA
TLA

AA
DF Agent

AMS

Dummy
Agent

Sniffer
Agent

Disseminate ADBA back to
CA
Report
Apoptosis/
evaporation to AA.
Delegate ADBA request to KS
agents to deliver key shares to
the ADB VM.
Send key shares to VM

Name of Platform
Executing the Task
CA, BHT platforms

migrateADBD

CA, BHT platforms

migrateADBH

CA, TH platforms

auditRequestSer
ver
AchieveRERes
ponder

KA platform

KA Platform

Manages copy of ADBA.
BHT platform
2) Manage database of TH BHT platform
trust level.
3) Reply VM with host trust
level (TL) upon request.

Behaviour

AchieveRERes
ponder
N/A
HostTrustRespo
nder

Record ADBA activities

Audit platform

JADE agent itself, acts as
Yellow
Pages,
or
a
centralized registry service
for all agents of the platform.
JADE agent itself, offers
white pages service and is in
charge of all platform
management services, such as
creating and killing agents,
killing
containers,
and
shutting down the platform.
JADE agent itself, allows to
send ACL messages to
agents, receive and inspect
messages from agents, read
and save messages from/to
file.
JADE agent itself, used to
trace the system agents
communications.

All platforms

auditRequestSer
ver
N/A

All platforms

N/A

All platforms

N/A

All platforms

N/A
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Table 6.3- Continued
Agent Type

Task Description

Name of Platform
Executing the Task
Introspector JADE agent itself, used to All platforms
monitors the life cycle of an
agent
agent, its exchanged ACL
messages, and the Behaviours
in execution.

Behaviour
N/A

Table Notes:
1) The apoptosis, evaporation, copying, and the dissemination of the ADBA image
implemented through optional behaviours that are not part of the scenario that assume
no threat to ADBA data. They are executed in other scenarios that simulate the attack
on ADBA data. More information about ADBA scenarios are discussed in Section 6.6.

6.4.2.

Agent Type and their Tasks

This subsection presents the agent type and their tasks. Table 6.7 shows the system agent
type, task description, and the name of platform executing the task.

6.4.3.

ADB-SMC Prototype Design of Agent Messages

Table 6.8 shows agent ACL messages interactions among the ADB-SMC system
components that are managed and modeled by agents. The ACL messages are included
within the ADB-SMC behaviours described in Table 6.4.
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Table 6.4. ADB-SMC Agent Messages

Message
Request
ADB
identities
Inform Key
shares
QUERY_IF
TL
Send TL
Report
Apoptosis
Request
ADBA
Apoptosis
Request
Copy
Send Copy
Report
evaporate
Migrate &
Store Copy
Migrate
ADB
ADBA
Apoptosis
Request
ADB
identities

ADBA
Send

KAA
Receive

KSA

Delegate

Receive
Response

Receive
Send

Receive

Receive
Send

Send

BCA

H4

Send

Send
Receive
Send
Receive
Send
Send

AA

Receive

Receive
Receive

Send

Receive

Send

Receive
Send
Receive
Send

Receive
Send

Inform Key
shares
Migrate
ADB

TLA

Receive
Send

Receive
Send
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receive

H5

6.4.4.

ADB-SMC Prototype Interactions Sequence Diagram Using
ACL

Figure 6.8. ADB-SMC Agent Interactions.

156

Figure 6.8 shows the sequence of time points for scheduled activities among the ADBSMC system agents. The activities are as follows:
1) To create ADBA, the client agent sends a REQUEST message to the KAA for ADBA
identities
2) KAA delegates the REQUEST message to KS agents asking to send key shares to
ADBA.
3) KSA1, KSA2 from Container6-Host6, KSA3, and KSA4 from Container7-Host7
migrate to the CA platform to deliver the key shares.
4) To query information about Host H4 trust level, ADB sends a QUERY_REF to TLA
asking for trust information about Host H4. TLA responds with an INFORM after
processing the query.
5) ADBA VM processes the response and follows one of three cases presented as
follow:
a) Case: TL(H4) < RTTlow.
a1) ADBA apoptosizes itself at the CA Platform.
b) Case: TL(H4) ≥ RTTlow and TL (H4) < RTThigh
b1) ADBA creates a copy of itself and sends it to the backup server.
b2) ADBA evaporates Data which require trust level larger than RTThigh,
b3) ADBA migrates itself to Host H4.
c) Case: TL(H4) > RTThigh.
c1) ADBA re-encrypts and re-obfuscates itself.
c2) ADBA migrates to Host H4.
c3) At Host H4, ADBA sends a REQUEST message to the KAA for key shares.
c4) KAA sends a REQUEST message to KS agents asking to send key shares to
ADB.
c5) A group of KS agents from Container6-Host6 and Container7-Host7 migrate
the requested keys to the CA platform.
c6) ADBA sends an INFORM message to AA if decided to apoptosize itself.
6) If ADBA wants to visit Container5-Host5 from Container4-Host4, ADBA sends a
QUERY_REF to TLA asking for Host H5 trust level. TLA responds with an
INFORM after processing the query.
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7) ADBA follows (Steps c4, c5, and c6).
8) ADBA migrates back to the CA. This step is optional.
Note that we rely on Agent inter-platform mobility service (IPMS) [Jade07] to migrate
ADBA to the BHT Platform, and the TH Platform, and to migrate key shares (KSA1-KSA6)
to the CA and the TH Platforms. The steps of migrating ADBA from the CA Platform to the
TH Platform are initiated at the application level [CuNB08]. They involve the following:
1) ADBA contacts the local Agent Mobility Manager (AMM) at the CA platform and
requests to migrate. (Note AMM resides only at the main container).
2) AMM at the CA suspends ADBA execution and exchanges ACL messages with the
AMM located at the main container of the TH Platform to agree about the next subprocesses.
3) The agreed sub-processes are carried out which determine some options related to
agent security and content transfer.
4) AMM at TH Platform creates and registers new ADBA (at TH Platform AMS) using
the code, data, and state determined in Step (3).
5) AMM at the CA suspends ADBA and requests AMM at Host H4 to start ADB.
6) AMM at Host H4 starts the ADBA and informs the CA about the success of the
process.

6.4.5.

Inspect Conversations Between Agents in the Simulation

Using the JADESniffer Agent to Inspect Conversations between Agents during the
experimentation. The sniffer agent is a JADE agent itself used to capture the system event
timelines, and the log file. It receives copies of all messages exchanged by the ADB-SMC
agents so that a complete analysis can be then performed [KaNo15].
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6.5.

The Simulated Scenarios of the ADB-SMC Prototype

The simulated scenarios of the ADB-SMC prototype description are as follows:
1) A data owner wants to share data or file with two or more cloud users. For example,
a taxpayer intends to file a tax return without revealing personal or sensitive data.
2) A data owner wants a third party contractor located in the cloud to perform some
computation or service on his or her outsourced data file and return the file with the
result. The third party contractor can be represented by a service or a person. For
instance, a genetic testing and analysis services require secure sharing, storing,
processing of individuals’ private, sensitive data.
3) A data owner wants to send a file to multiple agencies that each performs certain
computations or that do an individual verification or services. For example, to give
an assessment for a mortgage or loan application for a candidate. In this case, the
data owner assumes “the right not to be annoyed” to sell mortgage insurance or any
unsolicited advertisements. Also, the data owner wants to ensure that the code, data,
or state of the mobile agent will not be altered when visiting multiple platforms.
4) A data owner wants to get the best travel fare from the travel booking sites that are
connected with multiple airline databases located in the cloud. The data owner
assumes the privacy of his or her information with the travel agents during the travel
reservation negotiations, so besides ensuring the best rate, no thieves can eavesdrop
on this information and target the property of an individual who is traveling.
Many applications can benefit from our approach. The below-simulated scenarios
describe how data can be securely outsourced to the cloud using the ADB-SMC
solution.
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Figure 6.9. ADB-SMC Simulation Scenarios Diagram.

Simulating the solution prototype (Figure 6.9) are described as follow:
1)

Data owner (DO) requests a service through a data outsourcing/verification
system to share data with users/ systems located in the clouds. We assume this
service available for major business, e.g., Banks, Insurance companies, etc. This
step includes 3 Substeps.
a- The system initiates an Agent call ADBA to automate the processes of
creating, disseminating, and enabling the data. ADBA then is activated by
registering its name and address with the CA Platform agent AMS. Hence
it can access all JADE platform features and interacts with the different
system components on behalf of the Data Owner (DO). Note ADBA at this
stage is in its active state.
b- ADBA provides a GUI to the data owner to enter/upload the data, and
metadata.
c- The DO enters/uploads the data into the system, including the metadata.
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ADBA on behalf of the DO requests keys to encrypt and sign the data and

2)

metadata. This step includes 3 Substeps.
a- ADBA sends a request to the key-share authority agent (KAA) asking for n
servers to encrypt, and then sign the data, and metadata.
b- KAA evaluates the ADBA request, and then forwards ADBA location and
request to n KS agents. Hence, multiple KS agents respond to the system
encryption and signing requests.
c- KS agents interact with the system key generation authorities to generate and
deliver the corresponding keys to ADBA. The generated keys are assumed
to be stored in a DHT. It is outside the scope of this dissertation to show the
implementation and simulation sides of the DHT.
3)

ADBA receives the key shares to encrypt and then sign the data and metadata.

4)

ADBA requests TLA for host trust information. This step includes 3 Substeps.
a- ADBA sends a query to TLA for host H trust level.
b- TLA queries its database and extracts the updated information about the
requested host's trust level.
c- TLA replies to ADBA with host trust value.
ADBA evaluates the received host's trust level information and compares it with

5)

the data owner’s required trust threshold then follows three directions:
a)

If host’s trust is low, ADBA decides not to disseminate its data. It reports the
situation to the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) audit service (agent: AA), then
it destroys its data. In this case, the scenario terminates.

b)

If host trust is sufficiently low, ADBA creates an image of itself and sends it
to backup host for storing it temporarily. Next, ADBA reports this case to the
CSP audit service. Finally, ADBA evaporates most of its sensitive data that
are not authorized to be accessed by the destination host. The evaporated
copy disseminates to the target host.

c)

If host’s trust is sufficiently high, ADBA decides to disseminate ADBA to Host
H with the intent to make full disclosure of the authorized data to the cloud
host.
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6)

For cases 5(b) and 5(c), the scenarios proceed with the remaining steps. ADBA
is sent to its destination.

7)

ADBA starts the enabling phase.

8)

In this phase, ADBA VM requests the KAA to forward the signature verification
and decryption keys.

9)

The KAA receives the ADBA request and forwards its location, ID, and request
to KS agents asking for signature verification and decryption keys.

10) KS agents are assumed to access the DHT to pull up the ADBA identification
information stored by ADBA ID when requested the cryptographic service at the
1st time. KS agents send to ADBA two sets of keys, one for signature verification
and the other for decryption.
11) ADBA receives two sets of keys from KS agents, one for signature verification
and the other for decryption.
a. ADBA uses the signature verification keys to verify ADBA payload.
b.

If the verification of ADBA payload failed, ADBA reports to AA. Otherwise,
ADBA proceeds to the following step.

c. ADBA uses the decryption key to decrypt its payload.

6.6.

ADB-SMC Prototype Simulated Scenarios Assumptions

This section includes the following: general simulation assumptions, agent simulation
assumptions, time measurement assumptions, and technology- or standard-related
assumptions. All assumptions described in Tables 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8.
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Table 6.5. General System Assumptions.
No.
Assumption
1A We assume the TH is protected against attack using a mechanism such as
sandboxing.
We assume the expected simulation overall result should be visible when running
1B on three computer systems, however; we cannot predicate the moment the system
or service becomes as a bottleneck. This could result due to the continuous
increasing of communications from different nodes during the running of
implementation. In other words, no accurate information on how much
communication from various nodes the service can handle, before it becomes a
bottleneck.
1C We
assume that each major component in our system like the CA, BHT, KA, and
Audit can be deployed as a service in the cloud.
1D We assume the system exchanged identities between the system entities, the
network servers, the underlying network is protected using Secure Sockets Layer
or anonymized protocols [LiHW11].

Table 6.6. Agent Assumptions.
Assumptions
No.
2A We assume that there is no firm time-period between two agents; the interaction
among agents is an instant operation [KaNo15].
2B We assume the CA platform cannot interact directly with BHT platform, but after
creating ADBA on the CA platform only ADBA can then communicate with BHT.
2C We assume the Host trust level agent (TLA) manages a database of cloud host trust
level values.
2D We assume the backup copy agent (BCA) manages a database of ADBA copies.
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Table 6.7. Time Measurement Assumptions.
Time Measurement Assumptions
We assume there is no clock or time-synchronization problems between the
3A system hosts.
3B We assume there is no additional overhead during the experimentation when
integrating Agent.GUI in our system
3C We assume measuring the interaction among agents by exchanging messages in an
orderly manner should help in achieving an accurate result. A simulation that runs
with the same initial settings could produce entirely different results.
3D We assume some agents in the system that perform many tasks, e.g. ADBA could
require a separate time point for every one of its multiple tasks, so ADBA is not
restricted to a single time point.
We assume ADBA could autonomously need to revise its dissemination and
3E enabling decisions due to the received information from TLA or due to their
cognition processes. In this case, in terms of time management; ADBA must have
the option to change its next wake-up time.
We assume the current system components can give a good idea of system
4F performance time, the non-implementation of the system additional components or
features like a database that store host trust values, obfuscation method, or DHT
should not affect the overall picture of the system overhead and performance time.

Table 6.8. Technology- or Standard-Related Assumptions.
No.
Assumptions
4A We assume the differences in hardware's capabilities or configurations; such as
CPU clock, the size of memory, the number of cores, hard disk speed/size, should
not have a great impact on the simulation because entities constituting the system
are agents, and MBAS differs from conventional simulation [BPLK06].
4B We assume no performance limitations should affect the simulation of the system
due to tools versions comparing to various hardware configuration.
4C We assume using MBAS to measure performance and schedule the system
interaction is the best as “conventional distributed simulation techniques cannot
easily be applied to the problem of modeling the interaction of a system of
autonomous components” (Theodoropoulos and Logan 1999) [BPLK06].
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6.6.1.

Simulation Parameters

This subsection presents the Simulation parameters. The Simulation parameters are
extracted from the configuration setup step described in Subsection 6.2. We outline the
parameters of the CA platform in Table 6.9, the parameters of the BHT platform in Table
6.10, the parameters of the TH platform in Table 6.11, the parameters of the Audit platform
in Table 6.12, and the parameters of the KA platform in Table 6.13.

Table 6.9. The Parameters of the CA Platform.
Parameter
Platform
Originating container
Host
Port
Network type
Destination container
Destination platform

Description
The name of the platform that creates
and house ADB.
The name of container where ADB
reside
IP address of Slave1 host.
Network Port that CA host uses to
connect with KA, BHT, and TH
platforms.
The
type of network used in the system,
wireless or LAN
The name of the container where ADB
visits.

Examples
CA

The platform name that should be
connected with the CA

BHT
TH
KA
7

OS version

OS version
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Client Agent
192.168.1.113
1099, 7778
WLAN
Conteinare4Host4

Table 6.10. The Parameters of the BHT Platform.
Parameter
Platform
Originating Container

Host
Port
Network Type
Total Host
Destination container

Description
The name of the platform that creates
and house TLA, and BCA.
The name of containers where TLA and
BCA reside.
IP address of Slave4 host.
Network Ports that BHT when
interacting with the CA.
The type of network used in the system,
wireless or LAN
Number of Host that platform includes
The name of the container where the
image of ADBA visits.

Destination platform

The platform name that should be
connected with the CA, TH, AA

OS version

OS version

-

Examples
BHT
Container2Host2
Container3Host3
192.168.1.128
1099, 7778
WLAN
2
Container4Host4
Container5Host5
CA Platform
TH Platform
AU Platform
8.01

Table 6.11. The Parameters of the TH Platform.
Parameter
Platform
Originating Container
Host
Port
Network Type
Total Host
Destination Container
Destination platform

OS version

Description
The name of platform that receives
ADBA
The name of container where ADBA reside
IP address of Slave3 host.
Network Ports that TH uses to receive
ADBA
The type of network used in the
system, wireless or LAN
Number of Host the platform includes
The name of the container where
ADBA visits.
The platform name that should be connected with the TH
OS version
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Examples
TH
Container4Host4
192.168.1.109
7778
WLAN
2
CA Platform
CA Platform
KA Platform
AU Platform
BHT Platform
7

Table 6.12. The Parameters of the Audit Platform.
Parameter
Platform
Originating Container
Host
Port
Network Type
Audit File
Destination Container

Description
The name of the platform that creates
and house AA.
The name of containers where agents
AA reside
IP address of Slave4 host.
Network Port that ADB controllers use
to connect with ADB.
The type of network used in the system,
wireless or LAN
Data record and store activities of the
ADB-SMC
The name of containers that alert AA
-

Destination platform

The platform name that may be
connected with the AA

OS version

8.01
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-

Examples
AU
Container8Host8
192.168.1.102
1099, 7778
WLAN
TBD
Container1Host1
Container3Host3
Container4Host4
Container5Host5
CA Platform
BHT Platform
TH Platform
TBD

Table 6.13. The Parameters of the KA Platform.
Parameter
Platform
Originating Container

Description
The name of the platform that creates
and house KA and KS agents.
The name of container where agents KA
and KS agents reside
-

Host
Port
Network Type
Total Host
Hosts Name
Destination Container

IP address of Slave5 host.
Network Port that KA uses to interact
with ADB and KS agents.
The type of network used in the system,
wireless or LAN
Number of Host that platform includes
Name of Host the platform includes
The name of the container where KS
agents interact with.
-

Destination platform

The platform name that may be
connected with the AU

OS version

8.01



6.7.

-

Examples
BHT
KA Container
Container6Host6
Container7Host7
192.168.1.136
1099, 7778
WLAN
2
TBD
Container1Host1
Container4Host4
Container5Host5
CA Platform
KA Platform
AU Platform
BHT Platform
TBD

the value of parameters is the configuration variables

Simulation Measures / Metrics

This section defines the ADB-SMC simulation measures. It then presents the
simulation measures for the ADB-SMC system. Next, it introduces the description of the
experiments performed on the ADB-SMC prototype. Then, it describes the data collection
for the experiments, finally it highlights the time measurement method used in the
experiments.
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6.7.1.

Definitions of Simulation Measures

Table 6.14 shows the definition of measure used in the ADB-SMC simulation.

Table 6.14. ADB-SMC Simulation Definition.

2A
2B

ADB-SMC Resource Usage Measure
CPU fraction time
The fraction of CPU time per JADE platform.
Memory fraction usage
Memory Fraction (relative) for each platform and the
memory size (absolute) per platform

2C

Core Utilization

A number of the core in use per Platform.

2D

Log size

3A
3B

Average ADB creation
time
ADBA apoptosis time

3C

ADBA migration time

Total size of log file produced during auditing
ADB Measure
The time required from requesting ADB creation, to
time ADB created.
The time duration from requesting ADB apoptosis to
agent apoptosis finalization.
The time required migrating ADB to its destination.

3D
3F

ADB
round
trip
migration time
ADB evaporation time

3G

ADB payload size

The time needed to migrate ADB from one platform to
another and to come back to the origin platform. See
Table
1. from requesting ADB evaporation, to
Time Note
duration
agent evaporation finalization.
Amount of data carried by ADB Agent measured in bits

Table Notes:
1) Measuring round trip migration time help in overcoming synchronization
problems. The two measured times belong to the same host [LoBS06].

6.7.2.

Simulation Measures

In this subsection, we present the ADB-SMC Resource Usage Measure as it shown in
Table 6.15.
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Table 6.15. ADB-SMC Resource Usage Measure.
Measure
2A CPU fraction time

2B

Memory fraction usage

2C

Core Utilization

Measurements Instances
1) The fraction of CPU time for Host Slave 1
See Table Note 1.
2) Fraction of CPU time for Host Slave 2
3) Fraction of CPU time for Host Slave 3
4) Fraction of CPU time for Host Slave 4
5) Fraction of CPU time for Host Slave 5
1) Memory fraction usage for Host Slave 1
2) Memory fraction usage for Host Slave 2
3) Memory fraction usage for Host Slave 3
4) Memory fraction usage for Host Slave 4
5) Memory fraction usage for Host Slave 5
1) Core Utilization for Host Slave 1
2) Core Utilization for Host Slave 2
3) Core Utilization for Host Slave 3
4) Core Utilization for Host Slave 4
5) Core Utilization for Host Slave 5

Table Notes:
1) Unlike JADE Platform Hosts, which designed to simulate Hosts in a cloud, Hosts
Slave 1, Slave 2, Slave 3, Slave 4, and Slave 5 resolve to IPs or physical addresses
of the server(s) or network nodes that are configured to setup the simulation
environment.

6.7.3.

Description of the Experiments

We performed four majors experiments to measure the system performance time for
the ADB-SMC solution. The first experiment compares the overhead time in both the
ABTTP and the ADB-SMC prototype. Both ABTTP and ADB-SMC presented multiple
scenarios to protect the data. In this experiment, we consider only the first scenario where
ADBA assumed to deliver its payload without any possible threats.
This experiment requires two setups. The first one records the measurements of ABTTP
on a single processor model. We run this experiment on Platform 2 as described in Table
6.1. The second one records ADB-SMC measurements on a wireless local area network
(WLAN) of five Hosts configured as platform 1, platform 2, platform 3, platform 4, and
platform 5 as described in Table 6.1.
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ABTTP executes all its agents in a single processor machine, whereas in ADB-SMC
the agents are distributed and executed in multiple hosts. Since ADB-SMC simulation
requires 5 hosts, we average the result of the load measures for all agents in ADB-SMC.
The primary goal of the experiment is to measure the system overhead time in both
solutions. We used AGENT.GUI to measure the system overhead time in both solutions.
The experiment compares the fraction time of the memory-load for the Java virtual
machine (JVM), CPU-load, and the memory-load for the hardware in both solutions.
The second experiment measures the system functionality execution times in both
solutions. It measures (i) encryption, decryption, signature generation, and verification
execution times for the selected cryptosystems; (ii) systems agents’ behaviours execution
times; (iii) messaging and identities transfer execution times. We created a Java timer class
to record measurements. We also relied on JADE behaviours superclass methods to setup
the measurement execution time. For instance, we override the onStart and onEnd methods
to act as a start and end execution time of agent actions.
Action, done, onStart, onEnd are all methods that are triggered by certain events. The
action is triggered once per tick. onStart is triggered before the first call to the action
method; onEnd is called immediately after the end of the action (behaviour) method, so
both methods are called before and after the invoking of the action code in the behaviour.
The method done is triggered every tick to determine if the behaviour has ended. It calls
the method onEnd when it returns true, and this happens when the behaviour end.
The third experiment compares the average migration time for ADBA in ABTTP vs.
ADB-SMC. Migration time is the time an agent migrates from one execution environment
to another one. ABTTP relies on the JADE built-in intra-platform, and inter-container agent
mobility service which limits the mobility of ADBA to move to external platforms. ADBA
in ABTTP can move only across the single platform containers. The ADB-SMC uses InterPlatform Mobility Service (IPMS) which supports inter-container and inter-platform
communication mobility services so that ADBA can move freely to any ADB-SMC
platforms.
We used the BeforeMove and AfterMove methods to configure the recorded
measurement times. BeforeMove is used to place the initiation of the migration start time.
It records and prints the system time before migration. It is triggered at the source host,
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which is the client agent platform or container-1 in the ADB-SMC or the ABTTP. It is
called for the successful completion of the move operations. AfterMove is called at the
destination host, which is in our case the targeted host (TH) platform, Container4-Host4.
We stop the timers that record the migration time at the AfterMove method.
Finally, the last experiment measures the migration time versus the number of migrated
key shares in ADB-SMC solution. To test the performance time of the multiparty
computation idea in our solution we used pail liner threshold encryption toolbox [Pail10]
to generate multiple key shares. Table 6.16 shows the average execution time for creating
multiple keys with nine iterations that each creates different key shares and the threshold
value. We use IPMS as a migration strategy to migrate the key shares to the destination
host. To minimize accuracy due to the clocks synchronization problem on the execution
environments, we run the migration process five times for each iteration.

6.7.4.

Data Collection for the Experiments

We collected data using three ways described as follow:
1) We used AGENT.GUI to record and capture the system load information for the
two developed prototypes: ABTTP and ADB-SMC. We replicated the experiment
for ten times, clean the dataset files, and exported the generated results to Excel
worksheets to analyze them and to perform basic statistical measurements. We set
the experiment to record/ produce measurements samples every 500 milliseconds.
We analyzed the memory-load JVM, CPU-load, and the memory-load for the
hardware in both systems.
2) We created a payload with multiple sizes that are range from 1 KB to 1 MGB. The
generated files set to be transferred by ADBA to their final destinations in both
solutions. The goal is to measure and compare the migration time in both solution
design. We replicated the experiment for five times on each file size and calculated
the average migration time. We used different payload sizes to produce accurate
information and to deal with clock synchronization problems. The used payload in
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the measurements is a text file. We performed this experiment as the migration time
is a primarily dominated factor in our comparison.
3) We used single data instance file to measure the execution time in both solutions
functionalities, for instances, (i) encryption, decryption, signature generation, and
verification execution times; (ii) Systems agents’ behaviours execution times; (iii)
messaging and identities transfer execution times.

6.7.5.

Time Measurement in the Experiments

We measure the simulation time using a created Java timer class that records
measurement

execution

time

using

the

Java

method

System.currentTimeMillis(). The method returns the number of milliseconds
elapsed since the 1st of Jan 1970. The method is called whenever an agent in the ADBSMC interacts with other agents in other platforms [LoBS06].
The measurements should record the execution times for the following:
i)

The cryptosystems used in both ABTTP, and ADB-SMC (encryption,
decryption, signature generation, and verification algorithms).

ii)

The Agents behaviours execution time in both ABTTP, and ADB-SMC.

iii)

The identities or keys transferee execution time in both ABTTP, and ADB-SMC.

6.8.

ADB-SMC Simulation Results
This section introduces the result of the ADB-SMC experiment. We present a

performance evaluation for both the ADB-SMC and the ABTTP solutions. We compare
the performance of both solutions in term of system load, execution time, ADBA
migration time, and finally the total average migration time in ADB-SMC versus
number of transferred key shares.
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6.8.1.

ABD-SMC Vs. ABTTP System Load Performance

Figure 6.10 illustrates the performance evaluation for both the ADB-SMC and the
ABTTP. It evaluates the solutions based on three performance metrics. They are the CPU
load, the memory load for the hardware, and the memory-load JVM. The figure shows no
significant differences in term of CPU load since the components of ADB-SMC executes
their tasks using multiple CPUs. ABTTP increases sharply at particular time series; this is
because all components and agents of a JADE container are loaded into a Java virtual
machine. JVM acts as a basic container for agent and provides execution environments.
Since ABTTP containers and agents execute on one machine, this illustrates the sharp
increases at certain point in ABTTP especially at the points when the system agents interact
with each other. The memory load in ADB-SMC is larger than this in ABTTP this due to
the number of agents that exist in ADB-SMC comparing to ABTTP. It can be seen that both
solutions have a firm start, this is due to the fact that the execution of ADBA is the start
point of both solutions, and since ADBA has the largest (number of) behaviour in the
system, a sharp increase is shown at the start point.

Figure 6.10. ADB-SMC Vs. ABTTP Performance Measure.

174

6.8.2. ADB-SMC Vs. ABTTP Average Total Migration Time

Figure 6.11. Average Total Migration Time ABTTP vs. ADB-SMC.
Figure 6.11 gives the result of the ADBA migration time in both ADB-SMC and
ABTTP solutions. There is a noticeable but acceptable difference in migration time
between the two systems. The increase of migration time in ABTTP is steady compared to
ADB-SMC. In ABTTP, the ADBA only moves within one platform container in one
computer system. It does not require any network connectivity. During its migration, the
data is transferred completely to the destination, but the code only transferred partially
when it invoked.
The variation of migration time in ADB-SMC from 1 to 500 KB is justified due to
external factors that might impact the system, for instance, hidden environment changes as
the clock synchronization problem, or a busy WLAN. We also noticed the steady increase
in migration time when transferring files larger than 500 KB. We noticed that the growth
occurs about every 100 KB.
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6.8.3. ADB-SMC Total Average Migration Time Vs. Number of Key
Shares

Figure 6.12. Total Average Migration Time vs. Number of Key Shares.
Table 6.16. Average Key Shares Creation Execution Time
Key size
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128

Number of Secret Key share
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20

Threshold
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Average Execution Time
262
294.2
310
316.8
388.8
440.6
423
408
407.08

Figure 6.12 gives an idea about the performance result of transferring key shares in
ADB-SMC solution. In this experiment, we performed the following procedures. We first
generate and store the key shares and threshold values as it shown in Table 6.16. The test
uses nine made iterations to observe the overall picture of migrating key shares when it
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requested by the ADBA. The iterations are varying by the number of key shares. For
instance, in the first iteration, we migrate four key shares while in the ninth iteration we
migrate 20 key shares. We run every iteration five times and calculate the total average
migration time, for instance, in the first iteration, four key shares will migrate to the ADBA,
we created 4 KS agents to read the created stored key shares from files, and then migrate
them to ADBA. We replicate the experiment for five times and then calculated the average
migration time for every KSA. Finally, at last, we sum the average migration time for each
KSA in each round. We then performed the same procedures with the next iteration where
the key shares and agent delivering them are increasing by 2. As it shown, the execution
time of generating the key shares including the thresholds are almost steady.
Our observation is that the majority of the average total migration time for the key
shares are non-linear which means they are not moving in a particular direction in spite of
the fact that they show a projection of the increase of average total migration time. The
correlation between the key shares migration time seems weak notwithstanding the fact
that they are increasing due to the increases in migrated values. Also, we observed that the
linearity of migration time could be located for fewer key shares comparing to more key
shares. For instance, transferring key shares less than 10 (4, 6, 8) seems to follow a
particular linear direction that shows the migration times increase with increasing the
number of key shares. However, after the transfer of ten key shares, the linearity varies.
We justify the increases in migration time due to the parallelism feature where a
coordinated group of KS agents is used. There is also an exponential growth of key shares
migrating time after transferring 18 key shares. We calculate the average migration time
per agent using the following equation:
Average time per agent =

Total Average Migration Time
Number of Agents

For instance, in round 1, the total migration time is 6065, and the number of agents are 4,
so the average migration time per agent in round 1 is calculated as follow.
Average time per agent =

6065
4

= 1516.25 ms
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We should also note that transferring data that is more than 250 k might still consider
as inefficient due to ACL Message issue in Jade [KuJZ06, Cucu04]. The migration of agent
in Jade performed using ACL messages.

6.8.4.

ADB-SMC Basic System Measurements
Table 6.17. ADB-SMC Vs. ABTTP System Functionalities Measurements.

Functionality

Action/ metric

ABTTP

ADB-SMC

Computing
Environment

Number of Hosts

1 Host

5 Host

Key Size

Size of Keys and
Attributes

RBAC
DEC

Data Size

N/A
56

DAS
1024
13 bytes

ABE
5 Si
RSA
1024
AES
128
RSA
1024
13 bytes

Key Generation

Total Average Key
Generation Time

95.25

465.5

Key Transfers

Send keys in ABTTP
Migrate Keys in
ADB-SMC

5

Encapsulation

Average Encryption
and signature
Generation Time
Average Round Trip
(RTT) Migration
Time
Average Verification
and Decryption Time

326

RSA
960
RSA
964.66
RSA
977.66
RSA
985.33
ABE
841
ABE
845
ABE
798
1799.6

140.5

664

52.5

2729

Dissemination
Enabling
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Table 6.17 shows a comparison between ADB-SMC and ABTTP prototypes. We
implemented ADB-SMC and re-implemented ABTTP to capture system performance
measurements. We compare the two approaches in term of key generations, key transfers,
encapsulation, dissemination and enabling of data and metadata. The above approximated
averaged information extracted from executing the prototypes in one Host in the case of
ABTTP, and in five Hosts in the case of ADB-SMC. The execution of the prototype actions
was performed on a small data file size 13 bytes.
The key generation time in ADB-SMC far greater than in ABTTP for several reasons.
First, ABTTP uses data encryption standard (DES) which relies on 56-bit key size. ABTTP
solution suggested using Role-based access control (RBAC) as a data privacy layer.
However, this layer was not implemented.
The ADB-SMC prototype implements three layers of protection for the data and
metadata. Thus, the key generation time is greater than this in ABTTP. ADB-SMC uses
1024-bit key size to generate the RSA key pairs, and 1024-bit key size for signature
generation and verification, and the 128-bit key to generate a symmetric key. In addition,
ADB-SMC uses CP-ABE to implement the data access and privacy layer. CP-ABE is based
on elliptic curve bilinear pairing groups which require additional algorithms to be executed
as a setup algorithm. For instance, the system setup initialization algorithm that we run as
a preliminary step to run the key generation algorithms in CP-ABE has an execution time
of 154 milliseconds. Please note in this example, we only run the algorithm using 5
attributes as it shown in the table as 5 si. Execution time usually grew up with increasing
the size of attributes.
The average time for encapsulating ADB is 1799.6 ms comparing to 326 ms in ABTTP.
This is due to the multilayer encryption that we use in our solution as an effective protection
mechanism.
The average round trip migration time in ADB-SMC is larger than the time in ABTTP.
ADB-SMC relies on an inter-platform agent migration protocol where ADBA needs to carry
the data, code, and state whereas, in ABTTP, the code is transmitted more efficiently. The
trade-off between efficiency and security is clear in the two approaches.
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The decryption time in ADB-SMC is greater than in ABTTP due to the notion of using
multilayer encryptions and decryptions. Also, ADB-SMC uses longer and strong key-bit
sizes which require additional execution time.
For transmitting ADBA identities or requesting keys for encryption and decryption.
ADB-SMC uses seven keys to demonstrate the idea of key shares. It uses two pairs of RSA
one for encryption and decryption and one for signing and verification. To minimize the
complexity of the system implementation, the solution only uses three keys for encrypting
and decrypting the data layer.
We conclude that ADB-SMC requires more execution time comparing to ABTTP due
to the practicality of the solution, the number of features and tasks performed comparing
to ABTTP which was only implemented partially by its authors.

6.9.

6.9.1.

Analysis and Discussion of the ADB-SMC Simulation Results

Results Analyses and Discussion

The overall picture shows that the ADBA dominates the performance of the system in
both solutions. ADBA has more actions to execute in ADB-SMC than in ABTTP. Also,
ADB-SMC has more containers and agents to run comparing to ABTTP, but since they are
distributed among several hosts, this minimizes the overall overhead.
In terms of execution time, we see ADBA in ADB-SMC has more decryption execution
time comparing to ADBA in ABTTP for several reasons. The ABTTP solution implemented
only one encryption layer. If RBAC was implemented, the decryption time in ABTTP will
increase. Furthermore, ADB-SMC uses ABE to protect its data. Hence the key-decryption
size for ABTTP is larger since in ABE the attributes that identify who can decrypt the data
is embedded as part of the secret key.
In terms of migration time, ADBA in ADB-SMC uses a protocol that provides fault
tolerance. This requires ADBA to carry its data, code, and state. There is a trade-off in
performance versus security. While ADBA in ABTTP is considered efficient since it is not
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required to take its code, data and state in a “one shot” transfer strategy, the fault tolerance
and the key share parallelism features in ADBA (ADB-SMC) make it more practical, and
visible to be used to protect against any threats.
We should also note that key shares in the key migration experiment were transmitted
from one machine, in practice, this should be performed by multiple machines relying on
the parallelism feature in the mobile agent. Thus, this shows a significant improvement in
migration time that the chart does not show.
Also, the experiment shows that the migration time grows exponentially after a certain
point, which says that the rapid increase in Memory and CPU affect the performance time
significantly.
Lessons learned from the experiments:
(i)

The use of the parallelism in ADB-SMC should significantly improve the
performance time, since as our observation highlighted that the execution
time increases exponentially after certain points. This indicates that CPU
and memory are important factors in protecting the efficiency of the
system,

(ii)

The migration time should not be considered as a weak factor that causes
the system to lose its performance. A good agent migration strategy can
give a significant improvement in the system overall efficiency since
migration can help in migrating agents from heavily loaded executed
environment to a lightly loaded one. This case applies to the cloud.

(iii)

The migration performance issue can be resolved by better system design.

(iv)

We can eliminate overhead in ADB-SMC using a proper distribution of its
components. For instance, in Figure 6.10 we observed at certain points
there was no significant difference between ABTTP and ADB-SMC, and
this because of the distribution of components that ADB-SMC offers to
guarantee good load balance compared to ABTTP.

181

Figure 6.13. ADB-SMC System Hosts Synchronized Time.

6.9.2.

Validity Threat

In spite of the fact that we have followed many procedures to perform absolute
measurements and to produce accurate results, and eliminate outliers, we list some issues
we observed that we think made a little impact on the final accuracy of the results. Please
note that listing these validity threats does not necessarily mean that our results are not
accurate. We strive to reach a good level of accuracy.


ABTTP is a centralized solution that does not require a distributed environment.
However, the solution components should not be simulated in a single machine. We
simulated the prototype of the ABTTP solution on a single machine following the
design presented in [BenO10]. However, we do not recommend implementing such
system in one machine to get an accurate result. If ABTTP components were
deployed using more computing resources, we would believe as a consequence
additional timing measurements like network latencies that are caused due to the
interaction of the ABTTP servers would be present.

182



There is insufficient information such as system configurations (CPU speed,
memory sizes, etc.), experimental setup, performance and overhead results
information presented in ABTTP [BenO10] solution. We re-implement the ABTTP
solution on our computing environment following the same system design, and the
cryptosystems algorithms presented in [BenO10].



ABTTP suggested two encryption layers. However, it implemented only one layer
that uses Data Encryption Standard (DES). Our concern is not that DES is slow, old,
or not secure, but accurate measurement comparisons between ABTTP and ADBSMC cannot be validated accurately when one encryption layer uses a suggested
role-based access control (RBAC) solution had not been implemented.



ABTTP uses IMTP/RMI as communication channels between agents interacting in
a single platform. ABTTP does support the capability to communicate with remote
platforms.

Regardless of the security issues of the ABTTP solution, we

recommended that ABTTP should be redesigned and redeployed on a small local
area network with a few machines, so accurate performance information can be
visible. We deployed a prototype of the ABTTP solution only in one machine
following the design of the solution author.


In our simulation, we run several iterations of ADB-SMC and took averages.
However, we observed a few outliers in the migration times. ADBA migrates from
the client agent Container to Container4-Host4, in which each component is located
on a different platform. We calculated the round trip migration times. However, we
observed a few negative numbers. We consulted the literature and found that
System.currentTimeMillis method returns different time accuracy on the
various operating systems. We tested System.nanoTime()

since it is

recommended by Bloch [Bloc08] as the method that should be used for timing
intervals

since

does

not

work

as

a

“wall

clock”

as

System.currentTimeMillis() does. However, System.nanoTime() still
returns negative values. We investigated the issue of distributed clocks drifting in
our small wireless area network (WLAN) which skewed the results of
System.currentTimeMillis(). Figure 6.13, shows five agents that we ran
on ADB-SMC, five hosts to display the synchronized time and demonstrate the time
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in milliseconds. We noticed that there is clock drifting ranging from 100
milliseconds to 4 seconds at time t. This drift is not steady and increases whenever
with consumption of the machine CPU and memory increases. We configured the
windows time service to synchronize with (Network Time Protocol) (NTP) in all
machines and observed that is not sufficient [KiIM02]. To deal with this issue, we
removed the few outliers that return negative numbers, repeated experiments, and
used

the

JADE

TickerBehaviour

to

implement

the

migration

action.

TickerBehaviour uses onTick which is a method that executes periodically with a
given period and used to introduce some delays. Our goal was to present a delay
during the round trip migration of ADBA from Host to the destination, and
destination back to the host to minimize and balance CPU and memory overheads
as it appeared as the primary factor that causes the clock synchronization problem.
The delay is not affecting the actual time of migration; it just slows the process of
migrating among hosts without counting the delayed time in the migration total time.


As stated in our assumption the differences in hardware should not give a great
impact on the simulation because entities constituting the system are agents
[BPLK06]. However, there seem to be some impacts due to the two VMs that share
resources from the other machines. We observed high consumption of CPU and
memory in the two VM comparing to the other hosts.



We performed some procedures like freeing the local network from any unnecessary
network traffic, by disconnecting our WLAN from the WAN network to deal with
any network performance restrictions( packet loss, bandwidth limitation, or high
latency) and to avoid any software update. We disconnected firewalls and antivirus
software to ease traffic between the system components and minimize system
overhead. It is still possible that there might be other hidden factors that might
slightly affect the firm accuracy of the result.



Overall, we performed several and various experiments to take more measurements
and ensure accuracy. We replicated the experiment to deal with many issues and to
minimize

the

measurement

error

that

is

introduced

by

long

System.currentTimeMillis() in Java and to minimize any possible impact
that might be present from the issue where a different JVM provides different
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precision information as the case with SUN SDK 1.4 on Windows 2000 [Cort05].

6.10. Chapter Conclusions
This chapter gave a prototype implementation of the ADB-SMC solution. It introduced
the solution tools, computing environment, implementation details, and simulation
scenarios. We presented four experiments that highlight the performance of the system.
The experiments examined the performance evaluation in ADB-SMC vs. ABTTP. The
first one compares the performance load in ADB-SMC vs. ABTTP. The second one
evaluated the execution time in both solutions. The third and fourth experiments measure
the migration time in both solutions, and the migration time in ADB-SMC solution versus
the size and number of key shares. Finally, we presented the results and the result
discussion.
We believe that the result for the overhead of our system is acceptable for the following
reasons: (i) The number and size of tasks that ADBA requires to perform in our system are
more than the actions in ABTTP. For instance, the ADBA encapsulation time is almost five
times the ABTTP encapsulation time. This is because ADB-SMC fully implemented the
encapsulation functionality that consists of three encryption layers, and it used longer and
secure key length compared to ABTTP which used short key length. (ii) ADBA in ADBSMC is more feasible, practical and provides additional important features to enhance
security compared to ABTTP. For instance, the fault tolerance property that ensures that
the system operates continuously even in the event of failure is supported via ADB-SMC
compared to ABTTP. This feature is found in ADB-SMC due to the mobility service that
ADBA in ADB-SMC used to migrate its payload. However, this important feature comes
with an acceptable downside in terms of performance due to the throughput, the bandwidth,
and latency that are considered as important performance measures which characterize
ADB-SMC. This is because it is deployed in WLAN compared to ABTTP that is deployed
on one single machine. (iii) The number of agents and number of containers in ADB-SMC
are more than three times the number of agents those found in ABTTP. This impose more
CPU and more memory overhead. (iv) The Clock synchronization problem causes some
performance issues in ADB-SMC compared to ABTTP. The physical clocks in ADB-SMC

185

platforms were not precisely synchronized, so there was no proper message ordering
between ADB-SMC agents.
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7.

CONCLUSIONS, EXPECTED IMPACTS AND
SIGNIFICANCE, AND FUTURE WORK
This chapter presents three subsections. It first presents the conclusion, then it

highlights the expected impact and significance, and finally it states the future work.

7.1.

Conclusions

We proposed a solution called ADB-SMC (which stands for active data bundles with
secure multiparty computation). The solution enhanced the previous solution known as
ABTTP. It protects sensitive data (including identities) in the cloud and other distributed
environments throughout their entire lifecycle.
Our proposed approach relies on decentralized solutions, independent of third parties
and trusted dealers. It is a secure multiparty-interaction solution that combines, among
others, the active data bundle (ADB) scheme, the secure multiparty computation (SMC),
threshold cryptography, and attribute-based encryption (ABE). It enhances an existing key
management algorithm to avoid any duplicate secret partial shares during the decryption
process. It uses time and location attributes to improve further and (secure) the decryption
process.
We provided a comprehensive analysis and design of the proposed solution using
Unified Modeling Language (UML) and Agent Modeling Language (AML). We
developed two prototypes: one to implement and validate the enhanced solution, the other
to re-implement ABTTP to measure performance. We demonstrated that our approach is
secure, robust and efficient,22 and balances security and performance requirements well.
We used Agent.GUI to record load measurements on both prototypes. We conducted
four experiments that compare the performance of ADB-SMC with ABTTP
Comparing to previous solutions that used ADBA to protect sensitive data, this
dissertation has the following contributions:

22

Efficiency results from exploiting parallelism.
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•

Uses cascade encryption to structure ADBA to enhance security.

•

Uses a fully decentralized solution that does not rely on TTPs or a trusted dealer.

•

Protects against data loss by using secure backup copies of ADBA.

•

Implements two kinds of policies: data Privacy policy, and dissemination policy.

•

Supports secure fine-grained access control for ADBA data.

•

Implements the location and time attributes to enhance security.

•

Uses IPMS to improve security and support fault tolerance.

•

Presents two solutions: one to protect sensitive data, and the other to protect
identities in the cloud throughout their entire lifecycle.

Expected Impact and Significance.

7.2.

We believe that our solution has a high impact on protecting security and privacy in
the cloud and many other distributed systems such as grid computing, banking systems,
health care systems, sensor networks, mobile computing, and ubiquitous computing.
In more detail, the impact should be visible for any application that has any of the
following needs:
1)

Full protection of privacy of sensitive data throughout their entire lifecycle.

2)

Comprehensive protection of privacy of sensitive output data on untrusted hosts.

3)

Strong data security in the cloud and other distributed computing systems.

4)

Strong IDM security in the cloud and other distributed computing systems.

5)

Support for authentication with encrypted credentials.

6)

Support for revocation of credentials.

7)

Support for the minimum disclosure property for authentication.

8)

Minimal authentication overhead (including single sign-on).

9)

Support for delegation and revocation of access rights.

10) Fault tolerance including avoiding centralized TTPs.
11) Efficiency (due to using parallelism).
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We strongly believe that our research is significant for privacy and security researchers
and practitioners. It aims to provide a solution that minimizes the risk of theft as well as
accidental leakage of data, which jeopardize the nation’s security, business assets and
intellectual property, and an individual’s sensitive data and their right to privacy.

7.3.

Future Work

The future work for improving ADBA mechanism and ADB-SMC solution are as
follows:
1) We plan to improve the performance of ADBA by eliminating one encryption layer.
Current ADBA consists of three primary encryption layers. The third encryption
layer protects the BHT server ID, RTTlow, and RTThigh. The purpose of Layer three
encryption was to exploit the autonomy of ADBA, so ADBA can decide on its own
to migrate to different hosts when one host in the cloud is endangered. However,
we believe in such a situation ADBA will migrate to the backup server and then it
should be directed to an alternative host that has a very high trust level.
2) We plan to modify the current trust management subsystem mechanism. The
current trust mechanism requires ADBA to request a trust value for the target host
(host ADBA want to visit) and compares it with the user RTT values. The
improvement that we suggest for the trust management subsystem requires sending
an inquiry for a required threshold trust (RTT) value of the target hosts to the trust
level agent (TLA). Then, TLA sends a score based on the RTT values we sent, and
then we can determine based on the sent value, RTTlow, and RTThigh. For example,
assume we define five to be RTTlow, and ten to be RTThigh. We send to the TLA value
five as an RTT inquiry for host x. If TLA replies that the target host trust level less
than five, we know that it is low; if it sends it between five and ten we are aware
the trust level value is sufficiently low; if it sends a value that is ten or more we are
aware the target host is sufficiently high. The improved subsystem should transfer
the CPU cycles for comparing multiple hosts with RTT values on the cloud BHT
platform. It should improve the performance of ADB-SMC in two ways. First, it

189

justifies eliminating the current ADBA Layer three encryption. Second, assuming
ADBA will always need to ask for a trust level for a large number of target hosts, it
also should help in eliminating overhead from the client and transfer the
computation power to more powerful cloud servers.
3) The current ADB-SMC relies on a cascade encryption that consists of three
encryption algorithms where the output of one encryption system is the input of the
other. We plan to provide a security and performance assessment that compares the
current approach with an approach that uses only one crypto subsystem that consists
of D-CP-ABE.
The new approach should not change the structure of ADBA that requires
encryption on three levels. However, the generation and management of the system
key shares via key share authorities will be performed using one cryptosystem: DCP-ABE. In other words, Layer one encryption will be generated using key shares
created from D-CP-ABE. Layer two encryption will be made using other key shares
managed by other key share authorities and produced via D-CP-ABE. Layer three
encryption will be made using key shares managed by different key shares
authorities using the same cryptosystem that encrypted Layer one and layer two
encryption.
4) Our current approach includes a security feature that increases the protection level
on the data owner data if requested. The procedure requires a data owner to send a
security code to KAA which should describe the security level needed for the data.
We plan to categorize the key shares authority servers that are managed through
KAA to multiple levels. One level can use high-security procedures compared to
another level. For instance, using longer key size than others.
5) There is a possible impact of low entropy in some of the multiparty servers when
generating threshold cryptography’s keys. The goal would be to propose a solution
that avoids generating keys from servers that have low entropy. For example,
systems recently restarted due to software update might have low entropy.
6) Obfuscation was outside the scope of our research; we presented a simple
mechanism, and we plan to introduce an effective obfuscation mechanism that
protects the ADBA VM. The goal to present a mechanism that should hide the VM
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functionality with techniques such as garbled circuits. We also plan to propose an
obfuscation mechanism for the ADB’s virtual machine code using periodic
functions.
7) Assuming ADBA at one point will be fully encrypted, we plan to benefit from
deterministic encryption in securing ADB-SMC. Deterministic encryption allows
queries over encrypted records. For instance, ADBA can be stored on the backup
server in a fully encrypted way and can be queried without decryption using
deterministic encryption. The advantages of deterministic encryption for storing a
backup ADBA copy will be utilized in the current intelligent backup ADBA service,
which calls a backup ADBA copy dynamically when the ADBA is damaged or
destroyed.
Overall, ADB-SMC solution provides a significant effect on protecting sensitive data
and identities in the cloud. The ADBA multi-layering enhanced structure maximizes its
protection levels and makes it difficult to compromise its payload of data and metadata.
The solution can minimize the impact of data breaches in the cloud and can be used as an
excellent tool for an early detection of any data breach since its auditing reporting
mechanism can be serviced as an alert to any occurrence of data evaporation or destruction.
It is key management approach is highly secured, and its features in protecting data and
identities in the cloud make it a fully comprehensive solution to protect data and identities
in the cloud.
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